Russia’s Glorious Summit – by Mick Ryan

It has been a crazy week with news about the war in Ukraine, with the Alaksa Summit between Putin and Trump dominating the news, while at the same time there was the Russian penetration and attempted breakthrough on the eastern front in Ukraine, Putin’s continued his aerial onslaught against his “brothers” in Ukrainian cities, as well as Chinese ships playfully ramming each other in the Pacific.

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.

This week, I explore issues related to the war in Ukraine as well as news from the Pacific theatre. As always, I also include my top five national security and war reads.

It is easy to forget in the media scramble to cover the Alaska Summit that Ukrainian soldiers continue to fight a grim battle on the southern, eastern, and northern fronts as well as engage in a nightly battle to defend Ukraine’s skies. I want to mention that before the section about the Alaska Summit because every screw up by politicians at these kinds of summits might result in a little embarrassment for them, but has life-changing implications for those doing the fighting, and can have existential effects for nations.

As Williamson Murray has written in Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change:

It is more important to make correct decisions at the political and strategic level than it is at the operational and tactical level. Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected but political and strategic mistakes live forever.

The Alaska Summit. The much anticipated Putin-Trump summit was held in Anchorage, Alaska on Friday, Alaska time. Commencing with the ceremonial reception of the two smiling, jovial leaders (this was a war summit right?), handshakes, and a flyover, Trump and Putin soon got down to business. Fortunately, they were not left alone for a long one-on-one chat, and were supported by staff such as their respective foreign ministers.

After nearly three hours of talks, Trump and Putin emerged. Putin was still smiling. Trump, not so much. Both leaders issued statements. Putin ilaid the flattery on quite thickly, in a Rutte-esque endorsement of Trump’s claimed 2020 election win. Putin, also celebrated the wonderful, close historical relationship between Russia and America. Trump did not appear quite as happy while he issued his statement.

Neither of the two took questions after delivering their prepared remarks. Each departed Alaska after short detours to commemorate fallen service personnel (Putin) and give a media interview (Trump).

In the immediate wake of the summit, I published an article with the catchy title “Moscow Next Time!” that provided my initial assessment. To save you having to read the entire thing, I have provided a summary below of my initial thoughts:

First, Putin appeared to be more upbeat at the press conference than Trump did. While Trump did not appear downcast, there was a marked disparity in the overall posture of the two leaders. This indicates that no overall agreement has been reached but that some small points of common ground may have been agreed.

Second, Putin was laying on the flattery of Trump in a big way. This is an attempt by Putin to ensure the next meeting is also a one-on-one and does not include Ukraine. It will also be an attempt to split Trump from European leaders by convincing him that Putin is not as bad as European leaders have portrayed.

Third, ultimately, Putin is paving the way for future talks with Trump. Putin is too good a manipulator to think he will get what he wants in a single meeting. Putin will probably have mapped out a campaign of meetings and conversations with Trump to get what he wants. This is just one of those conversations.

Fourth, there were no details on what was agreed and what was not. Trump was clear he would be making a bunch of phone calls to Ukraine’s president and European leaders. We may find out more then.

Fifth, Putin made it clear that he has not stepped back from his key objectives of the war, which remain the destruction of Ukraine’s sovereignty, removal of its capacity to defend itself and ensuring Ukraine can never join NATO.

Finally, there was no ceasefire agreed to – at least not that has been discussed yet. As Trump noted, “there is no deal until there is a deal. I will call President Zelenskyy. It is ultimately up to them.”

One good thing that emerged from the Alaska Summit is that Trump has not (yet) bargained away Ukrainian territory.

Over the past 24 hours, we have learned more about what Trump discussed with Putin. Perhaps the most serious and concerning issue was that Trump has endorsed Putin’s view that no ceasefire is necessary and that Ukraine and Russia should leap directly to negotiating a war termination agreement. On his social media platform, Trump wrote that:

It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a Peace Agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere Ceasefire Agreement, which often times do not hold up.

This goes against Ukrainian and European negotiating strategies for ending the war. A ceasefire is necessary to give the sides the time and space to negotiate. Neither Ukraine or Europe wants to negotiate war termination while still under the pressure of active military operations. Trump, who appears to be easily seduced into changing his mind by Putin, has blown that strategy away.

In the wake of the summit, President Zelenskyy held a long phone call with Trump. Zelenskyy describes how the U.S. president provided a summary of what was discussed at the summit and also raised the possibility of American involvement “in guaranteeing Ukraine’s security”.

The Washington Post also describes how:

Trump also told the Europeans he would be open to providing security guarantees for Ukraine in a deal but the details were unclear, according to two European diplomats.

Other leaks about the Trump-Putin conversation have emerged. In an article for Financial Times, Christopher Miller writes that:

Vladimir Putin has demanded Ukraine withdraw from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as a condition for ending Russia’s war but told Donald Trump he could freeze the rest of the frontline if his core demands were met…Trump then communicated that message to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders in a call on Saturday, during which he urged them to drop efforts to secure a ceasefire from Moscow…Putin made it clear that he had not dropped his core demands to “resolve the root causes” of the conflict, which would essentially end Ukraine’s statehood in its current form and roll back Nato’s eastward expansion.

Ukrainian and European leaders understand that the root causes of this conflict are not about territory or even Ukraine’s membership of NATO. The true root cause of this conflict is Putin’s terror that neighbouring countries might demonstrate alternative, democratic forms of government as an example for the Russian people. This is intolerable for Putin because it directly conflicts with his ability to rule for life and continue looting their national treasuries for their own gains.

The Trajectory of the War From Here. Moving forward, President Zelenskyy will visit Washington DC early in the coming week for discussions with President Trump and other U.S. officials. Reports are already emerging that he may be accompanied by other European leaders in order to prevent the kind of terrible spectacle we witnessed on 28 February.

There is some hope for a trilateral summit, involving the leaders of Ukraine, America and Russia. However, the Kremlin has noted that this was not discussed in Alaska.

Given the editorials in Ukrainian and other news outlets in the past 24 hours, the summit has also dashed any slim hope that Ukrainians and many Europeans had that Trump might slip the bonds of his Putin admiration and begin to support Ukraine in achieving a just peace. That is now an almost impossible prospect to imagine.

Putin had a Cheshire Cat grin for the entirety of the Alaska summit for very good reason. As a war criminal, he had a red carpet welcome, a lovely USAF flyover and a very friendly greeting from an American leader who in a previous era would have been described as “the leader of the free world”. Putin left the meeting having received no further sanctions and with absolutely no mention of the brutality he has unleashed on the Ukrainian people since 2014.

Putin achieved something else. He very successfully kicked the can a long way down the road for any ceasefire, allowing him to continue his ground and aerial assaults against Ukraine.

Perhaps worst of all, Putin now definitively understands that he has Trump’s full measure. And he knows the rest of us know that as well. This does not bode well for the road ahead in achieving a just peace for the people of Ukraine.

For Europeans, this only reinforces that they must urgently build up their defences against Putin. Putin is already conducting a massive sabotage and subversion campaign against Europe, and has malign designs against other parts of Eastern Europe. Trump’s supine, passive posture before Putin at the Alaska summit confirms (again) that Trump is not inclined to offer any defence against Russia’s future predatory behaviour against its neighbours – because Putin will talk him out of it.

For those of us in the Pacific, we must do the same as the Europeans. And we must wonder just what kind of deal Xi of China will offer Trump now to throw Taiwan (and possibly the rest of us) under the bus of Chinese hegemonic aspirations.

The Eastern Front Penetration by Russia. Earlier this week, Russian forces penetrated Ukraine’s front line defences on the eastern front. This occured in a region just to the east of Dobropillia. In an article I published on this issue earlier in the week, I wrote the following:

Like all operations of this type, time is absolutely critical. Whoever can utilise time most wisely in the coming days will win this crucial battle. If Ukraine can deploy its reserves to cut off the salient more quickly than Russian can surge reinforcements into the salient, danger might be averted. But if Russia can rush more mobile troops, supported by artillery, drones and aircraft delivery glide bombs, this penetration could turn into a breakthrough.

In the past 48 hours, the situation has clarified. It is clear that the Ukrainians were better at utilising time and reserve forces in the region of the new Russian salient. As the maps below demonstrate, Ukrainian forces have stopped further penetration into Ukrainian defensive lines, while also cutting off the penetration about halfway along its length.

But as Rob Lee has noted in a recent post, Ukraine was required to employ elements from multiple brigades, as well as the newly formed 1st Azov army corps to achieve this. A full list of these (sourced from Rob and @Deepstate_UA) is below. To confirm, it is not confirmed whether it was elements from each of these formations or the entire brigades:

79th Air Assault brigade.

82nd Air Assault brigades.

1st and 425th Assault Regiments.

25th Airborne Brigade.

2nd battalion, 92nd Assault Brigade.

32nd Mechanised brigade.

93rd Mechanised brigade.

38th Marine Brigade.

14th National Guard Brigade.

Magyar Brigade.

National Police and SBU.

1st Azov Corps to contain Russia’s advance east of Dobropillia.

Clearly the Ukrainian general staff still retains significant reserves – both dedicated and situational – on the eastern front. The question is this however: has the deployment of these reserves created further opportunities for the Russians in other parts of the front line?

As of today’s reporting, Ukrainian forces appear to be continuing operations to capture or destroy Russian forces in the salient created by the Russian penetration. As President Zelenskyy noted in his update last night, there has also been an important replenishment of Ukraine’s “exchange fund” with Russian soldiers.

In separate news, it has been reported that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to two kilometres in Sumy. Good news.

Putin’s Air War Against Brotherly Ukraine Continues. In his comments at the end of the Alaksa Summit, Putin made the following statement:

We’ve always considered the Ukrainian nation, and I’ve said it multiple times, a brotherly nation…We have the same roots, and everything that’s happening is a tragedy for us, and terrible wound.

While there was a lot of cynical stuff in Putin’s statement, this plumbed new depths. Putin’s forces have looted, raped, castrated, murdered, tortured and kidnapped their way through Ukrainian territory in the past three and half years. They continue mass ground attacks across a thousand kilometre front line and are executing a nightly terror bombing campaign with drones and missiles against Ukraine’s people and cities.

This is a weird way to treat a brotherly nation, given that air attacks continued on Ukraine throughout the week, including the nights before and after the Alaska Summit. Such is Russian ‘good will’ towards a brotherly nation.

Ukraine’s Strike Campaign. This week, Ukraine has stepped up its strategic strikes against Russian economic and military targets. It has hit oil refineries in multiple regions of Russia and also struck a Russian freighter in the port of Olya in the Astrakan region that was carrying munitions and part for Russian military drones. There has been a lot going on with Ukrainian strategic strike capability in the past couple of months, and I will shortly publish a detailed update on this topic.

Playing Chicken at Sea. This week, two Chinese vessels collided while they were attempting to coordinate their operations around the Scarborough Shoal. A useful summary of the incident was posted by Ray Powell, which you can read here.

Ray also recorded a podcast on this subject, which you can see here.

Of course, the Chinese blamed the Philippines for the collision.

Ferry-borne Amphibious Operations. This week, naval expert Tom Shugart posted about an exercise where a Chinese civil ferry was employed to transport and launch assault vehicles on amphibious operations. You can the his thread, as well as associated articles on this topic, at this link.

Taiwanese and Chinese Naval Drones. This week, H.I. Sutton published a couple of useful updates on the development and deployment of naval drones by Taiwan and China.

In the first article, published by Naval News, Sutton examines the development of several maritime drones by Taiwan which are designed to deter or prevent a Chinese invasion. Among the types examined are the Endeavour Mantra, the Sea Shark 800 (essentially a speed boat), and the stealthy Piranha 9.

In his second article, Sutton examines China’s growing fleet of underwater drones and its extra-large drone submarine (XLUUV) programs. The article, which is available to read at Naval News here, is focussed on two models of this uncrewed submarines: the AJX002 and another even larger design.

Exercise Alon 2025. This week, Exercise Alon 25 kicked off in the Philippines. More than 3,600 personnel are participating in the activity, including personnel from the Philippines, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Since beginning in 2023, Exercise Alon has expanded in scope to include training in maritime, sea, cyber, space and air domains.

Australia is deploying an Australian Amphibious Force Joint Task Force Headquarters, Navy’s Hobart-class destroyer, HMAS Brisbane, an Army combined Arms Land Task Group and an Air Task Group of Super Hornets, Growlers and Hercules aircraft.

The nations participating in the exercise will also conduct amphibious landing operations and maritime exercises.

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It’s time to cover this week’s recommended readings.

I have included a new report from the National Institute of Defence Studies in Japan that explores how the war in Ukraine may have forced changes in the military strategies of China, Taiwan and America. There is also an analysis of the Alaska Summit from Estonia, a good piece on strategic innovation, and an article on how China views the American Golden Dome missile defence program.

Finally, there is a new CNA report that examines how Russia’s views on the future of war may have evolved since its full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

As always, if you only have time to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.

Happy reading!

In this new publication from the highly respected National Institute for Defence Studies in Japan, a range of experts examine change and continuity in warfare. Drawing heavily on the experience of war in Ukraine, as well as Chinese military aggression in the Pacific, the authors, provide a range of useful insights across six chapters. It provides a good analysis of how the Ukraine war may have changed Chinese, Taiwanese and American strategy for a future conflict in the Pacific. You can access the publication (in English) here.

In this article, the author examines the institutional imperative for innovation and adaptation, and why tactical adaptation is insufficient for military success. As the author notes, “a fixation on bottom-up models permeates the American military culture and its desire to promote individualistic achievements, but future conflicts will require innovative concepts to address the growing disparity between America’s strategic interests and its military capabilities.” You can read the full article here.

In this piece, the author examines the outcomes of yesterday’s Alaksa Summit from the perspective of European nations. Unsurprisingly, there is an explicit tone of disappointment in the article. As the author notes, “whatever the outcome of the Alaska summit, it is unlikely to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. On the contrary, it would confirm the Kremlin’s perception of “the collective west” as weak and encourage further expansion of Russia’s sphere of influence through military aggression.” The full article is available at this link.

This is a fascinating new CNA report that examines the evolution of Russian thinking about military strategy and conventional military operations after three years of conflict in Ukraine. One of the report’s key finding is that “despite significant technological advances, which in turn have led to major tactical changes in the character of armed conflict (especially widespread use of uncrewed systems), Russian strategic and operational thinking on conventional military operations remains largely unchanged from approaches adopted before the war.” The full report is available at this link.

In this piece published by the China Aerospace Studies Institute, the authors examine how the Chinese regime views the development of America’s Golden Dome missile defence system. The authors describe how “the PRC has long been concerned by U.S. missile defense efforts. Beijing has expressed alarm over the U.S. Golden Dome system since its inception in late January.” You can read the full piece here.

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