In February 2022, engineers across northern Germany stared in disbelief as thousands of wind turbines went dark—not from mechanical failure, but a cyberattack on the KA-SAT satellite network known as AcidRain. The hack disabled remote control for nearly 5,800 ENERCON turbines across Germany and Central Europe, cutting over 10 gigawatts of power. Wind generation had hit a record high that month, averaging more than 30,000 megawatts and sharply reducing reliance on coal and gas.
The disruption extended beyond Germany: in France, nearly 9,000 satellite internet customers lost connectivity, and about a third of subscribers across several European countries—including Germany, France, Hungary, Greece, Italy, and Poland—were affected. What initially appeared to be a technical glitch in green energy was, in fact, a stark warning shot from orbit, occurring nearly simultaneously with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
A Bold Policy Shift
Three years later, Berlin has answered. In a dramatic move, Germany pledged €35 billion (US$41 billion) to military space defense over the next decade—the largest commitment of its kind in the country’s history. The investment signals that space is no longer a peripheral concern but a frontline of national security, NATO defense, and Europe’s strategic autonomy.
German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has sounded the alarm on the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure in space. Speaking at a Berlin space conference, he stressed that Germany must defend itself in orbit just as fiercely as it does on land, sea, and air. Pistorius warned that Russia and China have rapidly expanded their space warfare capabilities: they can disrupt satellite operations, blind satellites, manipulate them, or even destroy them kinetically. The German military has already felt the sting of jamming attacks—proof that space is no longer a safe frontier.
A Shock from Orbit
The ViaSat hack was a watershed moment. For the first time, millions of Germans saw that satellite vulnerabilities were not abstract—they could ripple into daily life, turning off turbines, disrupting internet access, and threatening energy security. In a country heavily invested in renewable energy and digital infrastructure, the attack served as a jarring reminder that a hostile act in orbit can instantly cascade into terrestrial disruption.
For Berlin, it marked the end of strategic complacency. Space could no longer be treated as a benign or secondary theater. The scale of the funding—€35 billion—represents an unprecedented investment in a single capability domain, rivaled only by broader defense spending increases since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This is not merely about buying satellites; it is a recognition that in 21st-century warfare, the frontlines now extend 36,000 kilometres above Earth.
Building Autonomous Capabilities
The German plan is ambitious and comprehensive, including:
Resilient satellite systems designed to withstand jamming, hacking, and kinetic threats.
Advanced orbital surveillance networks to detect and track hostile maneuvers or debris.
A dedicated military satellite operations centre, the first of its kind in Germany, under the Bundeswehr’s Space Command, integrated into the Air Force since 2021.
Berlin’s shift goes beyond passive systems. The program may extend into launch capabilities—ensuring Germany can deploy its own assets—and potentially into offensive tools designed to deter adversaries. Such a move would have been unthinkable only a decade ago.
Pistorius has made the rationale clear: repeated instances of Russian reconnaissance satellites shadowing German military communications satellites—proximity operations that could tip into aggression—justify the potential for offensive deterrence. Germany intends to defend its assets with more than words.
Strengthening NATO and EU Security
For NATO, Germany’s move could reshape space defense. Independent German assets provide redundancy in communications and reconnaissance if US systems are degraded, spreading risk across the alliance. Stronger German space capabilities allow NATO to integrate space with cyber, land, sea, and air operations more effectively.
Berlin’s commitment resonates across the EU. Space is increasingly seen not just as a defense asset but as a pillar of resilience. Navigation, communications, banking, and even agriculture depend on satellites. By taking the lead, Germany embeds space into the EU’s drive for strategic autonomy. Shared frameworks—from satellite defense to ensuring the continuity of Galileo, the EU’s GNSS operational since December 2016—stand to benefit directly.
The symbolism matters too. Europe has often struggled to translate economic weight into military clout. Germany’s move demonstrates leadership, signaling to allies and rivals alike that Europe will not remain a junior partner in space.
Legal and Normative Context
Germany’s pivot raises questions in international law. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans WMDs in orbit but is silent on conventional weapons or electronic warfare. By exploring offensive deterrence, Berlin enters a grey zone.
Supporters argue Germany is responding to an already dangerous reality: Russia has tested anti-satellite missiles, China has conducted kinetic strikes on its own satellites, and the U.S. has created a Space Force. Critics warn that Berlin risks accelerating the erosion of norms that once sought to keep space peaceful.
Either way, Germany is now a rule-shaper. Its choices will influence EU and NATO debates on arms control, responsible conduct, and crisis management in orbit, and may even help shape new international codes of conduct for space security.
Industrial and Economic Dimension
Germany’s aerospace and defense industries stand to gain. Airbus Defence & Space and OHB SE are likely frontrunners for contracts, while smaller firms in software, sensors, cybersecurity, and AI-guided satellite systems will grow alongside them.
Military-driven innovations—hardened encryption, autonomous navigation, advanced debris-tracking, resilient satellite power grids—often spin off into civilian markets, strengthening telecommunications, logistics, and climate monitoring. The €35 billion investment is thus as much strategic industrial policy as military spending, helping Europe compete with the U.S. and China in the global aerospace race.
Public Opinion and Political Debate
Domestically, the announcement has divided opinion. Germany’s post-war culture has long been wary of militarization, especially in new domains. Opposition parties question the wisdom of spending billions on orbital weapons amid economic pressures.
Yet geopolitical developments—Russia’s war in Ukraine and China’s assertive behavior in Asia—have shifted sentiment. Polls suggest growing acceptance that defense spending is necessary to protect infrastructure and deter coercion. In March 2025, Germany’s Bundestag approved a €500 billion defense and infrastructure package to counter ‘Putin’s war of aggression’, loosening constitutional debt limits. Passed with broad bipartisan support, the measure signals a growing consensus on strengthening national security.
Alliance Politics: Cooperation and Rivalry
Germany’s initiative reshapes alliance politics. France, with its advanced space program, may see Berlin as both collaborator and competitor. The U.S. has long urged allies to step up in high-tech domains. By taking responsibility, Germany contributes to collective deterrence, strengthens NATO cohesion, and underscores the strategic importance of emerging domains.
The Risk of Escalation
The real fear is escalation. Developing offensive space capabilities risks a classic security dilemma, where defensive measures can be seen as threatening. Moscow and Beijing could respond, fueling a spiral of competition. Even minor incidents—misinterpreted satellite maneuvers—could ignite crises.
Pistorius has stressed that Russian and Chinese activities pose tangible threats. Neutrality in space is no longer viable; Germany must build offensive capabilities to deter rivals rather than embolden them through restraint.
Entering the Military Space Race
Germany’s announcement places Europe in the modern space race, where dominance, survivability, and deterrence matter. Russia and China already field anti-satellite weapons; the U.S. has a Space Force. Germany signals it will not be left behind, potentially spurring other EU states to accelerate programs and laying groundwork for a collective European approach to space defense.
Long-Term Strategic Vision
Germany’s investment is more than satellites. It embeds space into an integrated defense ecosystem combining cyber, AI, and autonomous systems with traditional assets. Analysts see early building blocks of an EU Space Defence Doctrine—a framework that could make Europe a key player in orbital security by the 2030s.
A New Era in European Space Strategy
Germany’s billion-euro orbit gamble represents a fundamental recalibration of security thinking, placing orbit alongside land, sea, and air as a core domain of conflict and deterrence. The benefits are clear: strengthened NATO resilience, enhanced EU autonomy, industrial growth, and a louder German voice in shaping global norms. The risks are equally stark: escalation, domestic opposition, and the militarization of a domain once envisioned as peaceful.
Yet Berlin has concluded that the greater danger lies in inaction. By embracing space as a contested domain, Germany is not only defending its satellites—it is redefining Europe’s role in the next phase of global security. In doing so, it sends a clear signal: deterrence in space is essential, and shaping the rules of this emerging domain is as vital as protecting national territory. Germany’s move may set the template for European defense thinking for decades, balancing ambition, caution, and foresight in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.
About the authors:
Scott N. Romaniuk: Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
László Csicsmann: Full Professor and Head of the Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary; Senior Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA)