Turkey–Israel relations have entered one of their most tense periods in years, triggered by a series of regional developments that have transformed the two countries’ post-Gaza diplomatic crisis into a full-blown geopolitical confrontation. Turkey has condemned the humanitarian tragedy and devastation created by Israel’s war in Gaza since its very beginning. But the recent deterioration stems not just from Israel’s war crimes in the Strip but also from its expanding footprint across the region. Turkey’s opprobrium has been sharpened by Israel’s twelve-day, multi-front assault on Iranian territory, its repeated strikes on Syria, which Turkey increasingly views as a protected client, and—most significantly—its September 2025 attack on the Hamas delegation in Qatar, Ankara’s closest regional ally and a formally designated major non-NATO ally of the United States. Initially rooted in moral and humanitarian concerns—reinforced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s need to respond to mounting domestic political pressures—tensions have now expanded because Israel’s actions directly challenge Turkey’s standing in the region. For Ankara, the quarrel now feels less about morality than about raw security.
Different Logics of Escalation
Although the Gaza war has been the most visible trigger of the Turkish-Israeli regional confrontation, its logic is distinct from other confrontations. For Ankara, Gaza is not necessarily a strategic issue in its own right, but rather a question of morality and domestic political pressure. Erdoğan initially resisted taking concrete measures against Israel, but in response to deepening public anger over Gaza, he felt compelled to close Turkish airspace and suspend trade—measures that are in practice only partial, as bilateral commerce often flows indirectly, through third countries, and even—according to widespread perceptions—through circles close to the government.
In contrast to Gaza, Israel’s escalations in Iran, Syria, and Qatar represent a direct challenge to Turkish regional posture. Turkish anxieties are shaped less by humanitarian advocacy and more by shifts in the balance of power across the Middle East.
Syria: Contrasting Strategic Visions and Managed Rivalry
With a new post-Assad order taking shape in Damascus, Ankara sees Syria as the arena where its hand has strengthened most. The emergence of a Turkey-friendly regime in Damascus has substantially strengthened Turkey’s position in the Middle East, projecting Ankara as a central actor in shaping Syria’s future and, by extension, political dynamics of the region as a whole.
Turkey’s postwar vision for Syria centers on the creation of a unified, robust central state with functioning security institutions, capable of curbing threats from non-state actors and providing stability. Ankara also envisions an important role for itself in supporting Syria’s reconstruction. However, this role would primarily rely on Turkey’s technical expertise and its construction sector rather than financial contributions. Ankara hopes that funds from Gulf and Western sources could flow into Syria in ways that stimulate Turkey’s own construction industry and broader economy. Such a scenario presupposes a stable and orderly Syria, which is why Ankara places such emphasis on the creation of a strong central state.
In stark contrast, Israel’s strategic calculus favors a weak, decentralized, and persistently unstable Syria—ideally fragmented along ethnic or sectarian lines, with a military largely stripped of heavy capabilities, similar to Lebanon. This fundamental divergence puts Turkey and Israel at cross purposes inside Syria.
Israel’s posture has been proactive and, at times, explicitly hostile toward the Syrian government. Since Assad’s removal, Israel has carried out numerous air and ground operations across Syrian territory, degrading heavy military assets and striking command and logistics infrastructure. Israel has further expanded its illegal occupation of the Golan Heights and seeks to deny the reestablishment of any significant Syrian military presence south of Damascus, along the approaches to the Golan. In parallel, Israel positions itself as protector of the Druze minority, casting its role as defending this community against the authorities in Damascus.
These moves clash with Turkey’s intent to professionalize and centralize Syrian state security. In September 2025, Ankara began to train Syrian forces and has signaled its readiness to provide military assistance and air defense support with the ultimate aim of establishing its own military bases to help stabilize and extend its influence in Syria. Israel, however, has repeatedly preemptively attacked prospective basing sites, for example by striking airfields such as the former T4 facility—effectively an attempt to block a durable Turkish military presence. Turkey’s response has been restrained: its commitments to Syria have mostly come in the form of political backing, security assistance, and technical cooperation, rather than rapidly building bases or deploying military advisors en masse.
Despite the rivalry, both sides have so far worked to avoid a direct Turkey–Israel clash on Syrian soil. Azerbaijan has quietly explored whether its ties with both capitals could narrow their differences. While no breakthrough has emerged, back-channels do exist, and deconfliction among military and intelligence services has so far contained risks.
Iran: Between Zero-Sum Rivalry and Red Lines
Turkey’s approach to Iran is shaped by both competition and caution. On one hand, Ankara views its rivalry with Tehran in Syria and Iraq through a zero-sum lens. The weakening of Iran’s regional allies—whether in Iraq, Lebanon, or Syria—can, in practice, serve Turkish interests by creating space for Ankara to play a large political role. Indeed, Turkey’s current ascendancy in Syria was partly made possible by Israel’s repeated strikes against Hezbollah’s infrastructure in Lebanon. For this reason, while Ankara condemns Israeli attacks on Iranian-backed groups rhetorically, it is not necessarily alarmed by the strategic effects of such operations.
Nevertheless, Turkey draws a sharp distinction between proxy warfare and direct attacks on Iran itself. Whereas strikes targeting Iranian allies may suit Ankara’s ambitions, an operation against Iran’s own territory is viewed as a dangerous threshold raising risks of uncontrollable escalation and eroding international norms.
Here, Turkey’s stance converges with that of the Gulf monarchies, which are also wary of Iranian influence but prefer pragmatic coexistence over a collapse in Tehran that would endanger regional stability. Thus, while Turkey may gain from Iran’s weakened proxies, it shares the broader preference for a predictable rival rather than a failing neighbor.
Qatar: The Most Significant Escalation
Among the recent escalations, Israel’s attack on Qatar has been by far the most consequential for Turkey as it directly targeted Ankara’s closest ally in the Gulf and one of its most important strategic partners worldwide. For Turkey, Qatar is not simply a friendly state but a pillar of its foreign policy network: the two share deep financial ties, defense cooperation, and political alignment on issues ranging from Libya to the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar is also a major non-NATO ally of the United States, which makes the attack significant beyond the Turkey–Israel dyad.
In Turkey’s perception, Israel’s assault broke an even more consequential taboo than its campaign against Iran. That twelve-day assault had already shocked the region by normalizing direct attacks on a sovereign state, but the strike on Qatar took escalation to a qualitatively higher level. Within months, thresholds long assumed inviolate were crossed. This erosion of norms unsettled not only Turkey but also other actors who depend on regional stability.
Equally troubling for Ankara is what the attack revealed about Israel’s approach to the regional order. By targeting Qatar, Israel demonstrated its willingness to ignore the red lines that long constrained interstate force in the region—and challenge not only US adversaries but also states closely tied to Washington. For Turkey, the message was clear: Israel does not consider itself bound by prior regional equations, diplomatic understandings, or the deterrent value of the American security umbrella
Limits of Escalation
Even as rhetoric sharpens, structural limits make a full-scale confrontation unlikely. Turkey’s position differs both from Iran and from Qatar. Unlike Iran, Turkey is anchored in the Western system as a NATO member and does not adopt an openly hostile military posture toward Israel; its opposition has remained rhetorical. Ankara’s ties to Hamas were limited to the political bureau, and its Syrian allies have consistently avoided direct clashes with Israel, even seeking security arrangements that could normalize relations. Journalists have even challenged the truth of Erdogan’s claim that Turkey has suspended trade with Israel since 2023. From this perspective, neither Turkey nor its partners have crossed into actual enmity with Israel.
Turkey’s position is not the same as Qatar’s. Doha has outsourced much of its security to foreign bases and the US umbrella, leaving it unable to respond directly to Israeli attacks. Ankara, by contrast, retains significant military capacity and may not refrain from responding if attacked. This dual reality carries mixed implications: Turkey’s strength makes Israel more cautious about direct strikes, yet retaliation would be almost unavoidable if one occurred. For Ankara’s security elites, Tel Aviv’s repeated disregard for regional red lines makes the region more volatile. While a direct clash remains unlikely, the likeliest scenario for escalation is an unintended clash in Syria, where Israeli strikes could by miscalculation hit Turkish positions.
