Iran’s cyber threat to the DIB

Iran-affiliated cyber actors may not grab headlines like their Chinese or Russian counterparts, but that doesn’t mean they’re not dangerous. For the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB), these groups pose a persistent threat driven by intent, timing and opportunism, rather than technical mastery. While their campaigns are often labeled as lower sophistication, make no mistake: Low-skill does not mean low-impact. From wiper malware to phishing and supply chain compromise, Iranian actors continue to exploit the weakest links in U.S. defense networks — often when attention is focused elsewhere.

Groups like Mercury (aka MuddyWater, Static Kitten), Holmium (APT33, Elfin), and Peach Sandstorm (Imperial Kitten) have consistently targeted U.S. defense interests, especially during periods of heightened geopolitical friction. These campaigns often prioritize disruption over espionage, deploying wiper malware or phishing lures as part of broader information operations or retaliatory strikes. Other IRGC-affiliated groups, such as CyberAv3ngers and Soldiers of Solomon, have also targeted U.S. infrastructure and defense-adjacent systems, often with disruptive or retaliatory intent.

Meanwhile, pro-Iranian hacktivists such as YareGomnam, Cyber Toufan and Haghjoyan also pose threats, as they may repurpose breached data from more advanced actors or use open-source tools to amplify disruption with minimal effort. These and other hacktivist or criminal groups can operate in parallel with Iranian state interests, giving Tehran plausible deniability while still enabling reputational or operational damage.

Unlike Russia’s hybrid warfare model or China’s long-term IP theft campaigns, Iran’s primary goal is often punitive or symbolic, such as disrupting systems, embarrassing adversaries or probing defenses. But these attacks can still lead to collateral damage that carries long-term implications.

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With geopolitical tensions rising across the Middle East and beyond, cyber retaliation against U.S. defense contractors remains not only possible but likely. The question for DIB organizations is not if they will be targeted, but when.

More than ‘noise’ — real disruptive potential

Although Iranian actors may not rival their peers in technical sophistication, the fallout from their campaigns can be severe. DDoS attacks, while often dismissed as low-level harassment, can still knock key systems offline, creating downtime and cascading disruptions, especially for small- to mid-sized contractors with less robust infrastructure or outsourced IT.

Iranian groups are also known for aggressive credential harvesting campaigns, typically relying on phishing, password spraying or brute-force attacks against VPNs, webmail and cloud services. These campaigns often target administrators, contractors or external partners who may have weaker controls. Even when data theft isn’t the primary goal, attackers can exfiltrate sensitive files or business-critical credentials in the process. In some cases, these credentials are reused in follow-on campaigns, sold on dark web marketplaces, or shared with other aligned threat groups.

Social engineering also plays a prominent role. Groups like Peach Sandstorm have impersonated recruiters for defense and aerospace firms to trick employees into opening malware-laced documents or logging into spoofed portals. These schemes may lack technical complexity, but they can be surprisingly effective when aimed at under-resourced or remote workers.

Supply chain compromise is another preferred tactic. Iranian operators have repeatedly targeted third-party vendors — such as IT service providers, industrial technology or software integrators — as entry points into better-defended networks. This approach mirrors the strategies of more advanced APTs and highlights the critical need for supply chain visibility, segmentation and access controls.

While zero-days get a lot of media attention, Iranian groups typically focus on “n-days” – publicly known flaws that remain unpatched in systems. These groups have repeatedly exploited such vulnerabilities in VPN appliances, remote management tools, cloud platforms and even industrial software, sometimes weeks or months after public disclosure. These attacks take advantage of slow patching cycles, poor asset visibility and legacy systems common in the defense sector. In many cases, the actors simply wait for vulnerability details to be published, then scan the internet for exposed systems to gain access with minimal effort or innovation. They’ve also been observed targeting human-machine interfaces and operational technology components in sectors like water, energy and manufacturing, often through similar exposed or outdated systems. For defense contractors with connected production environments or test facilities, this expands the threat surface well beyond traditional IT.

But the most dangerous tactic remains the use of wiper malware, such as ZeroCleare and Dustman, which can destroy systems and data. While not as stealthy as espionage-focused implants, these tools are deployed with intent: to make a statement, inflict pain or test the resilience of their targets. The psychological impact is also part of the objective as it sends a signal to both the victim organization and its broader sector. If these actors find a soft spot in your network, they won’t stop at exploiting it. They may try to destroy it.

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What DIB organizations must do now

The mistake many defense contractors make is assuming that only the most advanced actors matter. But as recent activity has shown, even a “basic” campaign can sideline operations, erode trust and open the door to bigger breaches. Iranian actors don’t need zero-days to be effective. They exploit poor patching practices, legacy protocols, weak perimeters and under-trained personnel.

Now is the time to act. DIB organizations, especially those still working toward the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification or National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-171 compliance, should focus on both perimeter hardening and internal resilience. Patch all internet-facing services aggressively, especially virtual private networks, remote monitoring and management tools, and firewalls. Implement geo-fencing or rate-limiting to block or throttle connections from known risky IP ranges. Deploy web application firewalls and ensure you’re protected against Layer 7 DDoS attacks, which remain a preferred tactic of even the most unsophisticated actors.

Network segmentation is critical. Limit lateral movement, monitor for abnormal PowerShell or Windows management instrumentation usage, and restrict the use of legacy login protocols wherever possible. Equip your security operations center to detect brute-force attacks, and require multi-factor authentication across the organization, with adaptive prompts where possible. And because wiper malware is a legitimate risk, maintain secure, tested backups and clear recovery time objectives.

Beyond technology, don’t underestimate the human factor. Mandatory security awareness and insider threat training must be enforced not just internally but across your subcontractor network. A compromised vendor could be the path into your own environment.

Don’t underrate the threat

Iran-affiliated cyber actors may not always demonstrate technical finesse, but they are strategic, opportunistic and persistent. They go after soft targets. They aim to disrupt and embarrass. And increasingly, they are probing the U.S. defense ecosystem for access they can use to exploit.

The cyber threat landscape is not defined by sophistication alone. It’s defined by impact. And Iranian actors have proven time and again that even so-called low-skill threats can deliver high-consequence outcomes.

DIB organizations that treat them as second-tier threats do so at their own risk. Defense today means defense-in-depth against all adversaries, not just the most elite.

Darron Makrokanis is chief revenue officer at Summit 7.

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Iran’s cyber threat to the DIB

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