Marrakech – In a display of profound political ignorance and blatant disregard for historical facts, Spanish MEP Irene Montero launched an inflammatory tirade in the European Parliament, condemning the recently signed EU-Morocco agricultural agreement as “illegal.”
Her baseless accusations, delivered with theatrical indignation, represent not merely a dissenting opinion but a dangerous distortion of established legal, historical, and diplomatic realities surrounding Morocco’s southern provinces.
The timing of Montero’s reckless speech is particularly telling, coming just days after Morocco and the European Union formalized a landmark agreement that ensures agricultural products from Morocco’s southern provinces maintain preferential access to European markets.
The agreement, signed on October 3 at the European Commission headquarters in Brussels, introduces origin labeling that specifically identifies goods from “Laayoune-Sakia El Hamra” and “Dakhla-Oued Eddahab” regions – a clear acknowledgment of these territories’ Moroccan identity.
And yet, Montero chooses to ignore a broader shift underway in the very chamber she sits in. In a time when MEPs such as Rima Hassan – herself of Palestinian origin and once sympathetic to pro-Polisario narratives – have categorically rejected Algeria and Polisario’s attempts to equate the Sahara with Palestine, Montero clings to outdated slogans.
Hassan has made it clear that the Sahara is a “frozen conflict” fundamentally distinct from Palestine, noting that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recognized Morocco’s historical, cultural, and legal ties to the territory.
Montero’s inflammatory rhetoric vs. historical reality
“The Sahara is a territory pending decolonization and subjected since 1975 to an illegal occupation by the Moroccan dictatorship,” Montero falsely claimed, revealing both historical ignorance and inflammatory rhetoric.
She further alleged that “the European Court of Justice has reaffirmed on numerous occasions, the last time in 2024, that the agreements between the European Union and Morocco cannot be applied to the Western Sahara without the express consent of the Saharawi people.”
These assertions fundamentally misconstrue the historical record. Spanish colonialism officially ended with the Madrid Accords of November 14, 1975, and Spain’s formal withdrawal from administration in early 1976. Spain explicitly notified the United Nations on February 26, 1976, that it had terminated its presence and responsibilities in the region.
This was not, as Montero deceptively portrays, an abandonment to “occupation,” but rather the culmination of a systematic decolonization process that had already seen Spain return Tarfaya to Morocco in 1958 and Sidi Ifni in 1969.
The ICJ’s 1975 advisory opinion – which Montero conveniently neglects to mention – explicitly recognized the pre-colonial legal ties of allegiance (bay‘a) between Saharan tribes and the Moroccan Sultan.
This crucial acknowledgment provides substantial evidence of Morocco’s historical and sovereign connection to the territory, demonstrating that the relationship between the southern provinces and the Moroccan throne long predates Spanish colonization.
Far from being an “occupation,” Morocco’s 1975-76 integration of the Sahara constitutes a legitimate restoration of territorial integrity, built upon centuries of allegiance, rather than the imposition of colonial rule.
False claims of ‘financing occupation’
Montero’s mischaracterization of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) rulings is particularly egregious. The ECJ did not declare “EU-Morocco relations illegal” as she implies.
In 2021, the General Court and in October 2024, the ECJ annulled the 2019 agricultural and fisheries decisions insofar as they applied to Western Sahara without addressing procedural consent defects. This was a ruling on process and consent – not a determination on sovereignty or a prohibition on engagement with Morocco.
The EU’s response has been precisely what the modified agreement represents: regulatory adjustment, not severance of ties. The revised arrangement explicitly labels origin while maintaining tariff preferences – a thoughtful attempt to comply with the ECJ’s consent/transparency requirements while informing European consumers.
Rather than the “illegality” Montero alleges, this represents the EU’s commitment to constructive diplomatic engagement.
“With this agreement, infrastructure for agriculture and desalination plants in occupied territories are being financed, contributing to the occupation,” Montero recklessly charged. “This agreement permits the commercialization of Sahrawi products as Moroccan products, benefiting large importing companies and forgetting that they are Sahrawi products and that it is the Sahrawis who have the right to decide about their commercialization.”
The reality is that Morocco places its greatest bid on what it builds inside its borders rather than what it says outside. Diplomacy, for Rabat, is ultimately the language of showcasing the tangible progress already happening on the ground – an invitation for others to “look at the inside.”
For Sahrawis, what truly matters is not empty slogans or symbolic endorsements, but the concrete services, infrastructure, and opportunities that Morocco delivers in their daily lives. This is Morocco’s wager: that real legitimacy comes from schools, hospitals, ports, desalination plants, and jobs – not from recycled rhetoric in distant parliaments.
Morocco has invested massively in transforming its southern provinces into a development hub, anchoring them in both the national economy and regional trade networks.
Flagship projects such as the Dakhla Atlantic Port – valued at more than $1 billion – are designed not only to serve the Sahara, but also to unlock opportunities for the entire Sahel and West Africa, particularly landlocked countries like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, by providing them direct maritime access to the Atlantic.
This strategic infrastructure is a cornerstone of Morocco’s Atlantic Africa Initiative, which seeks to integrate West African economies into global trade routes and reduce their dependency on Mediterranean or Gulf corridors.
Beyond the port, Morocco is building advanced desalination facilities and renewable-energy-powered water infrastructure in Dakhla and Laayoune, directly addressing the critical water scarcity challenges of the Sahara while setting a model for climate-resilient agriculture.
These initiatives reflect Morocco’s broader southern development model, launched in 2015, which channels billions of dollars into healthcare, education, renewable energy, logistics, and local governance reforms to ensure inclusive growth in the region.
On the European front, the EU-Morocco Green Partnership signed in October 2022 – the first of its kind with any non-EU country – cements Morocco’s role as a vital player in Europe’s energy transition.
It supports sustainable agriculture, forestry, and water security programs nationwide, while also enabling joint projects in green hydrogen and renewables that directly benefit the southern provinces.
Far from “funding occupation,” as Montero grossly misrepresents, this partnership builds traceability and transparency mechanisms into southern products, ensuring full compliance with EU legal standards and giving European consumers clarity about origin.
Taken together, these initiatives reflect Morocco’s commitment to sustainable development, regional connectivity, and economic opportunity – not only for its southern provinces, but for Africa at large.
They also show how Rabat is transforming the Sahara from a supposed “disputed zone” into a gateway for trans-African trade and green energy corridors, positioning Morocco as an indispensable partner for both Africa and Europe in the 21st century.
Diplomatic consensus contradicts Montero’s position
Montero’s accusation that the EU is “complicit” in what she terms an “illegal occupation” is particularly spurious given the growing international consensus supporting Morocco’s position. The recent agreement demonstrates the EU’s regulatory pragmatism, not complicity in any wrongdoing.
Away from “criminalizing” trade with the Sahara as Montero implies, the EU has conscientiously adapted its approach to maintain beneficial economic relations while ensuring transparency through origin labeling.
“We demand both from the Government of Spain and the European Union and the European Commission to reject the illegal Autonomy Plan of the Moroccan dictatorship,” Montero declared, once again displaying profound ignorance of diplomatic realities.
Her demand stands in stark contrast to the growing list of nations that have explicitly endorsed Morocco’s Autonomy Initiative as the most viable path forward.
Crucially, these endorsements recognize the plan not merely as a starting point for discussion, but as the workable end-state around which a durable, realistic, and pragmatic resolution can finally be consolidated.
The United States formally recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in December 2020. Spain itself, under Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, officially described Morocco’s Autonomy Plan as the “most serious, credible and realistic” basis for resolution in 2022.
This pivotal shift by Madrid ended a 10-month diplomatic rift with Rabat and launched a comprehensive bilateral roadmap covering migration, customs, energy, maritime delimitation, and investment.
Germany, in 2022 and again in 2024, called Morocco’s plan a “serious and credible” basis within the UN process. The Netherlands similarly endorsed it as “serious and credible” in 2022. Belgium characterized it as a “good basis” in 2024, while Israel recognized Moroccan sovereignty outright in 2023.
In 2025, the United Kingdom publicly endorsed the Autonomy Plan as the “most credible, viable, pragmatic path,” with Portugal following suit by describing it as a “serious and credible basis.”
Spain’s pragmatic shift vs. Montero’s ideological rigidity
Montero further made her fringe position clear with her claim that “Sánchez, like von der Leyen, is complicit at this moment in the illegal occupation of Western Sahara and also complicit with the Moroccan dictatorship.” This incendiary rhetoric fundamentally misunderstands Spain’s strategic calculation.
Spain’s 2022 policy shift toward supporting Morocco’s Autonomy Initiative was not “complicity” but a pragmatic recognition of geopolitical reality after the painful lessons of the May 2021 Ceuta crisis, when 8,000+ migrants crossed into the Spanish enclave amid loosened border controls.
This episode starkly demonstrated to Madrid the critical importance of functional cooperation with Rabat on border security, migration management, and regional stability.
Prime Minister Sánchez defended this strategic realignment in Parliament as essential for Spain’s national interest, securing border stability for Ceuta and Melilla while strengthening broader bilateral relations.
The decision recognized Morocco’s indispensable role in Spain’s security framework, particularly regarding migration control, counter-terrorism cooperation, and economic stability.
Montero’s strident accusations of “occupation” also reveal profound hypocrisy given Spain’s continued sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla – European enclaves on African soil dating back to imperial conquests. If Morocco’s presence in its southern territories constitutes “occupation,” what term would Montero apply to these Spanish possessions that Morocco officially disputes?
The same question extends to the Spanish-held islets and rocks known as plazas de soberanía, including Perejil/Leila, Alhucemas, Vélez de la Gomera, and Chafarinas.
Even NATO coverage for Ceuta and Melilla has been legally ambiguous for years, as Article 6 of the Alliance treaty refers to “Europe or North America” territories, while these enclaves are geographically in Africa. This has led to periodic “map controversies” and carefully worded NATO statements that underscore the legally tenuous nature of Spain’s positions.
The 2002 Perejil/Leila crisis required US mediation to resolve, demonstrating the fragility of these colonial legacies. Montero’s selective moral outrage about “occupation” conveniently ignores these uncomfortable parallels that would require critical examination of Spain’s own colonial survivals in North Africa.
UN process evolution contradicts Montero’s claims
Montero’s demand for a “referendum of self-determination” as the sole legitimate path forward ignores the significant evolution in UN Security Council approaches to the Western Sahara question.
For nearly two decades, the Security Council’s operative language has dropped explicit instructions to organize a referendum, instead urging a “realistic, practicable/pragmatic, enduring and mutually acceptable political solution” based on compromise.
This shift recognizes the practical collapse of the referendum process in the 1990s-2000s under irreconcilable voter eligibility disputes and appeals. In 2008, the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy Peter van Walsum explicitly told the Security Council that independence via referendum was “not a realistic option” – the clearest possible signal that the UN system has moved beyond the referendum paradigm.
Current UN envoy Staffan de Mistura’s trajectory has driven the final nail into Algeria’s exhausted Western Sahara playbook. After briefly testing partition ideas in the face of zero traction for a 1991-style referendum, he has shifted to what the diplomatic center of gravity already recognizes: concrete, workable autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.
That pivot – coupled with the steady international momentum behind Morocco’s 2007 plan – lays bare the bankruptcy of Algeria’s referendum rhetoric and exposes its hegemonic ambitions in southern Morocco.
At this stage, the logical next step is procedural, not philosophical: the UN should invite Morocco to table the operational blueprint – institutions, timelines, competencies – for “broad autonomy” so implementation can move on a reasonable schedule.
In substance and in tone, this evolution confirms what seasoned observers have long understood: there is no feasible end-state outside the parameters of Morocco’s Autonomy Initiative; everything else is political theater kept alive by habit, not by facts.
These developments underscore how far the UN facilitation has moved from the 1991 referendum concept that Montero stubbornly clings to.
It goes without saying that if Madrid truly cared about the “self-determination” of peoples around the world, it would begin by granting that right to its own separatist movements – Catalonia, the Basque Country, and others – rather than selectively invoking the principle only when it serves to undermine Morocco’s sovereignty.
In reality, this rhetoric is a political card that benefits Spain more inside than outside: nationalist and far-left parties exploit hostility toward Morocco not out of principle, but as a convenient tool to score points in domestic politics and distract from their own contradictions at home.
EU gains stability through Morocco’s southern growth
The agricultural agreement Montero so vehemently condemns delivers tangible economic benefits that her ideological posturing cannot match.
According to Rachid Bennali, President of the Moroccan Confederation of Agriculture and Rural Development, the agreement will “enhance existing investments in the southern regions and attract new ones” while contributing to “economic and social development” and creating “new jobs in agriculture and related sectors.”
Bennali specifically noted that the agreement “opens new horizons for the agricultural sector, particularly for small and medium producers looking to expand into European markets.” This practical focus on economic opportunity and sustainable development stands in stark contrast to Montero’s abstract political grievances.
Morocco’s Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita stressed that the agreement “makes a qualitative contribution at the national level” by supporting agricultural GDP and employment, particularly in the southern provinces.
Beyond agriculture, the EU-Morocco partnership extends across political, social, environmental, migration, mobility, security, digital, and cultural domains, reflecting a comprehensive relationship far deeper than Montero’s reductionist characterization suggests.
The diplomat described the deal as “not a political accord but a sectoral, commercial, and operational one” that nevertheless “sends strong and clear signals.”
He attributed Morocco’s southern development strategy to the “enlightened vision” of King Mohammed VI, through which the southern provinces have become “a zone of development, connectivity, and prosperity, a hub of stability and regional growth.”
In today’s Morocco-France Dakhla Economic Forum, the Moroccan General Confederation of Enterprises (CGEM) declared that “this accord positions the southern provinces as a premier investment destination for European and international investors.”
In this regard, what makes Montero’s stance even more detached from reality is that France itself – long Algeria’s most reliable ally in Europe – has now publicly realigned behind Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara by organizing this very forum.
“I would like to reaffirm this morning that the French State encourages and will continue to support our companies in their investments in the regions of the Sahara,” affirmed the French ambassador Christophe Lecourtier during the event.
Morocco’s Autonomy Plan outpaces outdated separatist illusions
Montero’s Podemos party, which garnered a mere 61 votes when she challenged Roberta Metsola for the EP presidency in July 2024, represents a fringe position far removed from both Spain’s official policy and the broader European consensus.
The rhetoric of “self-determination” that Montero employs belongs to a bygone era of 1970s slogans, superseded by 21st-century diplomatic realism, international law, and pragmatic national interests.
Her politically motivated attempt to undermine a constructive economic agreement reveals not principle but a dangerous ideological rigidity fundamentally at odds with the urgent quest for regional development and stability.
Spain itself has learned the hard way why siding with Polisario is reckless: the group’s record vis-à-vis Spain is one of violence, kidnappings, and bloodshed – and in June, US Representative Joe Wilson introduced legislation aiming to designate the Polisario Front as a terrorist organization.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Spanish fishermen and crews operating off Saharan waters were repeatedly targeted – most infamously in the Cruz del Mar massacre (1978), when seven Spaniards were killed, and in 1980, when international wires reported the kidnapping of 25 Spanish sailors. Victims’ families and associations, such as ACAVITE, have continued to press Spanish courts for accountability.
This history of violence, compounded by Polisario’s increasingly hardline rhetoric since 2020, has marked the separatist movement as a national security liability in Madrid’s eyes, not a trustworthy partner.
That is why, while humanitarian solidarity may persist in some Spanish circles, the Spanish state’s actual policy has converged on pragmatic alignment with Rabat’s autonomy framework as the only path to lasting stability.
As Morocco continues its substantial investments in infrastructure projects that integrate its southern provinces into national and international value chains, the antiquated slogans of politicians like Montero grow increasingly irrelevant.
The EU-Morocco agricultural agreement represents not complicity in wrongdoing, but recognition of geopolitical reality and a commitment to economic development that benefits all residents of Morocco’s southern provinces.