On November 10, President Donald Trump will welcome Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa for the first official visit to Washington by a Syrian head of state. Having recently visited Syria and Lebanon on a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees mission, I was struck by the fluidity of this period for both countries.
Almost a year has passed since transformative events occurred in the Levant. In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow after overseeing a horrific 14-year war that killed at least 400,000 people and displaced 13 million more. Hezbollah was not able to rescue him, and the Russians chose not to try, escorting Assad to Moscow instead. Russia was preoccupied by its grinding war against Ukraine, and Hezbollah had just suffered a historic set of Israeli attacks against its entire leadership and operators that left it flailing. Inside Lebanon, Hezbollah has been so severely devastated that discussions of its disarmament have become mainstream. Having led U.S. policy toward the Levant from the Pentagon and served on the Congressionally-mandated Syria Study Group, I know how rare this dynamism is—and the opportunities it offers for U.S. policy.
Syria: a mildly optimistic picture
Driving across Lebanon into Syria recently, I met one family as they returned home after fleeing more than a decade ago. Wrapped in Syrian flags and grinning, they were giddy about starting their new life. They represent some of the more than 1 million refugees who have returned from countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. Returning refugees and those Syrians who remained are struggling to find jobs, a real place to live, and basic services. Yet many seem overjoyed to finally be home—even if home lacks windows, doors, regular access to electricity and water; is potentially littered with unexploded ordnance; or has been occupied for years by others displaced from their homes.
Rebuilding Syria will take billions of dollars—more than $200 billion, according to World Bank estimates—but that investment won’t really start until the United States lifts all sanctions. In May, Trump announced that the United States would do so. While his administration did remove some and suspend others, Congress has yet to lift some of the harshest sanctions. Absent this relief, meaningful economic investment and reconstruction support will not move forward—and the 90% of Syria’s population living in poverty will remain mired in it.
Damascus itself is a city bustling and largely untouched by the war. Yet just 15 minutes out of town, there is devastation as far as the eye can see. I drove through Eastern Ghouta, where Assad famously used chemical weapons on his own people, in addition to barrel bombs, cluster munitions, and many others. Skeletons of buildings littered the landscape.
The new Syrian government is composed of a curious mix of former jihadists, civil society activists, bright young refugees who spent their formative years away from Syria, and a large number of former government bureaucrats who stayed on. Unlike in Iraq, where former government officials were banned from government service, the Syrian government has sought to keep the expertise of technocrats to help it function—while also avoiding having angry and disaffected former officials undermining the government from the outside.
To the surprise of many, widespread violence has not erupted over the last year since the Assad government fell. However, there have been a few very worrisome bouts of violence, including on the coast and in the south. These involved minority groups who hold justified fears about what their future will be in the new Syria. There have also been spikes of Islamist attacks and broader vigilantism as well. Inside Syria, new relationships are forming between and among different groups, those who stayed and those who left. As one Syrian woman I met implored, “Give us time to know each other once again.”
There’s no shortage of potential spoilers to undermine Syria’s increasing stability and security. Thousands of Islamic State (ISIS) prisoners and approximately 40,000 ISIS-affiliated family members live in Syrian camps; Iran is nostalgic about Syria as its old stomping ground (particularly as a waystation for getting weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon); the Russians still want access to military bases; and Israel’s uncertainty about the new government means continued airstrikes on military infrastructure. How Saudi Arabia and Turkey adjudicate their respective roles in supporting the new Syria will also have implications for security and stability across the country. Turkish and Israeli competition could also play out in dangerous ways inside Syria. The further one gets from Damascus, the trickier the security situation becomes and the less there is reliable access to services. And yet, Syria’s government is considering becoming the 90th member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and it has engaged in nearly half a dozen rounds of negotiations with the Israelis; both are critical steps for tackling those who seek to undermine the new Syria.
In 2012, one year into the Syrian civil war, I testified before Congress that “the longer this conflict lasts, the more bloody, internecine, and tragic it will be.” I had no idea what an understatement that would be. Syria is undergoing a moment of transformation, a rare one for a country that has seen so much destruction for so long. Its trajectory is shaky and uneven, but not predetermined to fail.
U.S. policy recommendations for Syria
Reopen the U.S. Embassy in Damascus. This would ensure the United States has a 24/7 understanding of the political, security, and economic situation inside Syria and can determine how best to shape it. Given the lack of setback, the current chancery is impossible to secure without closing major Damascus thoroughfares. But the ambassador’s residence could serve as a temporary small chancery.
Lift all sanctions on Syria. These sanctions have outlived their usefulness with the Assad regime’s downfall. Conditioning their removal could preclude the delivery of much-needed reconstruction assistance. The National Defense Authorization Act’s current language—repealing remaining sanctions would require regular reports on how Syria’s government is approaching key issues like terrorism and relations with Israel—is sufficient.
On the security front, encourage the Syrian government to join and meaningfully participate in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS; work with the Syrian military as it is rebuilt to facilitate professionalization; and continue facilitating negotiations between Syria and Israel on security arrangements.
Urge the Syrian government to protect minorities, including holding those who violate this tenet accountable.
Support humanitarian efforts to enable refugees and internally displaced people to return home across Syria. Encouraging the United Nations to name a new U.N. special envoy focused on reconstruction, reconciliation, and humanitarian issues could be useful as well.
Lebanon: at a security crossroads
The discussions happening inside Lebanon today are historic. For the first time in years, Lebanon has a competent and technocratic government. That government is juggling a devastating economic situation and the usual political machinations among Lebanon’s 18 or so confessional groups, but the most notable change is in the security realm. That is because the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire brokered by the United States in November 2024 requires the disarmament of Hezbollah, the most capable violent nonstate actor in Lebanon, which the Israeli military has severely weakened.
The challenge of disarming Hezbollah
During my recent visit to Lebanon, discussions illustrate that the plan for Hezbollah’s disarmament is either a secret or relatively vague and undefined, depending on who you ask. It appears that the multiphase process is heavily focused on geography, running all the way from the south of Lebanon to Beirut to the Bekaa Valley, so it includes all of Hezbollah’s strongholds. There is, however, no clarity on what weapons specifically will be included in disarmament, other than “heavy weapons … including missiles and drones.”
Lebanon’s history is a reminder that different approaches can be taken to disarmament. In 1982, disarmament in the case of the Palestine Liberation Organization required the removal of heavy weapons, whereas after the Lebanese civil war ended in 1990, disarmament was more comprehensive and included medium and light weapons as well. Neither effort involved removing personal arms.
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is taking real steps to disarm Hezbollah in the south. According to a statement by U.S. Central Command in October, “The LAF has successfully removed nearly 10,000 rockets, almost 400 missiles, and over 205,000 unexploded ordnance fragments during the past year.” And there are rumors that Hezbollah has been 80%-85% disarmed south of the Litani River. Moreover, the Lebanese government has substantially limited Hezbollah’s control of Beirut International Airport, which would have been unheard of before the last year.
However, without clarity on the size of Hezbollah’s arsenal, it is difficult to fully understand the magnitude of the challenge ahead. Moreover, tackling Hezbollah in the south, where it is materially weak following Israeli attacks over the last year, is much easier than doing so in South Beirut. To be sure, Hezbollah’s disarmament, and hopefully demobilization as well, is much bigger than its weapons, given its political role and state representation on behalf of many Lebanese Shia. That is why a center of gravity that merits serious focus right now is the level of political support Hezbollah commands across that population, and the extent to which credible alternative Shia actors can fill the space (many potential competitors to Hezbollah, like Lebanese Shia activist Lokman Slim, have died under mysterious circumstances that point to Hezbollah).
Hezbollah’s current secretary general, Naim Kassem, does not have the leadership abilities and charisma of his predecessor, Hassan Nasrallah, whose death in 2024 resulted in a major struggle between Kassem and Hezbollah’s security chief, Wafiq Safa. These leadership clashes are weakening Hezbollah’s coherence, particularly as Hezbollah debates how best to tackle the serious challenges it is facing regarding its future prospects.
The upcoming Lebanese parliamentary elections in May 2026 (assuming they are not postponed) are already affecting political calculations, as Hezbollah is in an electoral predicament since its constituents desperately need reconstruction funds, which it has not been able to mobilize yet. Simply put, although Hezbollah is under a historic level of pressure, and is clearly facing some real challenges in terms of resources, capabilities, and leadership, there will ultimately be limits to what military efforts can achieve.
The role of the Lebanese Armed Forces
U.S. support to the LAF has been critical to its survival. Nearly two decades have passed since I led the Pentagon’s effort to inaugurate a U.S. program to train and equip the Lebanese military. A force that had three to five bullets per soldier per year and required the most basic spare parts to move its vehicles is now deployed throughout the country and taking steps that had long been inconceivable. U.S. training and equipment have resulted in a professional and relatively competent force; one that, helped in part by the United States subsidizing LAF salaries amidst an economic meltdown in Lebanon, has maintained cohesion. Today, the U.S. role is particularly important insofar as Washington leads the monitoring mechanism that regularly convenes the Israeli and Lebanese militaries. Chaired by a U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant general, this mechanism can and should facilitate serious dialogue regarding the security environment.
The Israelis continue to regularly strike Hezbollah (or Hezbollah-perceived entities), and they also still occupy a handful of spots in Lebanon. Ideally, the LAF would gradually replace the Israel Defense Forces in these places, demonstrating the government’s willingness and ability to hold a monopoly on violence inside Lebanese borders. But if the Israeli military does not take meaningful steps through this mechanism to empower the LAF, withdraw from Lebanon, and limit its airstrikes, Hezbollah’s narrative that only it can protect the country will resonate with many Lebanese.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has pushed the LAF to take these historic steps, and he has publicly articulated his desire to negotiate with Israel. However, he appears to be growing increasingly frustrated with Israel’s unwillingness to give the LAF a chance, as he likely sees the Lebanese government’s ability to disarm Hezbollah slipping away. After Israeli airstrikes on November 6, he tweeted the following: “Almost a year has passed since the ceasefire came into force, and during that period, Israel has spared no effort to show its rejection of any negotiated settlement between the two countries … Your message has been received.”
Although the Trump administration’s December 31 deadline for Hezbollah’s full disarmament will not be met, it is conceivable that significant progress can be made south of the Litani River—and across southern Lebanon more broadly—assuming sustained and serious U.S. leadership.
It is unclear which path the Lebanese security environment will take, but the current moment provides a rare opportunity to extend the Lebanese government’s writ across its entire country.
U.S. policy recommendations for Lebanon
Work with the Lebanese and Israeli governments to clearly define the parameters of Hezbollah’s disarmament. Closely monitor Hezbollah’s efforts to rearm.
Continue leading the Israel-Lebanon military monitoring mechanism. Facilitate an action plan whereby the Israelis tie the Lebanese military’s steps on disarming Hezbollah to a diminution of military strikes and eventual withdrawal.
Maintain military support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, including training, equipment, and salary assistance.
Encourage cooperation between Damascus and Beirut on defining and securing the shared border to prevent smuggling and resolve disputed areas.