The United States maintains an extremely difficult and dangerous diplomatic relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) , which stands as one of the main unresolved security problems of the twenty-first century. This adversarial relationship persists as a dangerous combination of deep mistrust and ongoing technical warfare and nuclear proliferation risks, which create a prolonged security impact on both regional and global areas.

The Korean War produced a lasting consequence of no official diplomatic relations between America and North Korea, despite various attempts at communication and mutual interest in maintaining stability. The persistent estrangement stems from North Korea’s advancing nuclear programs, together with Washington’s absolute requirement for total denuclearisation, which creates critical difficulties that need a fundamental assessment of future normalisation approaches.

This complex antagonism developed its roots from the post-World War II division of Korea into two parts. When Japan surrendered to the Allies, Korea became divided into two opposing states, where the Soviet Union supported the DPRK in the North and the United States supported the ROK in the South. The geopolitical disagreement between the two nations broke out into a devastating proxy war during the Korean War, which took place from 1950 to 1953. The armistice agreement stopped fighting between parties, but no peace treaty was ever finalised, so the U.S. and North Korea, along with the two Koreas, continue in a state of technical warfare. The unresolved conflict strengthened Pyongyang’s perception of existential threat alongside ideological opposition through years of economic embargo from the United States starting in 1950 and various Cold War-era incidents like the Pueblo incident and multiple spy plane confrontations. During this time, North Korea developed its Juche ideology of independence, which deepened its isolation while increasing its wariness of external powers.

The Soviet Union’s collapse during the early 1990s created a short window for diplomatic engagement that ultimately failed. The Agreed Framework of 1994 functioned as an agreement that required North Korea to freeze its plutonium program in return for light-water reactors, together with diplomatic relationship improvements. The program failed when North Korea pursued uranium enrichment activities in secret, and both sides disagreed about implementation methods. The Six-Party Talks (2003-2009) provided China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the U.S. with a multilateral forum to resolve the nuclear dispute, but these discussions failed because of North Korea’s aggressive actions and ongoing verification disagreements. The two nations have engaged in periodic minimal diplomatic exchanges alongside humanitarian assistance, which demonstrates their sporadic interest in tension management even without official diplomatic relations.

North Korea has made nuclear and ballistic missile development its primary characteristic throughout the period starting in 2006. North Korea started its atomic testing program with its initial test in 2006, then proceeded to conduct additional tests while advancing its nuclear warhead development and creating multiple ballistic missile systems that now reach intercontinental ranges to strike the U.S. mainland. The international sanctions have increased as North Korea continues to develop its nuclear arsenal because it sees this capability as essential for protecting its regime. According to satellite imagery and IAEA reports, the nuclear infrastructure at Yongbyon has expanded, which would produce 70 to 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium annually, sufficient for five to ten new warheads each year. North Korea has conducted missile drills that simulate nuclear counterstrikes because it links these exercises to U.S. and South Korean military actions. North Korea has officially declared itself a nuclear weapons state through domestic legislation while fiercely resisting international efforts to deny its nuclear status.

The historical development between the two nations , along with their ongoing nuclear competition, has resulted in the nonexistence of official diplomatic relations. The United States operates without an embassy in Pyongyang , but North Korea maintains a permanent mission at the United Nations in New York, which serves as its diplomatic channel to the world. Neutral intermediaries such as the Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang serve as indirect communication channels between countries through their role as protecting powers.

High-level meetings between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un in 2018-2019 represented sporadic diplomatic attempts, but these summits ended without successful outcomes because both sides disagreed fundamentally about how to order denuclearisation steps and sanctions relief measures. In July 2025, Kim Yo Jong declared that the personal bond between Kim and Trump did not constitute a “bad” relationship , yet any attempt to use it for denuclearisation purposes would be considered “nothing but a mockery” because “the year 2025 is neither 2018 nor 2019”, thus establishing an unyielding nuclear status for North Korea.

Multiple critical issues obstruct the establishment of diplomatic relations. The mutual distrust runs deep between the two nations because of unresolved historical conflicts, together with broken promises from previous agreements. Both parties face an infinite loop where Washington insists on verifiable, complete, irreversible denuclearisation (CVID) before offering normalisation and security guarantees , and Pyongyang requires security guarantees and sanctions relief before making meaningful denuclearisation moves. The possession of nuclear weapons remains essential for North Korea because they protect the country from hostile U.S. policies and potential regime overthrow, as the regime observes what happens to non-nuclear states under military pressure during the mid-2025 period.

