Photo. president.gov.by
Copy link
Send email
Chinese presence in Belarus in recent years has become one of the most frequently invoked threads in descriptions of the Eurasian „great game.” However, when we strip the propaganda photos labeled „partner investments” of their color and look at the specifics, the picture turns out to be less spectacular than the headlines suggest.
Authors: Bartłomiej Wypartowicz, Wojciech Kozioł
This is primarily about the dimension, scale and character of that presence. Beijing offers Minsk capital and industrial projects, but this does not today translate into a real possibility of „escaping” Moscow’s influence, as some commentators try to sketch. On the contrary, Chinese engagement often reinforces asymmetries and creates new dependencies that do not give Lukashenko the kind of freedom that is sometimes ascribed to him. Also wrongly so.
Russia still dominates over other partners
The limitations are visible in the simplest figures: according to COMTRADE data, Chinese exports to Belarus in 2024 amounted to about 6.58 billion dollars. That is a significant sum in the context of the Belarusian market, but compared with the Minsk–Moscow relationship it stops looking like a „second source of power.” Russia remains a leap-larger trading partner and, more importantly, the guarantor of key elements of the functioning of the Belarusian state — energy, a market for industry, and mechanisms of fiscal support. At the level of the overall economic-political balance it is Moscow that has instruments allowing it to impose conditions in the short term; Beijing acts slowly and selectively.
The example of the „Great Stone” China-Belarus Industrial Park — the largest joint Chinese-Belarusian project — illustrates this duality well. The Great Stone industrial park is advertised as a strategic element of the New Silk Road: an investment zone with tax preferences and incentives for Chinese firms. Official statements speak of hundreds of millions in declared investments and thousands of jobs, and the Belarusian government points to a growing number of residents and a declared investment amount close to 1.5 billion dollars. All that sounds good and has real local significance: a few factories, a logistics cluster, new jobs. But when we translate that to the structure of the national economy and energy dependencies, it turns out to be barely a fraction (and a very small one at that) of what Russia actually provides in practice: continuity of raw material supplies, huge markets and a system of subsidies without which the Belarusian economy quickly feels pressure.
Moreover, most Chinese money in practice functions as loans and liabilities, and the value of direct investments is much lower than the sum of headlines advertising a „Chinese boom.” A significant portion of Chinese engagement takes the form of loans and conditional projects that result in an extended financial dependence of Belarus on Chinese contractors and creditors. Beijing does not so much open doors to some form of Minsk’s independence as build a parallel network of economic and corporate dependencies whose political effects appear slowly and are often limited. In other words: Chinese investments change the configuration of dependencies more than they eliminate them.
In contrast to this, Russia appears as Minsk’s dominant economic partner. According to an analysis by OSW \[Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Center for Eastern Studies\], Russia’s share in Belarus’s trade today approaches 70% of the country’s total trade turnover. Even before the Russian-Ukrainian war, Belarus exported to Russia about 37% of its goods (with about 30% toward the EU), but after the escalation of the sanctions conflict Russia’s share as a destination market and supplier of raw materials and energy has strengthened further.
In many sectors exports to Russia account for more than half of total sales. In the machinery and agricultural industries it reaches as much as 60–65%. It is precisely that market, not the Chinese or the European one, that sustains the liquidity of state enterprises and provides foreign currency inflows to the budget.
Total dependence of Belarus on Russia in the energy sector
Energy is the axis of the entire arrangement. Belarus practically imports gas and oil in full from Russia. In 2024, 98% of the gas consumed in the country came from Russian Gazprom contracts, and oil deliveries — about 18 million tons per year — were entirely based on the Russian direction. Moreover, the price of these raw materials is an element of policy: Minsk pays below market rates, but in return accepts systemic integration — a common customs space, shared security standards. Every gas crisis showed that a few days« interruption in supplies is enough to stop a large part of the country’s economy. In 2023, after a brief price dispute, production at chemical plants in Grodno and Novopolotsk fell by 14%, and the government had to subsidize energy for heavy industry in the amount of 640 million Belarusian rubles.
Photo. Официальный веб-сайт Президента Российской Федерации/Wikimedia Commons/CC4.0
At the level of Belarus’s domestic economy the chemical industry plays a special role, especially fertilizer production. The two largest entities, Belaruskali and Grodno Azot, generated before 2022 about 15% of export revenues, i.e., more than 3.5 billion dollars annually. After the introduction of European Union sanctions and the closure of Baltic ports, potash exports fell almost by half. In 2024 about 6 million tons of potash were shipped through Russian ports in Ust-Luga and Murmansk, whereas in the record year 2020 it was 12 million. This means that today the fertilizer sector is completely dependent on Russian logistics and port infrastructure. By offering alternative transport channels, Russia has de facto taken control of one of the most profitable segments of Belarusian exports.
This structure — cheap Russian energy in exchange for loyalty — creates the foundation of Belarus’s current economic model. China appears in this arrangement as an additional lender, not as a counterweight. Of the 6.5 billion dollars of Chinese exports to Belarus in 2024, the majority consisted of machinery and electronic equipment, largely financed by loans granted by Chinese state banks. The value of Chinese direct investment was below 700 million, therefore several times lower than the debt to Beijing. This means that Belarus buys Chinese technologies with Chinese money, which it must then repay from exports dependent on Russian raw materials.
The Chinese game of symbols
If in the economy Chinese presence is rather quiet, spread over time and heavily encumbered with loans, then in the symbolic-political sphere Beijing increasingly enters terrain of a much higher temperature — security and defence. It is precisely here, in the military sphere, that you can best see how the authorities in Minsk try to exploit every possible margin of maneuver, even if in reality they remain in Moscow’s shadow.
In summer 2024, pictures of Chinese soldiers exercising at the Brest training ground as part of the „Eagle Assault-2024” maneuvers circulated in global media. For Minsk it was a propaganda success. A demonstration that Belarus is still perceived by powers from outside the region as a partner, and not exclusively as Russia’s vassal. For Beijing it was an operation of much broader significance: an attempt to enter the West’s geostrategic space with its own narrative that China is not only an investor or trade intermediary, but also an actor capable of projecting force on European territory.
As Dr. Jacek Raubo wrote, the very choice of the place and time of these exercises was a political message in itself. The activity began precisely at the moment when a jubilee NATO summit was taking place in Washington on the occasion of the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. At the same time that the U.S. capital was discussing expanding cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners — Japan, Australia, or South Korea — Beijing was sending its own signal from the other end of the world: if NATO looks toward Asia, China can appear on NATO’s borders in Europe.
It was therefore, as Dr. Jacek Raubo notes, a kind of „strategic symmetry,” a mirror image of Western gestures toward Asia executed by Beijing, this time toward Minsk. Except that while for China it was a gesture of political experimentation, for Belarus it had a much more practical dimension: showing the West that despite isolation and sanctions, Minsk remains part of global military and economic flows.
Although „Eagle Assault-2024” was formally described as anti-terrorist exercise, its scenario went far beyond classic police training op. It included airborne operations, counter-sabotage actions and simulations of fighting in urban terrain. It is therefore difficult to speak of typical anti-terror exercise: rather, it should be treated as counter-revolutionary preparations, fitting into a long-term China-Belarus strategy of strengthening the resilience of authoritarian regimes to social pressure.
It is worth noting that operationally this was not a major exercise. Slightly more than three hundred soldiers participated, mainly from Chinese airborne units. However, the symbolic weight was enormous. For the first time in history the People’s Liberation Army appeared so close to the border of the European Union, and thus physically within observation range of NATO states.
But even in this aspect the Russians take the lead. Russia invests directly in Belarusian military and energy infrastructure, increasingly treating the neighbor’s territory as a rear for its own logistics. In 2024 construction began on a military base in the Mogilev region which, according to satellite photos, will include fuel depots, technical positions and infrastructure for short-range rocket systems. At the same time airports in Baranavichy, Machulishchy and Babruysk are being modernized, where new runways and hardened hangars capable of accommodating Russian tactical bombers have appeared. Around Homel and Mazyr the railway network and fuel terminal infrastructure are being expanded, enabling rapid transport of military equipment and raw materials southwards. These are not partnership projects but integrative ones — they are becoming an extension of Russian military infrastructure, and decisions about their use are made in Moscow.
Completely dependent on Moscow – also in the arms sector
Belarus does not have an independent defense industry capable of comprehensive production of modern weapons systems; both technologically and logistically it remains within the network of Russian suppliers. Since the 1990s key elements of the armament of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus — from aircraft, through missile systems, to communications equipment — have come from Russian production lines. In 2024 over 90% of the military equipment in use by the Belarusian army was of Russian origin, and nearly 80% of current arms purchases were financed from credits or subsidies granted by the Russian Federation.
Minsk buys from Moscow not only tanks and air defense systems, but also ammunition, spare parts, electronics. It also modernizes its legacy designs in Russia. Over the last five years Belarus has purchased, among others, batches of Su-30SM aircraft, Tor-M2 missile systems, Polonez-M rocket artillery sets (partly based on Chinese components, but with Russian system integration), as well as radar complexes and reconnaissance drones of Russian origin. The value of these contracts exceeded 1.1 billion dollars, most of which was financed through intra-Union State settlements or in the form of long-term preferential loans.
Importantly, Minsk has also lost the ability to independently service many weapons systems, especially modern aircraft and missile systems, which means the necessity of constant cooperation with Russian repair and technical plants. In 2023 as much as 92% of spare parts and components used in Belarusian aviation units came from Russia. The situation in the armored land-vehicle sector looks similar: Belarusian plants in Orsha or Baranavichy can carry out repairs, but modernizations and deliveries of key subcomponents depend on Russian supplies.
Belarus tried for a time to maintain the appearance of autonomy by developing its own military modernization projects, such as the Polonez rocket system or BTR-70MB1 transporters. However, most of those initiatives rely on Russian components and licenses, and their production does not exceed several dozen units per year. Even in military electronics or optics — areas where Minsk had competencies from Soviet times (Peleng, Agat, KB Radar plants) — dependence on the Russian market and components is now total.
As a result, the Belarusian defense system resembles more a branch of the Russian military-industrial complex than an independent national structure. Moscow not only supplies equipment but controls its maintenance, access to codes, parts, and even training programs. This dependence is systemic: without access to Russian parts and service the Belarusian armed forces cease to be operational after a few months.
China: not an alternative
As can be seen from the examples given, there is no real Chinese alternative to Russia in the context of Belarus today. Neither economically, politically, nor — even more so — militarily. Beijing not only does not try to replace Moscow as Minsk’s main patron, but consciously avoids taking on such a role. Chinese actions are selective, cautious and directed primarily at China’s own particular interests: gaining access to markets, logistical infrastructure and political footholds in the region that in the long run may increase the global reach of Chinese influence. In this logic Minsk is rather a tool, a transit point and a testing laboratory, not a strategic partner on equal footing with Beijing.
Therefore the growing Chinese presence in Belarus should not be treated as a sign of Minsk’s emancipation from Moscow’s influence. Beijing does not offer Lukashenko an alternative model of security or financing that could balance Russian instruments of pressure. On the contrary, Chinese loans and investments, insofar as they appear at all, create new networks of dependency whose character is much less political and more transactional. China has no interest in antagonizing Russia in a space Moscow treats as its zone of exclusive influence.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Russian-Chinese alliance, though increasingly labeled „without borders,” in reality has many limitations and areas of distrust. Moscow and Beijing cooperate closely where their common interest lies in weakening the West and maintaining control over the post-Soviet periphery, but their strategic goals differ fundamentally. For Russia, Belarus remains part of the „near abroad,” an integral element of its own state security and a buffer against NATO. For China it is merely a fragment of a broader project of economic-logistical expansion toward Europe, in which Minsk’s significance is rather instrumental.
What is the true degree of Beijing’s interest in Belarus?
Belarus is recognized as a „strategic hub,” particularly as a gateway to the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, China redirected trade routes through Belarus, making it a key rail corridor. In the Collective Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Belarus plans were recorded to deepen cooperation under the BRI, including an agreement on free trade, investment and transport, which is supposed to increase Belarusian exports to China by 12% and Chinese investments by 30% within five years. This document emphasizes Minsk’s importance, but only insofar as it serves the realization of China’s own goals. It is in no way an attempt to „take” Moscow’s partner away.
Beijing, moreover, maintains great caution in engaging in matters that could be read as undermining Russian suzerainty. China uses soft instruments: infrastructure investments, loans, institutional presence and the symbolism of cooperation. This asymmetry of methods only confirms that we are not dealing with a rivalry over Minsk, but rather with a quiet coexistence of influences in which Russia retains control and China benefits from maintaining a stable, predictable regime.
Ultimately, therefore, contrary to some narratives about a „Chinese alternative” to Russia, reality shows that Beijing does not intend to either pull Belarus out of Moscow’s orbit or create a parallel center of influence. China pursues its economic and geopolitical objectives in this direction, but does so in a way that does not violate Russian dominance. Despite the growing number of joint projects, exercises or declarations of a „strategic partnership,” Belarus remains in an arrangement in which Russia dominates and China observes and profits.
Authors: Bartłomiej Wypartowicz, Wojciech Kozioł