Russian forces launched a large, combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of October 9 to 10, primarily targeting energy infrastructure and civilian targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Lipetsk Oblast; 14 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and 12 Iskander-K cruise missiles from Rostov and Bryansk oblasts and occupied Crimea; four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles; and 465 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which roughly 200 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo and Shakhty, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 405 drones; one Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile; four Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; nine Iskander-K cruise missiles; and one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and that four missiles were “lost” or suppressed, likely by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW). The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 13 missiles and 60 drones struck 19 locations, and downed debris fell on seven locations.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian strikes injured over 20 civilians and killed a child in Zaporizhzhia City.[2] Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes caused power outages in Kyiv City and Oblast and Donetsk, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, and that Russian forces also targeted Zaporizhia, Kirovohrad, and Kherson oblasts. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha noted that October 10 is also the third anniversary of the first major Russian strike on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in 2022, underscoring Russia’s annual efforts to undermine Ukrainian morale by striking energy infrastructure during the fall and winter.[3] Poltava Oblast Military Administration Head Volodymyr Kohut reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure left 16,578 households in Poltava Oblast without electricity.[4] Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that the Russian strikes left 5,800 apartment buildings and homes without power and water in the city.[5] Russia has increasingly used recent strikes to target smaller regional Ukrainian energy facilities with more limited air defenses, likely in an effort to capitalize on Ukraine’s limited number of Patriot air defense systems.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russia is prioritizing strikes against civilian and energy infrastructure to continue its long-standing campaign to degrade Ukraine’s energy security ahead of winter 2025-2026 and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[7] Russia’s ongoing and ever-intensifying long-range strike campaign against Ukraine is just one indicator of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s disinterest in peace.
The Kremlin continues parallel efforts to curry favor with the United States while deflecting blame onto Ukraine and Europe for stalling negotiations on ending the war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on October 10 that Russia and the United States have an understanding of how to resolve Russia’s war in Ukraine peacefully but caveated that these are complex issues that take time to solve.[8] Putin also claimed that he and US President Donald Trump agreed during talks in Alaska in August 2025 that both would need to consult with colleagues and allies regarding peace in Ukraine before continuing negotiations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that “Ukraine’s reluctance to respond to Russia’s proposals” has stalled the Istanbul negotiation process.[9] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov told Russian business outlet Kommersant in an interview published on October 10 entitled “Russia made concessions at the Anchorage talks,” that Putin articulated his willingness to make concessions on resolving Russia’s war in Ukraine and that Russia “made certain concessions [in Anchorage].”[10] Ushakov noted Russia’s readiness to “take certain steps” toward the peace initiative but claimed that “this concession” is contingent upon the United States working with Europe and Ukraine.[11] Ushakov’s statement appears at odds with the article’s title, given that Ushakov asserts that it would be a “mistake” for Russia to discuss any concession to Ukraine at this moment. It remains unclear why Kommersant would choose to title the article “Russia made concessions at the Anchorage talks,” as the Kremlin has consistently messaged its unwillingness to make concessions to its domestic audience and has devoted significant resources to justifying its unyielding demands to the Russian population.[12] The Kremlin may be leveraging Kommersant’s article to gauge the Russian population’s reaction to any future Russian concessions in Ukraine, although it is unlikely that the Kremlin intends to follow through with any real concessions. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains committed to currying favor with the United States as part of a dual effort to normalize bilateral relations with the United States for economic and political gain while inhibiting the peace initiative in Ukraine.[13] ISW similarly continues to assess that Russia seeks to continue its long-standing effort to discredit Ukraine and Europe and undermine Western cohesion.[14]
Putin also continued to threaten the West as part of his reflexive control campaign aimed at preventing the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine and portraying Russia’s continued adherence to the New START treaty as a meaningful concession in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Putin threatened on October 10 that Russia would strengthen its air defenses in response to potential US provisions of Tomahawk missiles and claimed that Russia is finalizing the development of a new, presumably nuclear, weapon that he will soon announce.[15] A Kremlin insider source claimed that Russia may soon resume nuclear testing if Western countries take similar steps.[16] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to portray potential US Tomahawk deliveries to Ukraine as a dangerous escalation to deter the United States from sending such weapons to Ukraine, although the Kremlin has consistently failed to respond when the West violated Russia’s supposed “red lines” in the past.[17]
Putin also claimed that there is still enough time to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) after it expires on February 5, 2026 and that an agreement with the US on arms control would be “acceptable and useful” to Russia.[18] Putin’s statements are a continuation of Kremlin rhetoric that aims to portray Russia’s continued adherence to the New START treaty and potential arms control agreements as an indicator of Russia’s good faith to end the war in Ukraine and a meaningful concession to avoid engaging in genuine negotiations to end the war.[19] Russia’s ongoing strikes against Ukraine, repeated efforts to delay negotiations and then deflect blame for the delay onto Ukraine, and ongoing threats, including nuclear saber rattling, against the West indicate that Putin is disinterested in a peaceful and just ending to the war in Ukraine.