The diplomatic situation remains unresolved because of extensive US and UN sanctions, which were established to block North Korea’s military development programs. North Korea successfully evades international sanctions because it has developed strong connections with Russia and China. The ongoing Ukraine conflict has intensified Russia’s requirement for military supplies, thus leading North Korea to obtain substantial economic benefits as well as diplomatic backing and possible military technology exchanges in return for weapon supplies as of mid-2025. The emerging alliance of sanctioned nations strengthens North Korea’s position while minimising its willingness to accept US-imposed diplomatic terms since the country no longer faces the same degree of international isolation. The opposition from Russia and China inside the UN Security Council makes it difficult to implement stronger sanctions, which diminishes the effectiveness of pressure as a primary diplomatic instrument.

The political situations within both nations create additional obstacles to their diplomatic relationships. The United States maintains bipartisan support for denuclearisation goals , yet foreign policy approaches differ between parties , and presidential elections introduce foreign policy volatility. The North Korean regime bases its foreign policy decisions on domestic factors, including leadership stability and state propaganda control , as well as succession plans, since any concession could threaten its internal legitimacy.

The regional environment creates additional obstacles for both nations. South Korea operates between maintaining strong defence measures and diplomatic approaches through its statements, which demonstrate a desire for peace yet strong backing for its alliance with the United States. The economic power China holds over North Korea remains strong, yet Beijing maintains regional stability above all else while using North Korea as a defensive shield. The North Korean missile tests that cross into Japanese territorial waters create increased security concerns in Japan, which strengthens its alliances with South Korea and the United States.

The formation of any diplomatic relation, including partial normalisation, is essential to managing tensions because these relations prevent potential conflicts. The way to rebuild trust should begin with confidence-building measures (CBMs). The two nations can start with a joint declaration to end the Korean War , which North Korea has requested for years to establish dialogue. Medical relief and disaster aid programs , together with controlled people-to-people exchanges that include cultural events and academic exchanges, and sports programs, can establish minimal relationships. The development of military-to-military contact channels allows for crisis defusing and prevents incorrect assessments.

A progressive method of nuclear disarmament alongside normalisation represents a common proposal. The first steps must be reciprocal because North Korea will need to freeze its nuclear and missile development in exchange for limited sanctions reductions. Liaison offices between nations should come first as a stepping stone to create full embassies that enable better communication and improved understanding. The path toward Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Denuclearisation (CVID) would link to specific U.S. security guarantees and economic advantages to create a structured process for advancement. Due to its existing nuclear capabilities, some analysts propose starting with talks about arms control and limitations instead of seeking immediate full denuclearisation.

The revitalisation of multilateral diplomatic formats , including the Six-Party Talks, along with new regional mechanisms, will serve to maintain international coordination. The United States requires permanent South Korean and Japanese coordination because it needs their diplomatic support to achieve unified international diplomatic effectiveness. A fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy direction becomes essential at this point. The approach should shift away from demanding denuclearisation first to finding stable coexistence or risk reduction as the primary focus. The short-term acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power should accompany the continued pursuit of denuclearisation goals. The United States needs to present real temporary benefits which focus on North Korean security and economic issues instead of depending solely on punishment-based measures.

The United States and North Korea maintain no formal diplomatic relations because of the ongoing Korean War issues, combined with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Several significant obstacles, including deep mutual distrust and North Korea’s firm stance on its nuclear weapons and the limitations of sanctions and domestic constraints, and evolving alliances, make it difficult to establish diplomatic relations. The need to achieve stability in the Korean Peninsula and Indo-Pacific region requires moving beyond the existing diplomatic situation.

The path toward future engagement requires sustained patience because it needs both imaginative and step-by-step diplomatic approaches. The critical relationship between the United States and North Korea requires a practical solution that uses building confidence measures and stepwise denuclearisation agreements with corresponding rewards, while developing multilateral partnerships and shifting U.S. policies to match current realities, while preserving long-term targets to avoid catastrophic conflict. The requirement for continued strategic diplomatic efforts endures even though establishing normalised relations will take a long time.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

References

Cronin, P. M. (2025). Prospects for Renewed US–North Korea Diplomacy: Stability, Realism, and Strategic Clarity. George Washington University Institute for Korean Studies.

Wit, J. S. (2025, May 16). Recalibrating US Strategy on North Korea. Stimson Center

Aum, F., & Panda, A. (2025, May 6). Pursuing Stable Coexistence: A Reorientation of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace