Reinventing Deterrence
A missile capable of theoretically flying indefinitely has thrust the world’s eyes back onto the fragile balance of global security. Russia’s test of the Burevestnik (Буревестник, ‘Storm Bird’), a nuclear-powered cruise missile, has reignited global debate over strategic weapons, highlighting a new era of technological uncertainty.
Described as a ‘flying Chernobyl’, the missile’s defining feature is its compact nuclear propulsion system, which effectively eliminates conventional range limitations. First announced by President Vladimir Putin during his 2018 address to the Federal Assembly, the Burevestnik was presented as part of a new generation of strategic systems designed to counter U.S. missile-defence capabilities.
The Burevestnik programme has encountered a highly turbulent development path. Its progress has been punctuated by repeated setbacks, including numerous flight-test failures — of more than a dozen publicly reported tests since 2016, only two were partially successful. The dangers inherent in the programme were tragically highlighted in 2019, when an explosion and subsequent radiation leak linked to a Burevestnik test claimed the lives of five Russian nuclear specialists. Nonetheless, Moscow has continued to advance the project, with Putin announcing a successful test in October 2023, underscoring the Kremlin’s enduring commitment to this high-stakes technological venture.
This technological innovation represents a fundamental departure from traditional cruise-missile design. Nuclear propulsion enables the Burevestnik to sustain low-altitude, terrain-following flight over intercontinental distances, making it exceptionally difficult to detect or intercept. Existing missile-defence systems — designed primarily to counter predictable, high-trajectory ballistic threats — are ill-suited to engage a platform with indefinite flight time, erratic routes, and minimal radar visibility. In this respect, the Burevestnik stands as a unique and potentially disruptive component of Russia’s strategic deterrent arsenal. NATO designates the system as the SSC-X-9 Skyfall, reflecting its experimental and unconventional nature.
Challenging the ‘Golden Dome’ Defence Shield
A central strategic objective of the Burevestnik is to bypass sophisticated missile-defence systems, including Trump’s proposed ‘Golden Dome’ global missile shield. The Golden Dome concept seeks to establish a multilayered defensive architecture combining space-based interceptors, advanced radar systems, and integrated ground networks to neutralise missile threats worldwide. The Burevestnik, however, poses a direct challenge to this vision. Its unpredictable flight path, low radar signature, and theoretically unlimited endurance allow it to exploit gaps in static and orbital defence networks — approaching from unconventional directions or remaining airborne until enemy defences are saturated or misdirected.
Russia’s development of this system serves as a strategic countermeasure to American missile-defence dominance. By producing a weapon that potentially neutralises decades of U.S. investment in interception technology, Moscow reasserts the doctrine of mutual vulnerability — a foundational principle of deterrence that large-scale defensive shields were designed to overcome.
Reigniting Strategic Competition
Beyond its immediate tactical implications, the Burevestnik contributes to the resurgence of a broader strategic competition between the U.S. and Russia. Its unveiling underscores a renewed technological arms race reminiscent of the Cold War era, where innovation itself becomes a form of deterrence. The demonstration of a functioning nuclear-powered missile pressures the U.S. to accelerate its own hypersonic and advanced-propulsion research, while simultaneously encouraging NATO to explore new countermeasures in early warning and space-based surveillance.
The ripple effects of this competition could extend beyond the two major powers. States such as China and India, and even smaller regional actors, may interpret the Burevestnik as evidence that nuclear propulsion and ultra-long-range strike systems are achievable goals. This perception may stimulate additional investment in advanced missile research, further eroding existing arms-control frameworks and complicating global non-proliferation efforts.
Global Nuclear Doctrine in Flux
The emergence of nuclear-powered, long-endurance missiles such as the Burevestnik could fundamentally reshape nuclear doctrine for major powers. Traditional concepts of deterrence, built around predictable flight paths, limited ranges, and survivable second-strike capabilities, may no longer suffice when adversaries possess weapons capable of sustained, low-altitude, and unpredictable flight. For the U.S., this development could necessitate a reassessment of missile-defence deployment, early-warning systems, and the credibility of deterrent postures, potentially shifting emphasis from interception to resilience and rapid response. Similarly, China may interpret these advancements as both a strategic challenge and an incentive to accelerate its own development of long-range, survivable, or unconventional delivery systems, reinforcing a broader trend towards diversification of nuclear arsenals.
Across the board, the advent of such technology pressures states to rethink the balance between offence and defence, the role of technological innovation in strategic stability, and the assumptions underlying decades-old nuclear doctrines. For many, it may also create a sense of vulnerability and the perception of being left behind, potentially positioning Russia as the current leader in military technology in this domain and prompting accelerated efforts to catch up or counterbalance its advancements.
Environmental and Arms-Control Implications
The Burevestnik also raises profound environmental and ethical concerns. The risks associated with a nuclear-powered cruise missile are considerable — both during testing and potential deployment. A crash or malfunction could disperse radioactive material over vast areas, as reportedly occurred in the August 2019 accident near Nyonoksa in northern Russia. According to independent monitoring agencies in Norway and the U.S., the incident released short-lived radioactive isotopes into the atmosphere, underscoring the potential hazards of such propulsion systems. These risks not only endanger local populations but also challenge international norms governing the militarisation of nuclear technology.
The Burevestnik highlights the fragility of contemporary arms-control regimes. With the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 and uncertainty surrounding the renewal of the New START framework, the missile exemplifies how rapid technological innovation can outpace diplomatic and regulatory mechanisms. Without renewed engagement or transparency measures, such developments risk ushering in an unchecked cycle of escalation — a return to an era where mutual suspicion and technological brinkmanship dominated international security.
Security in the Shadow of Technological Asymmetry
The Burevestnik’s significance lies not only in its capabilities but in the broader questions it raises about the future of global security. Its nuclear propulsion system and virtually unlimited range redefine what deterrence, defence, and arms control mean in an era when technology moves faster than diplomacy.
As states pursue systems designed to bypass even the most sophisticated missile shields, a series of unsettling questions emerge. Can traditional notions of mutual vulnerability still ensure strategic stability when flight paths are unpredictable and range is no longer a constraint? Will the world’s great powers re-enter a full-scale technological arms race, where propulsion and endurance replace yield and warhead count as measures of power?
The collapse of long-standing treaties such as the INF and the uncertain renewal of the New START framework underscore another dilemma: how can arms-control regimes adapt to innovations that blur the line between nuclear and conventional systems? What new verification mechanisms could restore trust in an age of secrecy and asymmetry?
Beyond geopolitics, the Burevestnik raises pressing environmental and ethical questions about military innovation. What happens when nuclear propulsion becomes normalised in weapons testing? Could a future crash or malfunction contaminate entire regions, and should the world consider a moratorium on such technologies before they proliferate?
The defence dimension is equally uncertain. Can any future missile-defence architecture — whether space-based interceptors, quantum radar, or directed-energy systems — realistically counter a weapon designed to remain airborne indefinitely? If not, must nations shift from defence through interception to deterrence through resilience?
The missile’s global impact extends beyond the U.S. and Russia. How will other powers, from China to India, interpret this technological leap — as a model to emulate or a destabilising precedent? Will it fracture alliances or inspire new ones based on shared fears rather than shared values?
Brinkmanship Reborn
The Burevestnik symbolises more than a weapon: it represents the reawakening of strategic uncertainty itself. Analysts continue to debate why Russia pursues such unconventional nuclear systems — from a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile to autonomous nuclear submarines — but a pivotal motivation appears to be Russia under Putin’s persistent search for greatness. These weapons serve both to safeguard the survivability of Russia’s nuclear deterrent and to broadcast Moscow’s status as a global power to international and domestic audiences alike.
Understanding these motivations is crucial for shaping the appropriate response from the U.S. and NATO, which could range from cautious observation to the strengthening of allied deterrence. Yet, beyond geopolitical calculations, the main takeaway is clear and sobering: these developments reflect a tangible resurgence of nuclear risks on the global stage.
As innovation accelerates beyond regulation, the world edges towards a new era of security. This era will be defined less by the number of warheads than by the sophistication, endurance, and unpredictability of the systems that carry them. The choices of states and institutions in the coming years will determine whether this era yields renewed stability or a perilous return to brinkmanship. The coming decade will reveal whether these innovations secure peace or deepens global instability
About the authors:
Scott N. Romaniuk: Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
László Csicsmann: Full Professor and Head of the Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary; Senior Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA)