The European Union has observed a stark decline in institutional trust, with 74.5% of citizens lacking confidence in their institutions and 64% in international ones (Mingo and Faggiano, 2020, p. 825). This coincides with an increase in negative attitudes toward migrants. Many researchers have theorized that the rise in migration aversion is linked to an increase in institutional distrust. Therefore, as the European Union and the United Nations increase their roles in migration governance, it is important to determine whether trust in these international bodies affects public opinion more than trust in national governments. To discern which policy design is most effective and will bring about more success.
In addition, institutional trust is especially critical in times of democratic backsliding, which is characterised by the gradual decline in the quality of democracy within a country. For instance, when public trust in national institutions declines, international actors can act as normative anchors or be portrayed as scapegoats in nationalist narratives. This dynamic is particularly relevant in migration discourse, where the perceived legitimacy and competence of institutions often determine how policies are received. Additionally, we are currently in a period of mass polarisation, which hinders the natural political ecosystem and promotes securitisation narratives (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998, p. 20). This political phenomenon is amplified by media narratives that frame migrants as threats. This stresses the importance of considering media in the analysis of this report. Furthermore, understanding which source of institutional trust shapes the most public perceptions of migrants offers valuable insight into how to build social cohesion and resilience against divisive rhetoric.
This report explores this research question: To what extent does institutional trust in international bodies or their governments shape the perceptions citizens have of migrants? To answer this research question I used these following three hypotheses: (1) trust in international institutions is expected to shape migrant attitudes more strongly in countries with low levels of national institutional trust; (2) in contexts of high international trust, the impact of political ideology on migrant attitudes is expected to weaken, suggesting that international institutions can moderate ideologically driven perceptions; (3) high trust in international institutions is expected to mitigate the negative impact of frequent media consumption on migrant attitudes, particularly in contexts where media portrayals are polarised or hostile.
In the first portion of the report, I will support the research angle through an extensive literature review addressing the historical components that shape migrant integration and the crucial role of media. Lastly, I will study the methodology of this study and perform a statistical analysis.
I. Context and History: Determinants of Trust
Institutional trust carries a heavy historical legacy that shapes the current reality we face today, hindering our ability to address the larger social issues at hand, such as migration. For instance, southern European Member States, such as Spain, Greece, and Italy, have long struggled with legacies of bureaucratic opacity, politicised state structures, and recurring corruption scandals, making them fertile ground for institutional distrust. As Torcal (2017) notes, these countries entered the Great Recession already positioned at the lower end of the European trust spectrum. The crisis merely deepened these divides, as austerity measures and democratic unresponsiveness sharpened public perceptions of institutional failure. Therefore, trust became not only a reflection of democratic performance but also a proxy for lived experiences of mismanagement and exclusion. Additionally, Obydenkova and Arpino (2018) further confirm this shift, whilst corruption had a relatively muted or even paradoxically positive relationship with trust in EU institutions before the crisis, the post-2008 period displayed a stark erosion of both national and supranational credibility. Their statistical analysis shows that the impact of corruption on national trust became significantly stronger. This meant that the crisis served as a catalyst for citizens reassessment of institutional legitimacy.
Moreover, researchers such as Macdonald and Cornacchione (2023) demonstrate the relevance of institutional trust within migration governance. In their research, they highlighted the intersectionality of political trust (e.g national parliaments, parties, and politicians) and how this factor relates to more positive views of immigration and support for refugee policies. It also underscores the risks of the absence of this form of trust, as it often is in Southern Europe, where migration is more likely to be framed through threat perceptions and zero-sum logic. In other words, institutional trust acts as a buffer against fear-based narratives. Therefore, the historical and political context in Southern Europe not only highlights the differences it holds among other member states but also reinforces the need to investigate how such trust or its absence, shapes migration attitudes across European Member States.
II. Citizens Shaping Integration
Society and the individuals who construct it play a crucial role in shaping the success or failure of integration policies. While much of the literature on migration governance focuses on institutional capacity, recent work emphasises that citizen engagement, filtered through political trust and social narratives, is key to good governance. For example, Bonjour and Chauvin (2018) argue that integration policies are never neutral. They are embedded in broader classed, racialised, and gendered frameworks that shape both public understanding and policy legitimacy. Their work highlights how states construct categories of “deserving” and “undeserving” migrants using proxies such as merit, language proficiency, and employability. This last criteria often masks more profound inequalities rooted in class and ethnicity, as highlighted by this research. This framing is constructed both by society and its institutions. It inadvertently impacts the process of social cohesion and integration policies. Although Bonjour and Chauvin do not explicitly focus on institutional trust, their insights are deeply relevant. They demonstrate the dangers of institutions influence in emphasising conditional belonging and performance-based rights. Therefore, public support for inclusive migration policies may wane, especially in contexts of low institutional trust. Conversely, where institutions foster narratives of universal rights and civic inclusion, citizens may be more open to integration efforts. Lastly, they conclude that public attitudes are not formed in isolation; they are shaped by institutionalised discourses that classify, value, and legitimise the presence of migrants. Hence, it is crucial to understand the connection between institutional trust and attitudes toward migration, as citizens respond not only to what institutions do but also to how they frame their actions. In turn, this framing highlights the importance of both societal and institutional dialogues when constructing migration policies.
III. Media & Political Affiliation
Social media, radio, television, and the internet play a significant role in shaping public attitudes toward immigration, especially when intertwined with political affiliation and institutional trust. Although political ideology often serves as a dominant predictor of anti-immigration sentiment, media exposure has the power to amplify or buffer these ideological effects. Štětka, Mihelj, and Tóth (2021) analyse this dynamic within the context of the Czech Republic, where anti-immigrant sentiment remains high despite a relatively low presence of migrants. Their study investigates how diverse media and the consumption of migration-related news influence both public attitudes and support for populist parties. The authors find that consuming a limited range of commercial and tabloid media correlates with stronger anti-immigration views and higher populist support. Conversely, exposure to a more diverse set of news sources, including public service broadcasting, has a mitigating effect. However, if the national news predominantly leans toward one political affinity, even consuming more news does not seem to dissipate aversive attitudes. Their findings highlight that the type and diversity of media consumption are just as important as content in shaping political behaviour. Moreover, media in general has become an echo chamber, dominating fear-based narratives and contributing to the erosion of public trust in institutions. These factors entrench exclusionary views within society. The paper highlights that exposure to pluralistic, balanced information environments can foster more critical engagement and openness. Štětka et al.’s work therefore expands the traditional understanding of political trust and ideology by illustrating how media ecosystems mediate and sometimes override ideological priors. This is critical given the implications it may have for migration governance. When trust in institutions is low and media environments are polarised, citizens are more likely to perceive migration as a threat. Thus, there is a need for institutional narratives supported by diverse and reliable media. This reinforces the importance of examining media consumption not in isolation, but in relation to trust and political ideology.
This study was conducted through a quantitative, cross-sectional research design to investigate how institutional trust in national and international institutions influences public attitudes toward migrants in European Union (EU) member states. Specifically, it examines whether citizens’ perceptions of migrants are shaped more significantly by trust in international institutions such as the European Union and the United Nations, or by trust in their own national governments. This analysis also tests whether institutional trust can buffer the effects of political ideology and media consumption on these attitudes. The aim is to illuminate the channels through which public support for inclusive migration policy may be fostered, particularly in a time of political polarisation and institutional skepticism.
The primary data source is the European Social Survey (ESS) round 11 from 2023, selected for its robust, harmonised cross-national methodology and for its inclusion of multiple items measuring institutional trust, media use, political ideology, and opinions on migration. Six countries were included in this analysis: Spain, Italy, Greece, France, Germany, and Belgium. These countries were selected because of the spectrum of historical and contemporary levels of institutional trust and integration challenges they represent. This allows for a comparative study to evaluate the differences between Northern and Southern Europe. The selected cases also reflect the geographic and political diversity of EU member states, which allows for more meaningful cross-country comparison.
Moreover, the dependent variable, migrant attitudes, is operationalised as a composite index using three ESS items that ask respondents to evaluate whether migrants are good or bad for the economy, whether they enrich or undermine the country’s cultural life, and whether they make the country a better or worse place to live. These items were recoded and standardised so that higher scores reflect more positive perceptions of migrants. The three items were averaged to create a single continuous measure of public attitudes toward migrants. This approach captures both economic and sociocultural dimensions of perceived migrant impact and provides a nuanced indicator of broader public sentiment. To evaluate the reliability of this index, we conducted additional models treating each of the three items as separate dependent variables. The direction and significance of the main predictors remained consistent across these models, which confirms the reliability of the composite measure.
The two main independent variables are national institutional trust and international institutional trust. The former is measured by aggregating trust in the national parliament (trstprl), the legal system (trstlgl), and political parties (trstprt). Each item was standardised before inclusion, and the resulting composite reflects overall trust in domestic state institutions. The first one, which is international institutional trust, was measured by combining trust in the European Parliament (trstep) and trust in the United Nations (trstun), following the same standardisation process. The rationale for distinguishing between national and international trust lies in the different roles these institutions play in shaping migration discourse and policy. While national governments handle migration enforcement and integration programs, international institutions often establish norms, funding guidelines, and human rights standards that shape these policies.
To explore how trust shapes public attitudes toward migrants, I conducted a series of linear regression models using European Social Survey data from six EU countries. The key variables included trust in national and international institutions, political ideology (measured by self-placement on the left–right scale), media consumption frequency, and basic demographics (e.g age, gender, and education). Country-level controls were added to account for national variation. All variables were standardised where appropriate for easier interpretation. The main analysis tested whether trust in institutions directly influences attitudes toward migrants and whether this trust also moderates the effects of ideology and media exposure. I investigated whether individuals who had a higher level of trust in their national governments or in international organisations like the EU and UN were more likely to hold inclusive views on migration, even among those who consumed more media or leaned politically to the right. Each model included the same controls and followed the same structure to ensure comparability.
This methodological framework enables a rigorous yet policy-relevant examination of how institutional trust, both national and international, influences public attitudes toward migrants. It provides the empirical foundation for assessing how EU-level policy messaging, trust-building measures, and communication strategies influence social cohesion and inclusion across member states.
Data Analysis
To test the relationship between institutional trust and public attitudes toward migrants, a series of linear regression models were conducted in this part using European Social Survey (ESS) data. The analysis encompasses six EU countries and examines the impact of trust in national versus international institutions, with a focus on how these factors interact with political ideology and media consumption. Migrant attitudes were measured using a composite index of economic, cultural, and societal perceptions citizens have of them. Control variables include age, education, gender, media use, and political orientation. Additionally, the results are presented in three stages: first, the main effects, then the interaction terms, and finally, the disaggregated trust sources.
Table 1. Main Effects: International vs National Institutional Trust
DV: Migrant Attitudes (higher = more positive)
Reference country = Belgium.
Unstandardized OLS coefficients; robust significance codes from model output.
Predictor
Model 1: International Trust
SE
p
Model 2: National Trust
SE
p
(Intercept)
3.628
0.392
***
3.005
0.390
***
Trust – International
0.081
0.0047
***
—
—
—
Trust – National
—
—
—
0.243
0.0099
***
Left–Right Ideology (lrscale ↑=right)
0.041
0.0029
***
0.038
0.0029
***
Age (years)
0.0026
0.0011
*
0.0031
0.0011
**
Education (years)
0.091
0.0167
***
0.067
0.0164
***
Gender (1=female)
0.462
0.145
**
0.551
0.143
***
Media Use (freq)
0.0011
0.00019
***
0.0011
0.00018
***
Germany
-0.095
0.269
ns
-0.102
0.266
ns
Spain
0.510
0.285
.
0.870
0.282
**
France
-0.015
0.288
ns
0.251
0.285
ns
Greece
-1.635
0.264
***
-1.237
0.262
***
Italy
-0.223
0.266
ns
-0.095
0.263
ns
Model Fit
R-squared
0.057
0.078
Adj. R-squared
0.056
0.077
Residual Std. Error
8.326
8.234
N (df residual)
13,239
13,239
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p
Table 1 compares the impact of international versus national institutional trust on public attitudes toward migrants. Both models confirm that institutional trust plays a statistically significant and positive role in shaping these attitudes. However, the effect of national trust (β = 0.243, p
In addition, political ideology remains a strong and consistent factor in both models: individuals who place themselves further to the political right express significantly less favourable views toward migrants. Education and media use are also positively associated with pro-migrant attitudes, suggesting that exposure to information and civic knowledge enhances openness. Gender emerges as a relevant factor; specifically, women, on average, hold more inclusive views than men. Older individuals also tend to be slightly more supportive, though the effect is modest.
Country-level effects reveal notable variation. Spain stands out with significantly more favourable migrant attitudes (p
Table 2. Interaction with Political Ideology
DV: Migrant Attitudes (higher = more positive)
Reference country = Belgium.
Unstandardized OLS coefficients; robust significance codes from model output.
Predictor
Model 3A: Int’l Trust × Ideology
SE
p
Model 3B: Nat’l Trust × Ideology
SE
p
(Intercept)
3.956
0.393
***
3.264
0.394
***
Trust – International
0.044
0.0061
***
—
—
—
Trust – National
—
—
—
0.193
0.0157
***
Left–Right Ideology
0.026
0.0033
***
0.032
0.0033
***
Age
0.0025
0.0011
*
0.0031
0.0011
**
Education
0.088
0.0166
***
0.067
0.0164
***
Gender
0.465
0.145
**
0.560
0.143
***
Media Use
0.0010
0.00019
***
0.0011
0.00018
***
Germany
-0.119
0.268
ns
-0.092
0.266
ns
Spain
0.567
0.285
*
0.846
0.282
**
France
0.005
0.287
ns
0.245
0.285
ns
Greece
-1.592
0.264
***
-1.264
0.262
***
Italy
-0.146
0.265
ns
-0.099
0.263
ns
Interaction
Int’l Trust × Ideology
0.00112
***
Nat’l Trust × Ideology
0.00024
***
Model Fit
R-squared
0.063
0.079
Adj. R-squared
0.063
0.078
Residual Std. Error
8.299
8.229
N (df residual)
13,238
13,238
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p
Table 2 examines whether institutional trust at the international or national levels buffers the effect of political ideology on migrant attitudes. Both interaction models yield highly significant results, confirming that trust moderates ideological polarisation. In Model 3A, the interaction between international trust and right-wing ideology (β = 0.00112, p
Moreover, Model 3B shows a similar, though slightly smaller, buffering effect for national institutional trust (β = 0.00024, p
Across both models, political ideology remains a powerful individual-level predictor (β ≈ 0.026–0.032, p
Control variables follow consistent trends: education, media use, and gender (coded as 1 = female) are all positively associated with pro-migrant views. Spain again emerges as significantly more inclusive, while Greece continues to show entrenched negativity. Notably, Model 3B (national trust × ideology) achieves the strongest model fit thus far (Adj. R² = 0.078), suggesting that domestic trust not only drives baseline attitudes but also reduces the impact of ideological extremes.
Table 3. Interaction with Media Use
DV: Migrant Attitudes (higher = more positive)
Reference country = Belgium.
Unstandardized OLS coefficients; robust significance codes from model output.
Predictor
Int’l Trust × Media
SE
p
Nat’l Trust × Media
SE
p
(Intercept)
3.697
0.392
***
3.088
0.389
***
Trust – International
0.077
0.0048
***
—
—
—
Trust – National
—
—
—
0.225
0.0102
***
Media Use
0.00059
0.00022
**
0.00030
0.00021
ns
Age
0.0026
0.0011
*
0.0031
0.0011
**
Education
0.089
0.0167
***
0.069
0.0164
***
Gender
0.461
0.145
**
0.557
0.143
***
Ideology (lrscale)
0.040
0.0029
***
0.038
0.0029
***
Germany
-0.065
0.269
ns
-0.074
0.266
ns
Spain
0.524
0.285
.
0.866
0.281
**
France
0.002
0.288
ns
0.253
0.284
ns
Greece
-1.630
0.264
***
-1.251
0.262
***
Italy
-0.220
0.266
ns
-0.093
0.262
ns
Interaction
Int’l Trust × Media
0.000027
***
Nat’l Trust × Media
0.000084
***
Model Fit
R-squared
0.058
0.082
Adj. R-squared
0.058
0.081
Residual Std. Error
8.321
8.217
N (df residual)
13,238
13,238
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p
Table 3 evaluates whether trust in institutions conditions the effect of political media consumption on migrant attitudes. The results show that institutional trust, especially national in fact significantly amplifies the positive impact of media engagement on public perceptions of migrants.
In Model 4A, both trust in international institutions (β = 0.077, p p Int’l Trust × Media) is also significant (β = 0.000027, p
Model 4B shows an even stronger interaction between national trust and media use (β = 0.000084, p p = 0.15). This implies that in the absence of institutional trust, media exposure has little or no effect, but among those who trust their national institutions, media becomes a constructive vector for inclusive attitudes. Control variables remain consistent: education, gender (female-coded), and left-leaning ideology are all positively associated with pro-migrant views, while Greece again shows significantly lower acceptance than the reference country, Belgium. Spain continues to stand out for its pro-migrant orientation (p
While the increase in model fit is modest, Model 4B (Nat’l Trust × Media) yields the highest adjusted R² thus far (0.081), reinforcing the conclusion that domestic institutions, when trusted can act as gatekeepers of public discourse. They shape not only baseline attitudes but also how individuals process information in a saturated media environment. These findings are especially relevant in contexts where disinformation and polarisation are on the rise.