US First Lady Melania Trump announced that she assisted efforts to return seven Ukrainian children that Russia abducted. Trump announced on October 10 that her representatives worked with Russian President Vladimir Putin to return seven Ukrainian children that Russian authorities had abducted, and that Russia also agreed to return Ukrainian children who had turned 18.[20] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev amplified Trump’s speech on X (formerly Twitter), implicitly admitting to Russia’s deportation of Ukrainian children.[21] Ukraine has been able to verify Russia’s deportation of 19,546 children to date, although the true figure is likely to be much higher because Russia frequently targets vulnerable children without anyone to speak for them.[22] Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab reported that the number of deported children is likely closer to 35,000 as of March 19, 2025.[23] Russian State Duma Deputy Grigory Karasin and Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova claimed in 2023 that Russia had “accepted” over 700,000 Ukrainian children since February 24, 2022.[24]
Ukraine’s European partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on October 10 that it signed an agreement with the German MoD to provide financial support for key projects that support the digitization of Ukraine’s defense sector, including Ukraine’s DELTA battlefield management program, Army+ and Reserve+ systems, the DOT-Chain Defense Marketplace, and strengthening Ukraine’s cyber defense.[25] German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on October 10 that it will supply Ukraine with an unspecified number of additional Skyranger 35 mobile ground-based air defense systems based on the Leopard 1 tank chassis and that the contract is valued at hundreds of millions of euros, which an unspecified EU member state will finance using frozen Russian assets.[26] The United Kingdom (UK) announced on October 10 that the UK recently delivered hundreds of Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM) to Ukraine five months ahead of schedule.[27] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 10 that Ukraine and the Netherlands signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on joint drone production.[28]
Key Takeaways
Russian forces launched a large, combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of October 9 to 10, primarily targeting energy infrastructure and civilian targets.
The Kremlin continues parallel efforts to curry favor with the United States while deflecting blame onto Ukraine and Europe for stalling negotiations on ending the war in Ukraine.
Putin also continued to threaten the West as part of his reflexive control campaign aimed at preventing the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine and portraying Russia’s continued adherence to the New START treaty as a meaningful concession in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
US First Lady Melania Trump announced that she assisted efforts to return seven Ukrainian children that Russia abducted.
Ukraine’s European partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
Ukrainian forces advanced near Siversk and Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast; the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas; and near Borova, Lyman, and Velykomykhailivka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of October 8 to 9. Russian opposition outlet Astra confirmed on October 9 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Matveev Kurgan oil depot in Rostov Oblast on the night of October 8 to 9.[29] Astra geolocated footage of а fire that the strike caused to a storage tank at the depot, which has an annual turnover of up to 25,000 tons of gasoline and diesel fuel.[30] Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar claimed on October 9 that Russian forces downed three Ukrainian drones in Matveyev-Kurgansky Raion and that drone debris damaged residential buildings in Matveev Kurgan.[31]
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 10 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), Varachyne (north of Sumy City), and Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[32]
Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Novyi Put; north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Varachyne, and Oleksiivka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on October 9 and 10.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka.[34]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces complained on October 9 that North Korean forces are not helping Russian troops in combat in Sumy Oblast and are instead conducting demining and anti-drone operations in Kursk Oblast.[35] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces trained North Korean forces in drone operations. The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) accidentally killed North Korean servicemembers in a friendly fire incident in early September.[36] The milblogger claimed on October 10 that North Korean forces manning checkpoints sometimes block the movement of Russian artillery and vehicles along roads due to misunderstandings.[37] The milblogger complained that Russian hospitals treating wounded North Korean servicemembers allow the soldiers to use mobile phones, unlike Russian servicemembers, and feed North Korean servicemembers better than Russian servicemembers.[38]
The milblogger also claimed on October 10 that the Russian 1st Specialized Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) created its own unsanctioned hospital and only sends seriously wounded servicemembers to the facility while treating all other wounded on-site.[39] The milblogger claimed that soldiers often must purchase their own medicine and food. The milblogger claimed that Russian authorities often force wounded soldiers to leave before they are fully healed, withhold antibiotics from the wounded, and sometimes only allow servicemembers’ hospitalization when wounds turn gangrenous. The milblogger claimed that wounded Russian servicemembers often fall ill with respiratory diseases due to the unheated hospital building.
