The war in Ukraine continues to be played out by drone warfare to a large extent. FPV – first-person view drone footage from operators’ monitors – is arguably the most recognisable image of the conflict in international media. Despite Ukraine’s sizeable battlefield disadvantage in numbers and military industrial base, the nation’s ability to quickly, cheaply and innovatively produce systems for offensive drone actions and to counter Russian drone activity has proven a major determinant of Russia’s territorial progress.

Both sides are now engaged in a game of unarmed aerial vehicle (UAV) cat-and-mouse, with one side deploying a new form of drone tactic or technology, and the other looking to quickly nullify any advantages that new tech may offer. As the war continues, both Russia and Ukraine’s international allies seek to understand any new lessons learned from the threat of drone operations. With the global UAV market expected to almost double from $15 billion in 2025 to $27.7 billion in 2035, risks are only growing.

As the Ukrainian theatre acts as a proving ground for new UAVs, international allies have begun a technological catch-up to seek comprehensive, layered and effective counter-unmanned aircraft system programmes that address the range of acute UAV-based challenges playing out in the conflict – including the “exchange ratio” issue: the cost of a drone versus the cost required to disable it.

Laser-powered directed energy weapons (DEW)

In September 2025, Ukraine reportedly became the first nation in history to deploy an autonomous drone swarm in combat, believed to be able to coordinate, adapt and strike with minimal human input. Drone swarms, whether utilising AI or not, cannot be countered by limited ammunition counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) platforms due to the inherent redundancy of individuals within the swarm. For example, a C-UAS system that relies upon conventional surface-to-air projectiles will be unable to eliminate entire swarms and so is unable to cripple the adversary’s operational effectiveness. This weakness is driving investment in directed energy weapons (DEW) solutions. Lasers (light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation) are a form of DEW that can destroy vital segments of a drone’s airframe, causing it to fall to the ground. Lasers offer a low-cost-per-shot option to operators, requiring only electrical energy rather than chemically propelled munitions.

This characteristic renders them an attractive choice for C-UAS. Not only does it make the system highly transportable, as there is no need to transport associated ammunition to the operation area, but the ability to “fire” multiple shots in quick succession at a low cost also makes lasers a strong contender for future systems intended to tackle drone swarms. These swarms will be formed of many individual drones, and to cripple the operational effectiveness of the swarm as a whole, a large proportion of its component individuals will need to be eliminated.

Many laser-powered C-UAS solutions are not battle-ready, with a few exceptions. The UK is emerging as a potential leader in this field with its DragonFire system. DragonFire delivers a high-power laser over extensive distances and offers precision equivalent to hitting a one-pound coin from a kilometre away. While research and development costs for the programme are estimated at around £130 million ($175 million), deploying DragonFire for 10 seconds is estimated to be the same as running a standard heater for just an hour, making it a cost-effective alternative to certain missile tasks over the long term.

With operational costs claimed to be typically under £10 per shot, this weaponry has the potential to transform the battlefield by reducing reliance on expensive ammunition and minimising the risk of collateral damage. The trials have validated its capability to engage aerial targets effectively at relevant ranges, and the Royal Navy has so far purchased two of a total of four planned systems for deployment on four destroyers, expected to take place by 2027.

High-power microwave (HPM) systems

Much like laser-powered DEWs, high-power microwave systems offer solutions to drone threats that have emerged or developed during the war in Ukraine. High-power microwave (HPM) weapons are DEWs that direct pulses of high-intensity microwave energy at the drone, disabling the aircraft’s electronic systems. These weapons carry similar benefits as lasers, being highly transportable and low-cost per shot. However, these weapons have the added advantage of not requiring aiming. Instead, they could potentially blanket a wide area with electromagnetic energy to disrupt or destroy electronics, thus neutralising an entire swarm simultaneously. The underlying logic for HPM weapons is to exploit “front door” and “rear door” vulnerabilities in adversary electronic devices such as UAVs. “Front door” vulnerabilities encapsulate components of electronics that are exposed by design. These include antennae, electro-optical and infrared technology, sensors and other cameras. In directing a strong electromagnetic pulse towards the targeted device, these “front door” components are bombarded to the extent that they malfunction and deactivate. “Rear door” vulnerabilities describe components that are unintentionally exposed. This may include exposed wiring, damaged shielded parts or even gaps in the shielding case. These vulnerabilities provide an entry point for the electromagnetic wave through which to propagate, damaging the components inside.

Current versions of high-powered microwaves, being tested or in prototyping, currently have a limited range, with several projects underway to expand the same and pack in more power. These systems are anticipated to be effective for terminal defence against some types of swarm attacks or could be mounted forward on mobile platforms that intercept and incapacitate swarms further away from the area, personnel and assets being defended.

In February 2022, the Directed Energy Directorate of the US Air Force Research Laboratory announced that a contract had been awarded to Leidos to develop Mjolnir, a trailer-mounted, fully integrated high-power microwave system designed for quick deployment. The next-generation counter-electronic weapons system is an advancement on Leidos’ tactical high-power operational responder (THOR) technology demonstrator. THOR used bursts of intense radio waves to disable small, unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) instantly. The $26 million Mjolnir prototype will use the same technology as THOR but will add important advances in capability, reliability, and manufacturing readiness. The Mjolnir was set for delivery by the end of 2024, but few details have emerged since then.

The Ukrainian military’s meticulously planned Operation Spiderweb assault in June 2025 was a series of successful covert drone attacks deep inside Russian territory, which, according to Ukrainian sources, damaged or destroyed at least 41 Russian military jets, including several Tupolev-95 strategic bombers. The raids served not only as a major propaganda victory but as an acute reminder that, given the focus on the development and advancement of drone technology, it is likely that the cultivation and procurement of robust C-UAS systems capable of countering a range of UAV threats will be essential going forward.

The Russo-Ukrainian cat-and-mouse game of drone development followed by C-UAS innovation to stem any enemy advantages on the battlefield has taught international policymakers a series of lessons regarding the future of unmanned threats. The exchange ratio (cost of a drone versus the cost of intercepting it), the emergence of drone swarm capabilities and the limitations of electronic warfare or jamming techniques are all challenges played out and developing in the conflict. International allies are beginning to wake up to the need to develop C-UAS systems capable of countering such threats. Through directed energy weapons in the form of laser-powered and high-power microwave systems, major defence-spending nations are seeking to solve these challenges. While not household names yet, the proliferation of this technology marks a significant step towards a 21st-century approach to a threat that is set to grow exponentially. With most of the world, and especially Europe, moving towards a military-industrial footing, C-UAS, in many forms, is set for major advancements.