Drill baby drill: Moscow just triggered a new wave of Mediterranean gas exploration

The European Commission has thrown its weight behind a new offshore gas exploration deal between Greece and ExxonMobil, arguing that working with “reliable” partners such as the United States will help Europe finally wean itself off Russian gas. It is a striking endorsement at a moment when the bloc claims to be sprinting towards a green-energy future yet continues to deepen its dependence on hydrocarbons sourced far from Moscow.

At the same time, a long-stalled effort to build an undersea electricity cable linking the power grids of Greece, Cyprus and Israel appears to be stirring back to life. Investors from Washington and Tel Aviv have signalled fresh interest in the project, raising hopes that one of the most fraught pieces of Mediterranean energy infrastructure may yet be revived.

Neither development should be viewed in isolation. The Eastern Mediterranean remains one of the world’s more combustible geopolitical theatres – a place where overlapping maritime claims, unresolved regional rivalries and chronic political inertia have left vast energy reserves under-exploited. European officials have long talked up the region’s potential; few have shown the resolve to unlock it.

That may be changing. Discussions over the wider region’s energy prospects intensified almost immediately after Donald Trump’s return to the White House, with the new administration telegraphing a willingness to impose order where Brussels has repeatedly failed to lead. Washington’s sharper focus – and its readiness to back allies with hard infrastructure – has already altered the political mood.

Cretan oil

Last week, Greece signed an offshore exploration agreement with ExxonMobil covering blocks in the north-western Ionian Sea. Chevron, another US powerhouse, is drilling in the more politically sensitive waters south of Crete. For Athens, which has long flirted with the idea of exploiting its seabed resources without quite committing, the deals represent a decisive shift.

The EU’s Green Deal – Europe’s flagship climate-policy framework – allows for a transitional role for natural gas until the bloc achieves climate neutrality in 2050. Environmental groups are unimpressed. The World Wildlife Fund, a conservation NGO, warned that new drilling risks locking Greece into decades of fossil-fuel dependence and undermining the EU’s climate credibility. But Athens is pushing ahead regardless. Government officials say test drilling should be complete by early 2027. If reserves prove commercially viable, production could begin in 2030 and continue for at least a decade.

Brussels, far from objecting, is quietly cheering.

A senior Commission source told Euractiv that the EU’s overriding priority remains eliminating Russian gas imports – not only through diversification of supply but by working with “trusted and reliable energy partners”. Under its REPowerEU strategy, the bloc intends to shut the door on Russian gas by the end of 2027.

“The US has been and will remain a key reliable energy partner for the EU,” the official said. “We now also have a trade deal to boost our energy cooperation.”

Greece appears equally committed. It has sealed its first long-term LNG agreement with Washington – a 20-year deal to buy 700m cubic metres annually from 2030. Another Commission official noted that Greece’s long-term LNG costs would factor into the roughly $750bn (€680bn) in US energy exports Europe has agreed to purchase over the next three years – a pledge Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made to Mr Trump.

Back-door delivery

Yet even as Greece aligns more closely with Washington, it has warned Brussels that the Kremlin could still exploit loopholes in Europe’s sanctions architecture. Athens has privately urged EU officials to close a potential backdoor for Russian gas entering Bulgaria through the Gazprom-controlled TurkStream pipeline.

“We cannot have natural gas entering Europe through the back door – Turkey,” Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said last week.

Greek officials point out that Turkey imports gas from both Azerbaijan and Russia but lacks real-time transparency over its internal transmission system, making it difficult to confirm the origin of the gas that ultimately flows into Bulgaria. For Sofia to sever its 13-year supply agreement with Russia, significant infrastructure spending will be required – and investors will want guarantees that Russian gas cannot undercut them.

Against this backdrop, the second major Mediterranean project – the Great Sea Interconnector – has returned to the agenda after years of disputes between Athens and Nicosia. The undersea cable, partly funded by the EU, would link the Greek and Cypriot grids before extending on to Israel.

Bibi, Belt, Road

The Greece–Cyprus segment has been frozen amid political wrangling, but the project has gained new traction as Washington and Tel Aviv recognise its strategic value. In May, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to align the interconnector with the emerging ‘India–Middle East–Europe Corridor’. The corridor, stretching from India to Europe via the Gulf and Israel, is pitched as a Western-aligned alternative to China’s Belt and Road – and has the added benefit of bypassing Turkey.

Athens has informed Brussels that Israel, the US and the United Arab Emirates have expressed interest in investing. An updated cost assessment is being prepared for prospective backers. Commission officials view the involvement of American and Middle Eastern investors as a potential breakthrough, though the EU executive has not publicly commented.

A high-level meeting in Washington is already scheduled for April, bringing together energy ministers from Greece, Cyprus, Israel and the US, with the Commission likely to attend.

But the project’s supporters will need to tread carefully. Turkey, a powerful and unpredictable Mediterranean neighbour, opposes the planned interconnector and has its own ambitions to become a regional energy hub. Yet Ankara remains indispensable to Europe’s future defence and migration strategies. For the interconnector to proceed smoothly, the countries involved will need to find a diplomatic modus vivendi with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – no easy task in a region where underwater cables can be every bit as political as pipelines.

(cs, rh, mhk)