America’s Self-Defeating China Strategy: A Policy That Confuses Strength and Weakness

[SS from essay by Lael Brainard, Distinguished Fellow at the Georgetown University Psaros Center and a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Mossavar-Rahmani Center. She has served as Director of the National Economic Council, Vice Chair and Governor on the Federal Reserve Board, and Undersecretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.]

The landmark meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in October brought a respite to the trade war and led to some reciprocal deals. But it did not suggest any breakthrough in addressing the problems that have fueled tensions between the two countries in recent years. Instead, the meeting confirmed the curious direction of U.S. China policy in Trump’s second term. The president has not only broken with the policy of the Biden administration but also seems to have forsaken the strategic direction of his own first term.

For much of this century, U.S. policy toward China rested on a calculated bet that the country’s integration into the global trading system would drive its political and economic liberalization—in alignment with U.S. interests. That bet did not pay off. China developed not into an economic partner but into a disruptive competitor bent on shaping the global order in its favor. Washington waited too long to counter Beijing, which allowed it to grow strong enough to edge out American industry in many areas.