The Druze have found themselves in the spotlight repeatedly since the October 7th massacre, for tragic reasons – the Israeli Druze community has lost a proportionally large number of soldiers in the IDF, a Hezbollah rocket killed 11 Druze children in Majdal Shams, Druze communities were damaged or displaced during Operation Northern Arrows, and the new Syrian government has attacked Syrian Druze repeatedly since the fall of the Assad regime.

Throughout all of this, Israel’s leaders have made rapidly and unambiguously clear that the Israeli and even the Syrian Druze are entitled to Israel’s protection, and have gone to significant lengths to help the Druze in any way possible. Israeli cities and public figures have made repeated declarations of solidarity with the Druze, and civilians have worked to help them in any way possible. Who are the Druze, and why is Israel so determined to protect them?

A Distinctive Faith, A Distinctive People

The Druze are a unique religious and ethnic minority indigenous to the Levant, numbering around one million people globally. Concentrated in Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, with smaller diaspora communities in Jordan and beyond, the Druze have maintained a tightly knit society defined by loyalty to their own faith, discretion in theological matters, and a historically pragmatic approach to political alliances.

Originating in the 11th century as an offshoot of Isma’ili Shi’a Islam, the Druze faith quickly diverged, forming a monotheistic religion that incorporates elements of Gnosticism, Neoplatonism, and Greek philosophy. It is a closed religion – conversion in or out is forbidden. Core beliefs are kept secret from ordinary Druze and revealed only to accepted initiates, and Druze religious leadership has been cautious to preserve communal autonomy amid the volatility of the Middle East.

The Druze in Israel: Loyal and Integrated Citizens

Approximately 150,000 Druze live in Israel, primarily in the Galilee, Carmel, and Golan Heights regions, with several towns being almost, if not entirely, Druze – the Northern District, for example, is home to Maghar, Beit Jann, Abu Snan, Kisra-Sumei, Ein al-Assad, Hurfeish, and Shefa-‘Amr. Near Haifa, there is Daliyat al-Karmel and Isfiya, and in the Golan, Ein Qiniyye and Majdal Shams, site of the deadly Hezbollah rocket strike on a children’s soccer match.

A number of Druze have served as MKs in Israel over the years, including in the current Knesset. Hamad Amar holds a seat for Yisrael Beyteinu, Afif Abed for Likud, and Akram Hasson for United Right. Ayoob Kara, a Druze politiican from Daliyat al Karmel, served as a Likud MK from 1999-2021 and as the Communications Minister.

Unlike most Arab minorities, the Israeli Druze are willingly conscripted into the IDF, a fact which has forged a deep connection between the Druze and the Israeli state. Since the 1956 conscription agreement, Druze soldiers have served in the IDF with distinction, including in elite combat units and intelligence roles, at first in separate units and today within regular IDF units. Druze Colonel Ehsan Daxa, commander of the 401st Armored Brigade, was one of the highest ranking soldiers to be killed in action in the entire Swords of Iron war.

Many Druze proudly identify as Israeli patriots. Over 400 Druze soldiers have fallen defending Israel. The Druze town of Daliyat al-Karmel, near Haifa, regularly flies Israeli flags, and Druze leaders have historically emphasized the community’s loyalty to the state.

Controversies Within Israel: Identity, Loyalty, and the Nation-State Law

Loyalty has not shielded the Druze from internal debates and controversy. Despite their deep integration into Israeli society, the Druze community has voiced frustration over perceived inequality that came to the fore in the wake of the 2018 Nation-State Law, which defined Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. While many Jewish Israelis viewed the law as affirming a long-standing reality, Druze leaders publicly criticized it as marginalizing non-Jewish citizens, along with Bedouin communities of southern Israel, although that was not its intention.

One of the most high-profile critics was Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amal Asad, a respected Druze officer who warned that the law eroded the sense of equal citizenship Druze had felt for decades. Protests erupted across Druze towns, and delegations met with Israeli leaders, including then-Prime Minister Netanyahu, to demand legislative amendments or reassurances.

The government responded with gestures of goodwill, including promises of increased funding for Druze communities and infrastructure. Still, the issue has left lingering tension about the place of the Druze in the Zionist vision, particularly given their military sacrifices and steadfast loyalty.

Some on the Israeli right argue that the law did not alter any civil rights, and that Israel—as the sole Jewish state—has the right to define its national character. Others see the Druze’s loyalty as a compelling reason to revisit the law’s language to reflect the unique status of non-Jewish minorities who defend the state.

