On Monday, the United States Supreme Court allowed President Donald Trump to fire a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) at least for as long as it takes for the court to decide on the merits of whether he has the authority to remove her without showing cause. The court said it would hear that issue in December. It also announced that in December, it would reconsider its 1935 decision upholding the protection of members of independent agencies from being fired by the president.

Lisa Cook, the Federal Reserve Board governor whom President Trump wants to fire, has also requested the Supreme Court to continue serving on the Fed until her case is resolved on the merits.  The court has not ruled yet on Cook’s request, which is slightly different from the FTC Commissioner’s case since Trump claims he has cause to fire Cook. The common issue, however, is how free of presidential direction can presidentially-appointed members of independent agencies be. The likely resolution lies in the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.

In 1926, the court held that since postmasters were presidential-appointees exercising executive power, they could also be fired by the president. The court ruled in 1935, however, that a member of the FTC could not be fired by President Franklin Roosevelt since the FTC did not exercise executive authority, only legislative and judicial powers.  (This is the Supreme Court ruling to be reconsidered in December.)

A 2010 decision continued the court’s consideration of how executive, legislative, and judicial functions are combined in independent agencies. Congress had created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) in 2002, in the wake of the Enron scandal. The PCAOB had authority to promulgate accounting rules (a legislative function) and to prosecute firms that violated them (an executive function).

The Supreme Court said it could use a “blue-pencil” (a term from state line-item veto provisions) to eliminate those statutory provisions that gave the PCAOB executive functions, leaving it with only legislative-like functions, in which case PCAOB members could be protected from being fired except for cause. However, the court chose instead to leave the PCAOB with its executive functions, but to require that the president had to have at least indirect power (through the SEC) to remove PCAOB members when he wished.

These cases show how the court can deal with the Federal Reserve Board.  The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to “coin Money [and] regulate the value thereof.” In 1913, Congress delegated that legislative-branch authority to the newly created Federal Reserve Board. Congress also gave the Federal Reserve Board executive functions, including supervising the fiscal soundness of private banks that chose to be part of the Federal Reserve System, by watching over the kind of loans they made and reserves they kept on hand.

Independence of the Fed is most crucial in determining monetary policy. When that function was exercised directly by Congress in the 19th century, huge swings in the rate of inflation resulted. If President Trump can fire Fed governors over their differences on monetary policy, he will reintroduce political control of our central bank, undermining confidence in the dollar’s role in domestic and international finance.

It is far less crucial that the Fed supervise the lending behavior of its member banks. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) already performs that function for many banks; it could handle the Fed’s banks, too. Let the Fed continue its legislative function (to make monetary policy) without political interference, but it can lose its executive functions (regulating banks’ business activities).

The Supreme Court considered doing this surgery on the PCAOB; let it perform it now on the Fed.

Immediately after the court separates the Fed from its regulatory functions, the Congress should give those powers to the FDIC, whose chair, under current law, can be removed by the president at will.

America would have averted a constitutional crisis and a financial disaster.

Tom Campbell is a professor of law and a professor of economics at Chapman University. He was elected five times to the US Congress, serving on the banking and judiciary committees. He left the Republican Party in 2016 and is in the process of forming a new political party: the Common Sense Party in California.