“We have no family of plans for European defence, as NATO does”

Photo courtesy of the European Commission.

JAN FARFAŁ: As a former chairman of the EU Military Committee, how would you envision the main pillars that need to underpin the European Defence Union?

ROBERT BRIEGER: I think what the European Union needs most, especially in defence matters, is a method for reaching unanimous decisions at the table where choices are made. That requires unity of effort, political leadership, and the willingness to provide the necessary resources. Additionally, there is an urgent need to change the mindset, starting with the political class, but also within our societies across the EU member states.

When you refer to the European Defence Union, is there any area, be it hybrid, cyber, or crisis management, where the EU Defence Union can provide a unique added value to NATO?

We have different histories and different tasks, but today we face a common threat and a common challenge, which requires us to strengthen our ties. NATO remains at the forefront when it comes to collective defence. But, on the other hand, 23 of 32 NATO member states are European, and therefore close cooperation is essential. We need to intensify the exchange of information. And when it comes to the Defence Union, the discussion within European institutions about what it should actually look like is still unfinished. We do not yet have a clear picture of what is meant by “Defence Union”. Is it simply about strengthening the European defence industry and building a common defence financial market, or is it more than that? Is it about participating in the deterrence and defence of the EU’s territory? We have Article 42(7), but we have not yet defined or operationalised what this article truly entails.

Therefore, there are still many question marks to address, and we face a strong sense of urgency because the threat from the East is undeniable. Even if this war ends with a ceasefire or peace accord, Russia will rebuild its capacity very quickly, and we already know the ambitions of the Kremlin.

Does this mean we need a two-tier approach: being prepared for potential Russian aggression within three years, while also building the kind of political and industrial union that can endure over the long term?

The threat is real. One logical outcome is that we must prepare much better, not only in terms of industrial capacity but also in procurement.

When it comes to this issue, is there any “silver bullet” to address the fragmentation of the defence market, for example, the fact that we have 17 different types of tanks, while at the same time satisfying national interests in maintaining some form of local production?

I’m not sure there is a silver bullet. It’s a complicated process. On the one hand, we need to build financial incentives to overcome fragmentation. The European Commission already provides significant funding to foster cooperative projects, but this is obviously not enough to accelerate progress. We also need political will among member states, and we must accelerate flagship projects such as the Franco-German fighter aircraft of the future if we want to compete with other major actors. If the European Union still wants to remain relevant on the world stage of big players, as is written into almost all of our strategic concepts, then, as Professor [Joseph] Stiglitz mentioned in the Austrian media, we have to stand on our own feet. That is the key point.

At the same time, integration cannot stop at the level of big companies. We also need to bring in smaller firms, particularly those providing spare parts, ammunition, and other critical supplies. That would be a major step for the European Union in becoming strategically relevant. This is very much in line with the mood on the Eastern Flank.

That would also require satisfying Warsaw’s aspirations to contribute meaningfully to technological development rather than being reduced to a role in the supply chain. Nonetheless, even with the best equipment available, this would also raise the question of mobility. Looking ahead to mobility and partnerships, how would you evaluate the next steps that PESCO or the EU Battlegroups need to take over the next 12 to 24 months?

This is not only a PESCO project; it is also a NATO project, and a shared ambition of both organisations. This is crucial when we face the necessity of moving larger formations from West to East, a logical step in preparedness vis-à-vis potential aggressors. But there are still core questions to answer and issues to resolve. The legal framework must be harmonised among member states in order to allow rapid transportation. Infrastructure is another critical element. This also raises the question of financing. Credible steps have already been taken to implement these work strands, but when it comes to details, this remains a long-term project, because much of the existing infrastructure is either inadequate or outdated and cannot support the transport of heavy loads.

There are also procedural hurdles, not only among member states but even within some countries. For instance, in Germany, there are difficulties in transporting ammunition from one Bundesland to another. We also need to strengthen the supply chain across the Atlantic and enhance the movement of critical goods. Preparing for warfighting requires accepting certain risks in the context of that preparation. I am not sure that this sense of urgency is shared by all stakeholders.

And is it right to assume that European Battle Groups could become a forerunner to a European army?

Let us say that the newly established rapid deployment capacity is a brigade-sized formation with some strategic enablers, first and foremost designed for crisis management outside Europe. Within the European Union, we have not yet addressed the necessity of participation in territorial defence. We need to rethink our entire posture and design, and we must clarify with the Alliance what the European Union’s contribution should be.

We have a single set of forces. The challenge is how to make use of our capacities so that collective defence can function effectively, with the European Union taking responsibility in areas where it can contribute most. For instance, this could include the protection of critical infrastructure or the advancement of military mobility to establish the conditions for swift transport. What we need in this process is a clear definition of Article 42(7): how to operationalise it, and what should happen if Article 5 of NATO and Article 42(7) of the European Union are invoked simultaneously.

What would that mean in practice, and how would we interact? One crucial precondition for defining the necessary procedures is the exchange of information, but so far, this is officially not possible between the two organisations. That is my experience from Brussels. At the end of the day, it boils down to political will.

Speaking of political will – what happens if, in 2027, several Wagner groups operating from Belarus begin crossing the Polish frontier, prompting Poland to invoke Article 42(7)? What happens then?

That is the question politicians must ask themselves and answer appropriately. My advice as a military expert is – do not waste time. We must clearly define Article 42.7 in coordination with NATO, enter into structured talks with the Alliance, and harmonize our actions. It could happen that Article 5 is not invoked, and only Article 42.7 applies, then mutual support obligations are in force. That means member states, including my own country, are obliged to provide support. But to what extent, resources, actions, troops, remains undefined. There are no concrete plans. We have no family of plans for European defence, as NATO does.

In essence, from my three years as Chairman of the Military Committee, I have two core messages. What we need most is unity and leadership at all levels, starting with Brussels, but extending to member states and society at large. And we need it as of yesterday. Unfortunately.

This material appeared in cooperation with Club Alpbach Poland – an organisation associating Polish scholarship holders of the European Forum Alpbach – a conference that has been a leading platform for discussion on the future of Europe since 1945.

General Robert Brieger is the chairman of the EU Military Committee between 2022-2025. He joined the Austrian armed forces in 1975. He shaped the armed forces planning of the Austrian Bundesheer as the Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence. He also commanded Austrian troops in Kosovo (2001 – 2002) and led a multinational troop as EUFOR commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2011 – 2012).

Jan Farfał is a historian and recent PhD graduate of the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford. He has served as Associate Director at Visegrad Insight, Research Assistant to Timothy Garton Ash, and Jerzy Giedroyc Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna.

defence, EU, NATO