In every segment of the economy, there are healthy or even fierce rivalries among stakeholders for market share, and the global crude oil supply market is no different. The larger a producer’s share, the greater the influence it can exert. This prize used to belong almost exclusively to the OPEC producer group. At times, the alliance accounted for nearly 40% of global crude oil supply, as shown in the graph.
In recent years, however, the group has been forced to surrender some of this territory. Output from countries outside the cartel, most notably the United States, following the birth of the shale industry, has grown almost exponentially. Giving up part of its market share was as much a necessity as it was a choice. The supply war in the second half of 2014, which failed to curb US oil output and drove the price of the CME Group flagship Crude contract, WTI, from $108/bbl to $44/bbl in just seven months, remains the clearest example of the shale sector’s adaptability.
OPEC has therefore continued to pursue a pragmatic strategy: reducing output during periods of surplus and raising it when a supply deficit looms. Over the past three years, its share of the global supply market has fallen to its lowest level in 15 years (excluding the turbulent post-COVID period). At 35%, it has voluntarily curtailed production substantially to support prices. This strategy, however, came to an abrupt halt when the group decided to restore these barrels to the market over the course of 2026. In fact, a few months ago, OPEC announced plans to accelerate the unwinding of these constraints.
Several factors lie behind this move to reclaim lost ground. The recent production cuts failed to achieve their intended effect: Oil prices did not rise but instead declined. The OPEC basket price fell from $82/bbl in January 2023 to $70/bbl by September 2025. Several member states have already reached their production limits, so any quota increase will likely be met by Persian Gulf producers with spare capacity. The geopolitical backdrop, particularly Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, also supports a gradual rise in OPEC output. An added benefit is that increasing production will not incur the wrath of the U.S. administration, as domestic retail gasoline prices remain comparatively subdued. It is also worth noting that by preventing prices from rallying through a gradual increase in output, OPEC makes renewable energy less competitive.
In a nutshell, there is a growing sense that OPEC is now comfortable with a price band of $50 – $75/bbl and focuses on its market share. Unless prices fall below the lower end of this range for a prolonged period, further increases in the group’s output appear likely. As a result, OPEC’s portion of the global supply market is expected to rise, while that of the U.S., given its slowing growth rate, will probably retreat from its historic peak of 17%.