The milblogger claimed on October 10 that the new commander of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast, banned artillerists of the regiment from taking leave and that many servicemembers have been fighting for over a year without leave and are fatigued.[40] The milblogger claimed that Russian commanders also deny leave to artillerists of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) unless servicemembers pay bribes at a rate of 150,000 rubles ($1838) per week of leave.[41] The milblogger claimed that Russian commanders claim that they will continue to refuse leave until Russian forces seize Sumy City.
The milblogger claimed on October 10 that the Russian military command continues to accumulate forces near Kindrativka and plans to reinforce Russian forces near Tetkino but has not yet resolved logistics problems in the area.[42]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) are striking Ukrainian forces northeast of Stepne (northwest of Sumy City).[43] Drone operators of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[44] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast border areas.[45]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 10 but did not make confirmed advances.
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) contrary to Russian claims.[46]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Vovchansk.[47]
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward the Travyanske Reservoir, Lyptsi, and Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on October 9 and 10.[48]
A Russian defense industrial base (DIB) representative claimed that Russian forces are testing an octocopter drone capable of carrying TM-62 anti-tank mines and payloads up to 12kg in the Kharkiv direction.[49]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Dovhenke and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on October 9 and 10 but did not advance.[50]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2
Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Stroivka and toward Kolodyazne, Dvorichanske, and Bolohivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, Pishchane, and Ivanivka and toward Kurylivka on October 9 and 10.[51]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 (the Russian iteration of the Iranian Shahed-136 drone) strike against Lozove (northwest of Kupyansk).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted four FAB-500 glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Kurylivka and a FAB-3000 glide bomb strike on underground fortified Ukrainian positions in eastern Kupyansk.[53]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Izyumskyi Raion, Kharkiv Oblast.[54]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[55]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Bohuslavka, east of Borova near Kopanky, and southeast of Borova near Olhivka on October 9 and 10.[56]
The commander of a Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile battery operating in the Borova direction reported that Russian forces have a three-to-one personnel superiority ratio over Ukrainian forces.[57] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces recently conducted an infiltration operation into the rear of Hrekivka (southeast of Borova) and captured Russian servicemembers.
The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces conducted a FAB-3000 glide bomb and Kh-39 missile strike against Ukrainian positions near Vyshneve (east of Borova) and Bohuslavka.[58]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hrekivka.[59]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in northeastern Yampil (southeast of Lyman) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[60]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern and central Yampil.[61]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, Serednie, and Derylove; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, and Novyi Myr and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 9 and 10.[62]
The acting command post head of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces have become more active in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) and that Russian forces are only using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in the rear.[63]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook positions west of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[64]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Zvanivka (south of Siversk), although this claimed advance did not occur within the last 24 hours.[65]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Novoselivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on October 9 and 10.[66]
Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on October 10 that Russian forces are conducting fewer assaults in the Siversk direction and are accumulating forces at the Lysychansk Oil Refinery in occupied Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) in preparation to re-intensify armored assaults in the future.[67]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 9 and 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of and within southern Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of the settlement during a company-sized mechanized assault.[69] Additional geolocated footage published on October 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[70]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 9 and 10 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions east of Kleban-Byk (south of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in areas that Russian sources previously claimed to be under Russian control.[71]
Unconfirmed Claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups advanced into eastern Kostyantynivka.[72]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Bila Hora; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Kleban-Byk, and Pleshchiivka and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 9 and 10.[73]
Zaporozhets stated that Russian assaults have also become less intense in the Kramatorsk (north of Kostyantynivka) direction and that Russian forces will likely intensify assaults near Chasiv Yar and Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka) if there is warmer weather for several days in the near future.[74] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on October 9 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike in Kostyantynivka that killed one civilian and injured four others.[75]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and drone operators of the Shaman group of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Berestok.[76] Drone operators of the Russian 4th Assault Battalion of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions west of Shcherbynivka.[77]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[78]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Toretske (northeast of Dobropillya), to southeastern Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya), into central Ivanivka (east of Dobropillya), to the western outskirts of Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya), and southwest of Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya).[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Boikivka (southeast of Dobropillya).[80]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar, Vesele, and Hruzke; east of Dobropillya near Shakove and Nove Shakove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on October 9 and 10.[81] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Bilytske toward Dorozhnie and Zapovidne (both southeast of Dobropillya).[82]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on October 10 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed Claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk) and east of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[83] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing into Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), although a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger denied these claims.[84] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the Pokrovska Mine No. 1 north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[85]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoreske, Sukhetske, Novoekonomichne, and Myrolyubivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 9 and 10.[86] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok.[87]
The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Force reported on October 10 that Ukraine is deploying additional forces to help stabilize the situation in the Pokrovsk area and that the Russian military command intends to intensify assaults near Zvirove and west and south of Pokrovsk in order to advance into Pokrovsk itself.[88] The corps reported that Russia redeployed elements of the 1487th Motorized Rifle Regiment (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], SMD) and the 86th and 87th separate rifle regiments (likely both of the 1st Slavic Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) to reinforce Russian efforts south and southeast of Pokrovsk.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[89]
Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Udachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste and Ivanivka on October 9 and 10.[90]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Kotlyarivka.[91]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 10 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Oleksandrohrad (northeast of Velykomykhailivka) and in central Oleksiivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[92]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Vorone, and Berezove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksiivka on October 9 and 10.[93] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka.[94]
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the northern outskirts of and within southeastern Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[95]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Malynivka, Poltavka, Novohryhorivka, Uspenivka, and Novovasylivske on October 9 and 10.[96]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Novouspenivske (northeast of Hulyaipole).[97] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Hulyaipole direction.[98]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Novoandriivka, Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Plavni; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on October 9 and 10.[99]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division and elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[100]
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on October 9 that Ukrainian and Russian authorities have started working to repair two power lines to restore external power to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which has been relying on backup diesel generators to power its cooling pumps since roughly September 26.[101]
Russian forces continued assaults in the Kherson direction on October 9 and 10 but did not advance.[102]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian boats operating in the Kherson direction.[103]
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov reported on October 10 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike that destroyed a Russian “Nebo-M” radar complex worth roughly $100 million in occupied Crimea, using satellite data for target acquisition and naval drones for aerial drone transport closer to the target.[104]
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
See topline text.
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarus continues to offset the economic costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Belarusian state news agency Belta claimed on October 9 that Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Karankevich and Russian state energy operator Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller signed a roadmap cooperation agreement for 2025 to 2030 to increase Belarusian oil and gas exports to Russia, “facilitate the production of modern machinery and equipment for the energy sector, and enhance bilateral technology cooperation.”[105] Russia is struggling to procure parts to repair Russian oil refineries following pervasive Ukrainian strikes due to international sanctions that complicate Russia’s ability to repair technologically complex oil refinery facilities, and this agreement reinforces Belarus’s role as a vital sanction evasion tool for Russia.[106]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
Endnotes
[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/44381
[2] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1976533716202590557
[3] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1976524891705745828
[4] https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/27647 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/10/na-poltavshhyni-rosijskyj-obstril-poshkodyv-obyekt-energetychnoyi-infrastruktury/
[5] https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1879; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/10/naslidky-rosijskogo-obstrilu-v-kyyevi-pereboyi-z-vodoyu-ta-svitlom-ye-zminy-v-roboti-metro/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2025/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/
[8] https://tass dot ru/politika/25311855
[9] https://tass dot ru/politika/25307533
[10] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8117296
[11] https://tass dot ru/politika/25313095
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2025/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar07292025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2025/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/
[15] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78186; https://t.me/tass_agency/343297 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/343298 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/343299
[16] https://t.me/arbat/2172
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2025/
[18] https://t.me/tass_agency/343300
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2025/;
[20] https://x.com/i/broadcasts/1lDxLBqLPMkGm
[21] https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1976665471698280772
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/putin-is-still-stealing-ukrainian-children-2/; https://childrenofwar.gov dot ua/en/
[23] https://www.rferl.org/a/yale-ukraine-war-crimes-investigation/33351956.html
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_3-17/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_24-6/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/putin-is-still-stealing-ukrainian-children-2/
[25] https://mod dot gov.ua/news/ministerstva-oboroni-ukrayini-ta-nimechchini-domovilis-pro-dovgostrokove-partnerstvo-u-sferi-czifrovizacziyi; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/09/ministerstva-oborony-ukrayiny-ta-nimechchyny-domovylys-pro-dovgostrokove-partnerstvo-u-sferi-czyfrovizacziyi/
[26] https://www dot rheinmetall.com/de/media/news-watch/news/2025/10/2025-10-10-rheinmetall-skyranger-35-ukraine
[27] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hundreds-of-missiles-delivered-to-ukraine-months-ahead-of-schedule-as-uk-leads-kyiv-trade-delegation
[28] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1976672729672601721 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/ukrayina-ta-niderlandi-spilno-viroblyatimut-droni-volodimir-100729
[29] https://t.me/astrapress/94271
[30] https://t.me/astrapress/94271
[31] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/3473
[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/29762; https://t.me/severnnyi/5340
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032; https://t.me/dva_majors/80998; https://t.me/severnnyi/5340; https://t.me/wargonzo/29762; https://t.me/severnnyi/5340
[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/29762