NATO membership adds another layer of deterrence. In principle, Ankara benefits from a collective security umbrella stronger than Qatar’s. Yet Turkey’s confidence in NATO has been eroded by past episodes in which collective defense was either publicly dismissed or left ambiguous——such as in 2015, when Ankara downed a Russian jet and NATO quickly made clear that Article 5 would not be invoked in the event of Russian retaliation, or in 2020, when Russian airstrikes killed dozens of Turkish soldiers in Syria but NATO limited its response to statements of political solidarity rather than new military commitments or operational support. More recently, the American failure to shield Qatar—and muted reactions to Russian drones over Poland—have further undermined confidence in the alliance. Many Turkish strategists now suspect that NATO would remain neutral in any confrontation between Turkey and Israel, particularly if it unfolded on Syrian soil.
Turkey’s own military posture reinforces these uncertainties. Over the past decade, Ankara’s armed forces have proven capable in external operations from Syria to Libya and Iraq, but largely against irregular groups rather than a peer adversary. Questions about readiness, highlighted during the sluggish earthquake response in 2023, are compounded by vulnerabilities in the air force. Ankara’s exclusion from the F-35 program, stalled F-16 modernization, and delays in acquiring Eurofighters have left an aging fleet. Pilot shortages after 2016 purges further undermined capability. Unlike Iran, which built a missile program to offset weaknesses, Turkey lacks comparable long-range strike capacity, creating a gap in its security posture.
For all these reasons, Turkey’s leadership continues to calibrate its responses: harsh rhetoric to satisfy domestic demands, symbolic measures like trade suspension to demonstrate resolve, but no irreversible steps toward conflict. Still, the very fact that scenarios of direct confrontation with Israel are now discussed—however unlikely—is itself a sign of how thresholds once thought unshakable have already eroded. And as long as Israel maintains an aggressive regional posture, the possibility of an unintended spiral remains real, even if neither side seeks it.
Domestic Politics as an Escalation Driver
The paradox of the current Turkey–Israel confrontation is that while direct military conflict remains unlikely, the political incentives on both sides push leaders toward ever-harsher rhetoric. In Turkey, the humanitarian tragedy in Gaza has resonated deeply, and Erdoğan faces mounting pressure from his constituency to take a firm line. His electoral setbacks and the ongoing economic crisis heighten the need to demonstrate strength abroad. Symbolic measures and denunciations allow him to regain political ground without fundamentally altering Turkey’s strategic posture.
In Israel, Netanyahu’s domestic imperatives are even more acute. His political survival depends on sustaining a siege mentality that keeps the public rallied behind his leadership despite deep internal divisions. Judicial reform battles, corruption charges, and coalition fragility all weaken his standing; escalation abroad offers a way to shift attention from domestic controversies. Confrontation with Turkey, particularly one cast as a clash of narratives over Gaza and regional order, reinforces his image as Israel’s indispensable defender.
The result is a cycle in which domestic politics amplifies external tensions. Both leaders find political value in uncompromising rhetoric, even though their strategic constraints make full-scale confrontation unlikely.
Conclusion: Thresholds Eroded, Order at Risk
Turkey–Israel relations over the past year reflect more than a bilateral dispute. Successive escalations have shattered thresholds once thought unbreakable in the regional order. Israel’s twelve-day campaign against Iran normalized direct strikes on a sovereign state; its subsequent attack on Qatar crossed an even higher threshold. Assumptions about what was off limits in Middle Eastern warfare have crumbled in a matter of months.
For Turkey, this erosion of red lines is unsettling. Even if Ankara avoids direct confrontation, the perception that no ally is truly safe undermines its strategic calculus. Other actors seeking stability—from the Gulf monarchies to Pakistan—have been alarmed as well. The recent Saudi–Pakistan security agreement reflects hedging in a world where US guarantees are in doubt and Israel acts without restraint.
The Qatar strike in particular has devastated the credibility of the American security umbrella. A country hosting multiple American and allied bases was targeted without consequence, convincing many in the region that Washington cannot or will not uphold its commitments. For Ankara, this reinforces doubts already sown by NATO’s passivity in earlier crises and underscores the need to rely more on national defense industries and autonomous capacity.
Yet the most urgent lesson lies with Washington itself. US unpredictability has become a destabilizing force, enabling Israel’s unilateral escalation to set the regional agenda. Unless Washington exercises real restraint on its ally, thresholds will continue to erode, raising risks of spirals no actor desires. Constraining Israel is essential both for regional stability and for restoring US security credibility.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: X/Recep Tayyip Erdoğan