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Russia’s war, nuclear intimidation, and disruptive technologies are testing the credibility of NATO’s nuclear posture, says Jim Stokes, NATO’s Director of Nuclear Policy, in an interview with Dr. Aleksander Olech.
The Alliance is modernising its nuclear capabilities, strengthening political decision-making, and reinforcing frontline states like Poland. Yet, rising threats from Moscow, Beijing, and emerging technologies demand constant adaptation to keep deterrence credible and effective.
A.O.: How do you assess the current credibility and readiness of NATO’s nuclear deterrence—particularly in the face of emerging hybrid threats and escalatory rhetoric from adversaries?
J.S.: In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO has taken decisions to bolster its overall deterrence and defence posture, which is driving transformational change in our readiness and ability to collectively defend all Allies. The Alliance also has continued to further adapt its nuclear deterrence. Allies are modernising NATO nuclear capabilities, including making the transition to 5th generation F-35A Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA). The United States also has completed its modernisation of its nuclear weapons in Europe. We are also strengthening our nuclear planning capability, ensuring it is coherent with conventional military planning. These steps increase the flexibility and adaptability of the Alliance’s nuclear forces.
Importantly, we have also continued to update NATO’s nuclear consultation and decision-making processes, as well as the strategic thinking underpinning nuclear deterrence. In 2024, the Defence Ministers in the Nuclear Planning Group approved an update to NATO’s nuclear policy, which reflects the current security environment and provides political guidance for NATO’s nuclear forces, planning and exercises. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is responsible for producing coherent plans for deterrence and defence.
These military plans support Allied political decision-making, to ensure effective consultations and enable consensus-building on nuclear issues. As always, we ensure firm political control of NATO’s nuclear forces through effective decision-making at all times and under all circumstances. Taken together, these measures ensure that NATO’s nuclear deterrence remains credible and effective.
A.O.: Poland has become a key frontline state in NATO, bordering both Belarus and the heavily militarized Kaliningrad region. How does NATO view Poland’s role in strengthening nuclear deterrence, and why is strategic support for Poland vital to European security?
J.S.: With discussions around burden-sharing and the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, do you foresee a shift in nuclear sharing responsibilities? Could Poland be considered for a greater role in this domain if the security environment deteriorates?
NATO closely monitors Russia’s activities in Kaliningrad, which is a key location for Russia’s nuclear forces, as well as Russia’s relationship with Belarus. There are claims that Russia has placed nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus, and there have been activities to train Belarusian military forces. While we monitor Russia’s nuclear capabilities in these areas, it is important to keep in mind that the nuclear threat from Russia is much greater than this. Russia has the largest arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, a high number of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, and a range of dual-use delivery systems.
We have seen Moscow employ some of its dual-capable missiles against Ukraine. And of course Russia regularly uses dangerous nuclear rhetoric. When viewed in light of Russia’s on-going war against Ukraine, these factors are destabilising, and we will continue to closely monitor the entirety of Russia’s nuclear and conventional posture. Moscow’s attempts at nuclear intimidation, and its nuclear capabilities, pose a threat to the whole of the Alliance, and this is not limited to any one region.
We value the contributions and commitments being made by all Allies, including Poland, to strengthen NATO’s overall deterrence and defence posture. At The Hague Summit, the Allies made a historic decision to increase defence and defence-related spending to 5% of GDP. This increase in funding is vital, to ensure our militaries have what they need to keep us safe. Poland is already leading the way when it comes to investing in our collective defence, pledging 4.7% of GDP in 2025. Warsaw is purchasing F-35A aircraft, which provide a decisive advantage to the Alliance. Investments in modernised aircraft are necessary for conventional operations and also can be used to support a nuclear mission, if required.
This is exercised each year in STEADFAST NOON, NATO’s nuclear flying exercise, to demonstrate that NATO is able to effectively employ its nuclear Dual-Capable Aircraft and the conventional aircraft needed to support them. So as NATO Allies, including Poland, invest in modernised conventional capabilities, there is the additional advantage that they are further strengthening NATO’s nuclear deterrence and sharing the nuclear burden in different ways.
Allies have affirmed that NATO will adapt its nuclear posture as necessary, as stated in the Washington Summit Declaration in 2024. We continue to take stock of the security environment, and of the on-going transformation of our conventional forces, to assess how we may need to adapt NATO’s nuclear posture. Recent announcements by the United Kingdom and France, two of our nuclear powers, are further enhancing the security of the Alliance through strengthened nuclear deterrence.
This demonstrates that we are willing and able to respond to the threats and challenges we face. As a member of the Nuclear Planning Group, Poland makes valuable contributions to the Alliance’s discussions about policy, plans, and posture. We want the voices of all Allies to inform our consultations and decisions, so that we can achieve consensus and move forward together.
A.O.: Looking ahead, what do you identify as the most pressing challenges to NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture over the next decade — including risks from state actors, non-state threats, or disruptive technologies?
J.S.: Russia remains the main long-term threat to the Alliance, not least because of its nuclear forces. Terror groups also are a threat, and we must ensure that non-state actors cannot negatively impact our nuclear forces, such as through physical or cyber attacks. This is why the Allies have made an enduring commitment to the safety and security of nuclear forces. Beyond these threats, there are other challenges. China’s deepening strategic partnership with Russia and the rapid expansion of its nuclear forces also affects Euro-Atlantic security.
China has a growing appetite to change the status quo, which has implications far beyond the Indo-Pacific region. China, North Korea, and Iran are providing support to Russia in its war against Ukraine, which shows that our security is increasingly inter-linked. We are living in a multi-polar nuclear security environment that is increasingly complex, also when we consider the impacts of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), such as artificial intelligence and autonomous systems.
NATO keeps all of these factors in mind when considering how to continue adapting its overall deterrence and defence posture, including nuclear deterrence. The war against Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of effective air and missile defence, and the protection of NATO’s air bases for our Dual-Capable Aircraft is therefore of primary importance. We are also carefully managing the risks and opportunities arising from disruptive technologies.
These technologies are altering the nature of conflict, acquiring greater strategic importance, and have the potential to impact NATO’s nuclear deterrence. For example, EDTs can improve intelligence analysis and early warning capabilities, which can enhance our situational awareness and provide more time for decision-makers in a crisis. NATO Allies are committed to the responsible use of EDTs, which reflects the Alliance’s democratic values, and guides NATO’s adoption of new technologies for its deterrence and defence.
Finally, we are also assessing the impact of other domains, including space and cyber, on nuclear deterrence. These domains in particular are dynamically evolving, are used by state and non-state actors, and NATO is committed to keeping them safe and secure.