[35] https://t.me/severnnyi/5336; https://t.me/severnnyi/5106
[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/5337
[37] https://t.me/severnnyi/5342
[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/5342
[39] https://t.me/severnnyi/5341
[40 https://t.me/severnnyi/5343; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2025/
[41] https://t.me/severnnyi/5344
[42] https://t.me/severnnyi/5340
[43] https://t.me/armycorp44/210; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1976366196921598463
[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34792
[45] https://t.me/epoddubny/25088
[46] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1976362425671880762; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/12439
[47] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32604
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14345
[49] https://t.me/tass_agency/343211; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/25306293
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34806 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14345 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/80998 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29762
[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/343236 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/57427
[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34806
[54] https://t.me/epoddubny/25088
[55] https://t.me/ceroke24/3881; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10224
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032
[57] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/10/pihota-zahodyt-nizhkamy-nepodalik-borovoyi-do-pozyczij-syl-oborony-dohodyt-odyn-z-shesty-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv/
[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/57425
[59] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1976440551030522077 ; https://t.me/Visla3/2734
[60] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1976575464853664151; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1976547902836121753; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2163
[61] https://t.me/kalashgroup3/120; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10212
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34817
[63] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e1e3dP4cCgo; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/10/kozhen-dron-znahodyt-svogo-rusaka-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-u-vijnu-droniv-vklyuchylysya-nazemni-roboty/
[64] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1976675600753631292 ; https://t.me/OMSBr_123/767
[65] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34826
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032
[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/10/tehnika-chekaye-na-lysychanskomu-npz-rosiyany-gotuyutsya-atakuvaty-pid-chas-babynogo-lita/
[68] https://t.me/black_swan_ukraine/416; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1976684459027267876; https://t.me/azov_media/7397 https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10210 ; https://x.com/DPSU_ua/status/1976671149619826968; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1976685545557213273
[69] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/101464 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32601 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29762
[70] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/197663964840841259; https://t.me/Legion_W_Bat1/1001
[71] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1976646309776875819; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1976648638505083206; https://t.me/batAfipsa/987; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/3107
[72] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/101458
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032; https://t.me/wargonzo/29762
[74] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/10/tehnika-chekaye-na-lysychanskomu-npz-rosiyany-gotuyutsya-atakuvaty-pid-chas-babynogo-lita/
[75] https://t.me/astrapress/94282
[76] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14399
[77] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1976646309776875819; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1976648638505083206; https://t.me/batAfipsa/987; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/3107
[78] https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/7880; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10208
[79] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32607 ; https://t.me/rybar/74285; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/101464; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32601 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/43197
[80] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/101464; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32601; https://t.me/motopatriot78/43197
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34784 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29762 ; https://t.me/rybar/74285 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68051
[82] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68051 ; https://t.me/rybar/74285
[83] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32607
[84] https://t.me/wargonzo/29762 ; https://t.me/rybar/74285 https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34786
[85] https://t.me/wargonzo/29762
[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032; https://t.me/rybar/74285 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29762
[87] https://t.me/rybar/74285
[88] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1KVxWRkiXD/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/10/7-j-korpus-dshv-strymuye-voroga-pid-pokrovskom-likvidovano-sotni-okupantiv-i-ponad-tysyachu-bpla/
[89] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1976349556284801278 ; https://t.me/urga_74/7068
[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/80998 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/101398
[91] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1976349556284801278 ; https://t.me/urga_74/7068
[92] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1976586917857927254; https://t.me/stepova_61/1503; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10213 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10225; https://t.me/opforukraine/216
[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/17181
[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/17181
[95] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1976616502385324116;https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10218; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/744 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/19764742870927198686; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/743; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10214
[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29762
[97] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1976383338073161968 ; https://t.me/Mavic_57/52
[98] https://t.me/voin_dv/17172
[99] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30032 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/80998 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29762
[100] https://t.me/mod_russia/57416 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34792 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/81009
[101] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-320-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine
[102] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30035
[103] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34792 ; https://t.me/rogozin_do/7689
[104] https://t.me/zedigital/6222
[105] https://belta dot by/economics/view/pravitelstvo-belarusi-i-gazprom-podpisali-dorozhnuju-kartu-sotrudnichestva-do-2030-goda-742107-2025/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/339660
[106] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2025/