This is just a nerdy, fun thought experiment. This isn't a value judgment on either electoral system.

Netherlands:

Instead of working with a single national constituency on which the distribution of seats is based, we will work with multiple constituencies.

The process now begins with linking the 150 seats to the 12 provinces. For this, we rely on the populations of the provinces. (https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/03759ned/table?ts=1760093323949)

As an experiment, we can now apply the results of the 2023 House of Representatives elections to this. Parties are allocated seats within each provincial constituency using the D'Hondt method.

Belgium:

Instead of working with the current provincial constituencies, we will work with one national constituency in which the seats will be distributed.

As an experiment, we can now apply the results of the 2024 Federal Elections to this. Parties are allocated seats within the national constituency using D'Hondt's method.

by xMusa24

5 comments

  1. Most importantly: will we then get roads like in Netherlands?
    And will they get some decent food instead?

  2. Life in the Netherlands would become a lot simpler with so many small parties eliminated. Belgium would be heavily reshaped in power balance with so many extra seats for Flanders.

  3. Thank you for making this!

    I like the Dutch proportional system with one national chamber. It’s more democratic because there is less reason to vote strategically.

    It’s interesting to see that with how people currently vote, the government would still have their majority (78 seats).

  4. Really cool experiment. Now do FPTP and a mixed (FPTP/propotional) system for fun.

  5. This shows why I think the single national electoral district for Belgium is politically dead on arrival because it would shift power toward Flanders, a move Francophone parties oppose because the current system benefits them. The current system allocates federal seats based on total inhabitants per district, not on voters per district, which systematically benefits Francophone parties through two key issues:

    The number of seats for Brussels includes many non-national inhabitants who cannot vote federally. This means each vote cast by the mainly Francophone electorate in Brussels has a disproportionately high weight relative to the actual number of voters. Under a national election district, the large number of non-voting inhabitants would no longer artificially inflate the electoral weight of the Brussels votes, as the total number of seats would be based on the national aggregate of votes cast. The political influence of the Brussels electorate would therefore decrease.

    Wallonia has historically lower voter turnout than Flanders. Since seats are based on *inhabitants*, this lower turnout does not diminish Wallonia’s number of parliamentary seats, insulating its power from electoral participation rates. Under a national election district, seats would be distributed based on the total number of votes cast across the nation, Wallonia’s lower turnout rate compared to Flanders would cause the amount of Walloon seats in parliament to decrease.

    Consequently, the proposal for a national district is primarily favored by pro-Belgian Flemings.

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