In a highly consequential meeting for the future of Russia-Syria relations, Russian President Vladimir Putin met interim Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa in Moscow on 15 October.

Both leaders’ statements strongly suggest that the longstanding bilateral relationship between their countries has a future. And while that future will likely include significant changes from the pre-December 2024 status quo, analysts also expect substantial continuities.

During their first meeting, Putin sought to emphasise the historic links between their countries, saying he hoped they could expand. For his part, Sharaa talked about a “reset” in relations that would “redefine their nature” to ensure Syria’s “independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity” are upheld.

“Sharaa’s meeting with Putin in Moscow suggests that the worst-case scenarios have been avoided for the Russians in Syria,” Kyle Orton, an independent Middle East analyst, told The New Arab.

Aron Lund, a fellow with Century International and a senior analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, agreed.

“Relations seem to be working out well, considering the circumstances,” Lund told TNA. “Sharaa going to Moscow and shaking Putin’s hand is evidence of that.”

Moscow forged strategic ties with Damascus decades ago during the Cold War. Syria provided the Soviet Union and later Russia with one of its few warm-water ports at Tartus on the Mediterranean.

For decades, Moscow served as Syria’s main arms supplier. Russia supported Bashar Al-Assad diplomatically and later militarily after he violently repressed a popular and peaceful uprising against his dictatorial rule, igniting a civil war that killed more than 500,000 Syrians.

Russia militarily intervened in the war in September 2015, operating its fighter-bomber aircraft out of Syria’s Hmeimim airbase in the western Latakia province. These Russian warplanes routinely bombed densely populated urban centres, including the northwestern Idlib province, which Sharaa’s armed Islamist opposition group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) controlled and governed for years.

In 2017, Assad granted Russia generous lease agreements for its two bases for at least 49 years. Moscow’s future in Syria seemed secure for decades, if not generations to come, until, that is, HTS swiftly captured Damascus in December 2024, forcing Assad into exile in Moscow and ending more than 50 years of Assad family rule.

The future of Russia’s military presence and investments in Syria looked grim. Moscow scrambled to engage the new government diplomatically, hoping to secure at least some of its privileged position in the country.

“Russia has played its cards well since Assad’s ouster,” Lund said. “Things looked pretty dicey for Moscow back in December, but they’re now meeting regularly with the Syrians.”

For Russia, keeping the military assets it has in Syria operational is a priority. [Getty]

Moscow will most likely end up having a decent relationship with the new Syrian government, he says, if not necessarily a warm one.

Lund also noted that Sharaa and Putin are “ruthless pragmatists” who seem determined to keep their disagreements under wraps. “Neither trusts the other, but they will smile and shake hands as needed.”

Shortly before Sharaa’s visit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that Syria would like Moscow to keep the bases. He also said Russia might transform them into “humanitarian hubs” for Africa, underlining that Moscow “will be guided by Syria’s interests in this matter”.

“Russia has been floating this idea about converting the bases to humanitarian logistics centres for some time. It’s transparently intended to provide cover for a continued military role,” Lund said. “I would be surprised if either side takes the idea seriously – but that doesn’t mean it’s without political value.”

The fact that Russia keeps bringing the idea up publicly could be interpreted as a sales pitch, he added, meaning that Syria hasn’t yet accepted the idea.

“We’ll see what happens, but I guess things now look pretty good for the Russians. They should be able to keep one base or both, but perhaps under less permissive arrangements.”

Additionally, a Syrian defence delegation visited Moscow in early October. They were shown Russian military equipment available for export, including drones and air defence systems.

Orton, who observed Russia’s vulnerable military position at Hmeimim firsthand in March, says the terms for Russia retaining the bases, and whether Moscow “will need finessing by reflagging the facilities” as humanitarian hubs, remain unclear.

“The likelihood at the present time is that Russia will get to keep its Syrian footholds because Sharaa appears to have decided that, formally at least, it’s better to have the Russians inside the tent, rather than being in open confrontation with them,” he said.

But the contours of the relationship between them are uncertain, primarily because neither side seems to know what they will be yet, he added.

“The meeting in Moscow was a signal that overt hostility is at an end, but it also looks, as with the Syrian defence delegation visit, like part of a process of the two sides feeling one another out.”

Russia militarily intervened in Syria’s war in September 2015, routinely bombing densely populated urban centres, including the northwestern Idlib province, where Sharaa’s HTS governed for years. [Getty]

At this stage, Sharaa and Putin both have things that the other needs.

“Putin wants to preserve a foothold in Syria, including the two bases,” Lund said. “Sharaa wants Russia to accept his removal from UN terrorism sanction lists, keep sending oil and wheat to Syrian ports, and rein in exiled members of the old regime, among other things.”

Both Moscow and Damascus could have some interest in Russia supplying arms to Syria. If it came to that, it would help Syria balance military pressures from Israel.

Since Assad’s fall, Israel has launched hundreds of airstrikes targeting Syria’s military infrastructure, while also advancing into the UN-monitored demilitarised buffer zone separating Syria from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

While Sharaa has secured US backing, Orton believes that it is largely because the current administration in Washington wants Damascus to consolidate governance. The US knows this needs to happen before it completely withdraws its troops in Syria to ensure it doesn’t endure a repeat of the calamitous August 2021 pullout from Afghanistan.

“US support is sharply time-limited; there is not much long-term security in it even if the present trajectory holds and Trump’s notoriously mercurial nature makes it even less reliable,” Orton said.

“Having the option of Russian political support in arenas like the UN, Russian diplomacy as a buffer with states like Israel, the ability to make economic arrangements with Russia, and in due course access to Russian weaponry is obviously attractive for Sharaa.”

However, he also stressed that the arms issue presents a “tightrope” since Sharaa could face US sanctions or provoke more Israeli airstrikes if he bought new air defences from Russia.

“For Russia, keeping the military assets it has in Syria operational to secure its freedom of action in Africa is the priority, and beyond that to rebuild as much political influence as it can inside Syria,” Orton said.

While the broad strategic approach of Sharaa’s Syria to Russia and vice versa is reasonably clear, the interaction is likely to be characterised procedurally by reactivity and opportunism as the two sides try to take advantage of events in a fluid situation to work towards their goals, Orton added.

Sharaa also has good relations with the US and Europe, but this could change.

“Sharaa doesn’t trust the Americans either; he’s keeping his options open,” Lund said. “He’s on the record saying he wants to diversify foreign relations as much as possible, and that he wants to be able to talk to all actors on all sides. That’s exactly what he’s doing.”

And since Russia remains an international player and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Syria could benefit from retaining working relations with it.

“Syria has plenty of UN business – chemical weapons, aid, terrorism, the Golan Heights, and other things,” Lund said. “It needs Russia to support its position on these matters, not sabotage it.”

“So, Sharaa has decided that it’s in his interest and in Syria’s interest to build a good working relationship with Russia, never mind the fact that the Russians were very recently trying to kill him.”

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs

Follow him on X: @pauliddon