Another significant point of friction between Israel and the Druze has been several attempts at the construction of wind turbines in the Golan region. The Druze have claimed that they were beguiled into signing overly restrictive land leases, and that the construction of the proposed wind turbines would destroy or impede their connection to their farming plots and agrarian way of life. Protests against the turbines have caused several clashes with the police, including road blockages and physical injuries to both protestors and officers.

Syria

Israel’s regional conflicts, particularly in Lebanon and Syria, have had profound impacts on the wider Druze community, revealing both the strength and fragility of Druze identity across borders.

In Syria, the Druze population is concentrated in the southern province of Suwayda. During the Syrian civil war, Suwayda remained largely under Assad regime control, and the Syrian Druze community maintained a pro- Syrian or cautious neutrality. However, they were also targeted by Islamist factions such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, leading to massacres and abductions that prompted global outcry.

Israel’s response included quiet humanitarian aid and cross-border military support, especially in light of the Druze on the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, who maintain familial and communal ties with their Syrian counterparts. In some instances, Druze villagers on the Golan protested Israeli policy they perceived as endangering Syrian Druze, even blocking ambulances suspected of transporting wounded Islamist fighters.

As the new Syrian regime launched its most significant wave of massacres against the Druze so far, the Druze in Israel launched campaigns of protests and political pressure to demand that the IDF intervene. Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz quickly issued orders for significant airstrikes, as well as moving ground forces towards the Druze communities and delivering larger quantities of humanitarian supplies by airdrop. The Israeli operation, unsupported by any other nations, produced rapid results, with the swift imposition of a US-brokered ceasefire and Syrian regime forces sent to the region with ostensible orders to keep the peace.

Lebanon

In Lebanon, the Druze, led historically by the Jumblatt family, have played a central role in the country’s politics. The Druze here are a smaller percentage of the population but have wielded outsized influence.

During Israel’s involvement in Lebanon, Druze militias, especially during the 1983 Mountain War, were involved in fighting Christian Phalangist forces aligned with Israel. This has left a more ambivalent legacy regarding Israel among Lebanese Druze, compared to their Israeli or even Syrian counterparts. Samir Kuntar, who cruelly murdered the Haran family of Nahariya in 1979 and was targeted in an Israeli airstrike, was a Lebanese Druze. Israel closely monitors developments in the Lebanese Druze community, given their strategic positioning and long-standing rivalries with Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed factions.

As the skirmishes preceding Operation Northern Arrows intensified, the Druze communities on both sides of the border called for Israeli forces to push Hezbollah out of their region of southern Lebanon. These calls came to a head with the rocket strike in Majdal Shams, which killed eleven children and led to the Druze attempting to form their own militias to fight Hezbollah. These groups were eventually stopped by the IDF, which began its own campaign against Hezbollah in earnest just a few months later.

Calls For Annexation

Druze communities of both Lebanon and Syria have made public declarations of loyalty to Israel since the war began and called for Israel to absorb their region into Israel. In Syria especially, the ongoing IDF protection of Druze communities has led to many Druze trading with the Israeli flag or flying it from community landmarks. Longstanding Druze tradition, however, is that Druze are loyal to whoever is in power, so Israel is wary of absorbing Syrian Druze areas or offering them citizenship.

In some ways, Israel has already acceded to these requests to some extent; Defense Minister Katz has ordered the IDF to maintain control of portions of southern Syria and Lebanon indefinitely, and the IDF has begun enforcing several Israeli policy decisions regarding he contested areas. The result is a partial Israeli military governance of the Druze’s territory.

Alongside this, Israeli Druze have recently logged a sharp uptick in the number of requests for citizenship. The Druze have for some time touted some facets of an internal national identity, with their own flag and a tightly knit structure of community leadership. Nevertheless, the increased requests for citizenship may be intended to prevent any misconceptions that they are intending to declare an independent Druze state.

Looking Forward: A Balancing Act

The Druze stand at a historical crossroads: committed to their identity, navigating complex regional loyalties, and seeking full recognition for their contributions within Israeli society. In the face of mounting regional instability, the Druze have demonstrated remarkable resilience, often walking a tightrope between conflicting national and ideological poles.

For Israel, the Druze represent the first test of Israel’s capacity to impose a new order in place of the various regimes it has toppled since the October 7th massacre. If Israel can realistically protect the Druze – a beleaguered minority well beyond Israel’s borders in two other countries – it may be the first step towards replacing terrorist states with a new order based on Israel’s values as a Jewish and democratic state.