For nearly a decade, Southeast Asia has occupied a quiet yet significant position in global politics — important but not urgent. While Europe grappled with the war in Ukraine, the Middle East faced ongoing conflicts, and South Asia dealt with its own flashpoints, the Indo-Pacific region seemed to drift below the radar. However, as the 2025 Asean summit convenes in Kuala Lumpur on Sunday, the global spotlight is once again turning towards this dynamic and strategically crucial area. This shift is not coincidental; it stems from a growing realization that the Indo-Pacific is too central — economically, demographically, and geographically — to be ignored.
The region’s seas serve as the arteries of world trade, its economies are the engines of the post-pandemic recovery, and its islands are becoming zones of future great power contests. Much like Europe is to histo ry and the Middle East to ideology, Southeast Asia is to geostrategy — a crucible where geography shapes geopolitics.
The Indo-Pacific’s renewed prominence is driven by a complex interplay of necessity and neglect. The United States, stretched thin by commitments in Europe and Israel, is rediscovering the value of maritime partnerships in Asia. China, facing economic headwinds and wary of encirclement, is intensifying its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and maritime assertiveness. Japan and Australia are fortifying the alliances that form the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept. Meanwhile, India is attempting to revitalize its “Act East” policy, seeking both influence and investment in Southeast Asia.
This revival reflects an underlying geoeconomic gravity. The Indo-Pacific accounts for nearly two-thirds of global GDP and half of global trade. Control over key sea lanes determines not only commercial flow but also political leverage.
For decades, Asean has prided itself on its doctrine of “centrality” — a quiet consensus that it should remain the convening platform for regional dialogue. This has allowed Asean to host major summits, shape the security architecture through the Asean Regional Forum (ARF), and act as a neutral space for power competition. However, this centrality is now being tested as never before.
The US-China rivalry has divided the region’s strategic instincts. While Vietnam and the Philippines lean toward Washington, Cambodia and Laos remain within Beijing’s economic orbit. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand prefer strategic ambiguity, and Singapore continues to hedge –welcoming the American presence but wary of confrontation. The upcoming summit will again highlight this intra-Asean divergence, even as leaders speak of unity.
China’s economic might may continue to be irresistible, with infrastructure, trade, and digital networks binding many Asean states into dependency. However, Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and its grey-zone coercion have alarmed even its friends. The United States’ episodic engagement under successive administrations has not helped; its strategy oscillates between reassurance and retreat. Thus, Asean walks a tightrope, trying to keep the big powers engaged.
The Great Power Contest: Strategy by Other Means
The chessboard analogy fits perfectly. Each major power has chosen a piece and a strategy. China plays the long game, using the BRI to build enduring influence by controlling connectivity — ports, railways and digital corridors. Its aim is to redraw regional dependence through economic dependency. The US moves through alliances and defence partnerships — the Quad, AUKUS and bilateral pacts with the Philippines and Japan. Its focus is deterrence by presence, especially across the first and second island chains. Japan positions itself as the quiet but indispensable stabilizer. Under its FOIP framework, Tokyo provides infrastructure, digital standards and strategic reassurance without overt militarization.
The competition is not just for territory but for norms, narratives, and networks — who sets the rules, writes the code, and builds the connectivity of the future.
India, the newest and perhaps most aspirational player, sees the Indo-Pacific as a test of its middle power maturity. Its “Act East” policy aims to deepen trade, defence and cultural linkages with Asean, while countering Chinese influence through diplomacy rather than dominance.
India’s challenge lies in translating aspiration into sustained engagement. The “Act East” policy, though well-conceived, has lacked the momentum of consistent political and economic investment. While India is part of the Quad and supports Asean centrality rhetorically, its trade volumes and connectivity projects still lag behind those of China or Japan. However, India’s position within the Quad is under scrutiny, with some questioning its commitment. To remain relevant, New Delhi must demonstrate sustained engagement and strategic clarity, ensuring its voice is heard and its actions align with its regional aspirations.
Yet, this moment may offer a window. As the United States and China remain distracted elsewhere, Asean seeks a stable middle partner — one not intent on domination but committed to balance. India’s democratic credentials, cultural proximity and developmental expertise give it that advantage. By investing in digital linkages, resilient supply chains, and maritime domain awareness, India can reassert its role as a security provider and trusted partner.
For New Delhi, the Indo-Pacific is not merely an arena of competition but a stage for identity — the bridge from middle power to major power. Its ability to influence the Asean ecosystem will define whether it can shape outcomes rather than merely respond to them.
Global attention often moves in cycles. “Conflict fatigue” from Ukraine to Gaza may benefit Southeast Asia. Policymakers in the US, Russia or China understand that escalation elsewhere only strengthens the need for stable engagement here. The Indo-Pacific thus becomes the default zone of continuity — the one theatre where cooperation, not conflict, can still shape the global order.
Yet, this stability is fragile. Asean’s ability to sustain its consensus model will depend on internal discipline and external respect. If the great powers reduce it to a proxy playground, its strategic relevance will erode.
The 2025 Asean summit will not rewrite the world order, but it may reaffirm the region’s quiet indispensability. In a world of noisy crises, Southeast Asia remains the calm corridor through which global power must pass. Its neutrality is not weakness but wisdom — a form of resilience in an age of rivalry.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s presence would of course make a huge difference but even without that India’s resolve to be at the centre of the Indo-Pacific engagement, not a bystander to distant conflicts, must be made abundantly evident. The time has come for India’s headlines to reflect partnerships and possibilities rather than crises elsewhere. Southeast Asia offers India both opportunity and influence — a stage to shape the global balance through diplomacy, trade and technology, and to project stability as a confident regional power.