This piece is part of a joint CFR analysis assessing the geopolitical effect of the Trump administration’s tariffs policy on traditional U.S. allies, including Japan as well as Canada, the European Union, and Australia and New Zealand.
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Sheila A. Smith is John E. Merow senior fellow for Asia-Pacific studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
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Japan’s leaders have long tried to change U.S. President Donald Trump’s idea that allies are a burden to the United States. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo advocated for U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Trade Agreement during Trump’s first term, but the U.S. president rejected this new regional initiative. Japan eventually agreed to a bilateral trade agreement on goods as evidence of good faith in the partnership, and Abe went on to persuade Trump of the value of a shared Indo-Pacific strategy. This shared view seemed to develop after Abe invited Trump to Japan for a state visit, where he was the first foreign leader to meet the new Japanese emperor and empress.
Early signs from the second Trump administration suggest a tougher road ahead for even the most supportive U.S. allies in Asia. Its forceful disruption of international trade has teetered on the edge of affecting allied security cooperation, as the president occasionally states his displeasure at the unequal treaty with Japan. Yet the most concerning aspect of this new U.S. foreign policy approach is its abandonment of the ideas that underpinned the postwar international order. If the Washington no longer advocates for the economic world it helped build, will it also abandon the global security commitments that kept its allies and adversaries in check?
Several aspects of this early trade tumult have implications for U.S. security ties in Asia. The unpredictability of decision making—including the on-again, off-again hammer of high tariffs—makes alliance management difficult. All U.S. allies, especially in Asia, rely on incremental, steady adaptation. Sudden change is difficult for Tokyo, especially because it forces leaders to navigate the central role of the U.S. alliance in domestic politics.
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Moreover, the strategic goal of the tariffs remains ill-defined, which does not bode well for broader alliance discussions. The cabinet of Japanese Prime Minsiter Ishiba Shigeru are adapting to Trump’s emphasis on a trade reset, yet even as they seek cooperation with Washington’s new agenda, the tariff talks offer little hope of a clearly defined path of alliance cooperation going forward. And, they proved paralyzing for Ishiba as he announced his decision to step down on September 7.
These strategic alliances are also supported by strong corporate and civil society ties to the United States, which adds further consequences. While it is too early to judge consumer reaction to the Trump tariffs, many of the global corporations that have long invested in the U.S. market are severely affected. In the final deal, Japan’s automakers had to accept a new tariff rate—a reduction from 25 percent to 15 percent.
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To date, U.S. consumers can still purchase their favorite vehicles at reasonable prices, but it is uncertain whether this will hold in the months and years ahead. Other manufacturers will also have to adjust pricing in the United States. Billion-dollar investments across the country ensures that Japanese companies continue to offer jobs in regional communities. But the attachment of investment deals to tariff negotiations suggests a more complex environment for Japanese foreign direct investments in the future. For example, Japan has committed $550 billion in new investments in the United States, but how this will be directed, and by whom, remains unclear. President Trump has maintained that he will control how Japan’s investment is spent, adding another layer of complexity to how Japanese companies view their prospects in the U.S. economy.
Hints of similar pressure on security ties are already emerging. While the bilateral security treaty with Japan does not include military reciprocity, it does commit Japan to offering bases and facilities to the U.S. military. Without these bases, the U.S. Navy and Air Force would have not purchase to address a regional crisis. Ports and airfields used by the U.S. military in Japan have long been vital to coping with a potential contingency on the Korean peninsula as well as tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Today, the U.S. and Japanese armed forces work closely on a host of regional presence missions and operational coordination with each other and with other allies across the Indo-Pacific.
But Japan will be asked to do more. Already, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has argued that Indo-Pacific allies should aim for the same level of spending as NATO allies, 5 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP). In the coming months, Washington and Tokyo will also need to revise their five-year Host Nation Support (HNS) agreement, which outlines Japanese fiscal support for the U.S. military presence in Japan. Numbers matter to the Trump administration, as does the idea that allies do more. U.S. requests for Japan to raise defense spending and HNS are likely to invite ire among Japanese who see their economy as the primary priority.
The gathering at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit last week brought the leaders of India, North Korea, and Russia, alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping as he confidently argued, “The world has found itself in a new period of turbulence and transformation. Global governance has come to a new crossroads.”
A world order led by this group is not one that U.S. Asian allies will welcome. Nor do they embrace a world where the cost of alliance with the United States proves unacceptable to their citizens. At the very least, U.S. allies in Asia want a far more predictable and supportive strategic partner.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.