Is delaying Korea-U.S. drills a mistake? ‘It’s like handing them an excuse,’ expert says.

Elbridge Colby, U.S. under secretary of defense for policy, speaks during an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo at his office in Washington on April 23, 2024. [JOONGANG ILBO]

 
A top Pentagon official emphasized that “South Korea continues to be a role model in its willingness to take more of the lead in a strong defense against the DPRK” and stressed the importance of a “strategically sustainable alliance” following a phone call between South Korean and U.S. leaders.
 
Elbridge Colby, U.S. under secretary of defense for policy, recently made the remarks on X, formerly Twitter. The DPRK is an acronym for North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
 
 
Colby’s remarks suggest a U.S. vision of the bilateral alliance in which U.S. troops in South Korea shift their focus toward deterring China while Seoul takes the lead in responding to North Korean threats.
 
He wrote these remarks last Thursday, stating that South Korea also sets an example “in its spending on defense.”
 
“We and the Republic of Korea are closely aligned on the need to modernize the alliance in response to the regional security environment,” Colby wrote, referring to South Korea by its official name. “We will work closely with Seoul to ensure a strategically sustainable alliance that is ready to defend against shared threats.”
 
The remarks indicate that the second Donald Trump administration will likely seek a modernized alliance in which South Korea boosts its conventional defense capabilities against North Korea and also helps counter growing threats from China in the region.
 
Colby has long argued that this approach is compatible with the concept of “strategic flexibility” — a downsized U.S. presence on the peninsula coupled with an expanded regional role, especially in deterring Beijing. Washington often frames this as “modernizing the alliance.”
 

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, left, seated with Elbridge Colby, U.S. under secretary of defense for policy, right, meets with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., not pictured, at the Pentagon in Washington on July 21. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

 
Observers say Colby’s timely post following the defense ministers’ call suggests the Lee Jae Myung administration has signaled some level of acceptance of this “modernization” push. Seoul has previously avoided using the term, but after the call, the Ministry of National Defense referred to “mutually beneficial modernization of the alliance” for the first time in an official statement, highlighting talks between Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.
 
Ahn and Hegseth agreed to continue “consultations to mutually benefit the modernization of the Seoul-Washington alliance amid the changing regional security environment” during the talks.
 
Following a foreign ministers’ meeting in Washington last Thursday, Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated that “both ministers agreed on the need to modernize the alliance to further strengthen it and elevate its strategic value amid shifting regional security and economic environments,” confirming that alliance modernization is now a formal agenda item.
 
The change in tone may stem from the recognition that Seoul cannot indefinitely resist Washington’s modernization demands — especially with the first bilateral summit of the Lee administration on the horizon.
 

Elbridge Colby, U.S. under secretary of defense for policy, prepares for his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill in Washington on March 4. [GETTY/YONHAP]

 
Colby’s reference to a “strategically sustainable alliance” has also been interpreted as a prerequisite from the U.S. for the continuation of the alliance. The modernization concept implicitly views North Korean defense as a secondary variable under the broader goal of China deterrence, including preventing the Taiwan Strait conflict from spilling into the Korean Peninsula or Beijing using Pyongyang as a diversionary threat.
 
From this perspective, Colby’s comments imply that if Seoul fails to carry out its role in deterring North Korea, the future of the alliance may be uncertain. It could also signal an expectation for South Korea to take on greater military responsibilities in broader regional strategies to counter China.
 
Washington has long pressured allies, including Seoul, to increase defense spending to enhance their ability to handle regional threats independently. The U.S. strategy involves expanding the country’s nuclear arsenal to counter China and Russia while expecting allies such as South Korea, Japan and NATO members to provide support through advanced conventional forces.
 
Reducing the size of United States Forces Korea (USFK) — which mainly consists of conventional troops — and transferring wartime operational control to Seoul aligns with that goal.
 
In this regard, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May, Hegseth also pointedly remarked that “NATO members are pledging to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense … so it doesn’t make sense for countries in Europe to do that while key allies in Asia spend less on defense in the face of an even more formidable threat, not to mention North Korea.”
 

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth delivers a speech during the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31. [AP/YONHAP]

 
The Pentagon has said that Ahn and Hegseth look forward to meeting in person at the annual Security Consultative Meeting, which is scheduled to take place in Seoul in September or October. Observers expect issues such as the future of USFK and operational control transfer to be on the agenda.
 
In this context, the South Korean government’s recent proposal to postpone certain field training exercises during the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) joint drills has drawn criticism for being inconsistent with its stated goal of operational control transfer.
 
UFS serves as a mock exam allowing South Korea to demonstrate its ability to lead operations in preparation for a future transfer of operational control. The exercise is planned on a yearly basis and includes prearranged deployment plans for reinforcements from the U.S. mainland in the event of a crisis.
 

Military vehicles are parked at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, on July 16. [NEWS1]

 
Concerns are brewing that the Lee administration, which is pushing for the transfer of wartime operational control, has made such a proposal, which could be inconsistent. The UFS is scheduled to kick off in earnest next week with the crisis management exercise, but the South Korean government has proposed that the United States postpone some of the training until September, about two weeks before the scheduled start.
 
Some say the move may inadvertently validate Colby’s assertion that South Korea must prove it can handle North Korean threats without U.S. support.
 
“Washington already wants Korea to take more responsibility for the North,” said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. “So when the Seoul proposes to delay joint drills, it’s like handing them an excuse on a silver platter.”
 
 

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
BY LEE YU-JUNG [[email protected]]