Table 4. Disaggregating International Trust: UN vs EU Parliament
DV: Migrant Attitudes (higher = more positive)
Reference country = Belgium
Unstandardized OLS coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses
Predictor
Estimate
Std. Error
p-value
(Intercept)
3.628
0.392
***
Trust – UN
0.038
0.0047
***
Trust – European Parl.
0.043
0.0054
***
Left–Right Ideology
0.041
0.0029
***
Age (years)
0.0026
0.0011
*
Education (years)
0.09
0.0167
***
Gender (1=female?)
0.463
0.145
**
Media Use (freq)
0.0011
0.00019
***
Germany
-0.096
0.269
ns
Spain
0.506
0.286
.
France
-0.016
0.288
ns
Greece
-1.634
0.264
***
Italy
-0.225
0.266
ns
Model Fit:
R²
0.057
Adj. R²
0.056
N
13239
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p
Table 4 disaggregates the composite international trust measure into its two components. The first investigates trust in the United Nations and the second one observes trust in the European Parliament, to assess their distinct contributions to migrant attitudes. Both are statistically significant and positively associated with more favourable views, even when entered into the model simultaneously.
Trust in the European Parliament (β = 0.043, p
Moreover, all covariates behave as expected: political ideology remains a strong negative predictor (β = 0.041, p
The model’s overall explanatory power (Adjusted R² = 0.056) remains modest but meaningful, reinforcing that while international trust contributes to shaping public sentiment, its effects are nuanced and contingent on institutional proximity and perceived legitimacy. The slightly stronger role of EU trust further supports the idea that supranational institutions with tangible governance functions are more significant than global actors such as the UN.
The aim of this report was to explore whether trust in international institutions, such as the European Union and the United Nations, matters more than trust in national governments in shaping public attitudes toward migrants in Europe. Based on recent European Social Survey data across six EU member states, the analysis reveals a compelling narrative from 2023. Institutional trust is significant whether it be internationally or locally, but national trust emerges as the most significant factor. This finding is visible across models: national institutional trust consistently predicted more positive migrant attitudes, with an effect nearly three times greater than that of international trust. Even though individuals who trust institutions such as the EU and UN tend to express more inclusive views, their aversion toward migrants decreases further when they also trust domestic bodies such as national parliaments, courts, and political parties. These findings suggest that strengthening national institutional legitimacy is vital not only for democratic resilience but also for promoting social cohesion in the context of migration. It must be prefaced that this should not dismiss the real impact exerted by international institutions, since they also play a significant role. When citizens trust the EU or UN, the link between conservative ideology and anti-migrant sentiment becomes weaker. Similarly, media use is more likely to foster inclusive attitudes when individuals trust international institutions.
In short, these effects underscore the capacity of global and regional organisations to serve as stabilising influences in politically polarised or fragmented information environments. Nonetheless, national institutions appear to be even more effective in bridging ideological divides. Media exposure shows limited impact unless accompanied by high institutional trust. Therefore, this finding emphasizes the importance of both the source of information and the underlying trust citizens place in their institutions when forming opinions about migration.
Moreover, country-level patterns support this conclusion. For instance, Spain, where civic participation and transparency efforts have recently advanced, shows higher levels of migrant acceptance. In contrast, Greece, which continues to struggle with economic instability and public distrust, exhibits more negative sentiment. These findings reflect how institutional history and socio-political context continue to shape both trust and social attitudes.These insights point to a clear path forward. We must promote inclusive migration policies to rebuild institutional trust through participatory governance, open communication, and genuine responsiveness to citizens. At the same time, international institutions such as the EU and UN have a unique responsibility to reinforce shared values, encourage cooperation, and support national efforts to restore trust. Lastly, rather than viewing national and international institutions as separate or competing forces, they should continue to be seen as working together toward a sustainable form of governance. Ensuring this would enable human dignity, social inclusion, and further peace-building.
References:
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