The Wrong Way to Peace in Ukraine by Timothy Snyder

2 comments

1. I don’t mind Snyder, but it slightly grates me the way he’s put forward as an expert or worthy spokesman on this topic. In this context he is quite openly a political and ideological activist, not some dispassionate academic.

   > For starters, it would increase the risk of nuclear war. If Ukraine is pressured to accept terms that amount to defeat, the rest of the world will conclude that deterring a future invasion by Russia, China, or any other nuclear power requires possessing nuclear weapons.

   This has always been the case. The ‘deterrence’ is that normally if you try and get nukes the people with nukes stop you via various coercive measures or outright war. Welcome to the unjust reality we live in. Not to mention that merely stating the problem isn’t a solution.

   > That risk reflects the second problem with Trump’s peace plan: its implications for an international order that rests on the principle that national borders are inviolable.

   This isn’t true. Nobody is proposing de jure recognition of the territorial change, only de facto recognition of the reality. Similar to say turkey in cyprus.

   Territorial disputes are absolutely everywhere. We just saw Azerbaijan redraw the map and nobody cared. Israel has seized fresh territory in syria and nobody seems very fussed. In most cases territorial disputes don’t actually have any real legal solution except one side ‘officially’ backing down and withfdrawing their claims.

   > Third, acquiescing to the Kremlin’s long-standing demands would undermine regional peace and stability. If the terms of the settlement leave Russia stronger than Ukraine, Putin will be encouraged in every possible way – legal, moral, psychological, and economic – to continue waging war in Europe.

   Ignoring the complete lack of rationale behind the claim, I’d suggest that a full blown war and widespread ‘shadow war’ that’s *currently taking place* throughout the continent is rather more undermining to regional peace and security.

   > Fourth, Trump’s plan does not provide credible enforcement mechanisms. Given that Russia has violated every agreement with Ukraine it has ever made, assurances from the Kremlin that it will not attempt to seize more Ukrainian territory are meaningless. US security guarantees also lack substance, especially under an administration that cares little for honesty and fair dealing. The only meaningful deterrent against new Russian aggression is for Ukraine to join NATO – which the proposed settlement expressly forbids.

   NATO doesn’t have any enforcement mechanisms. It’s quite possible (albeit highly unlikely) that a NATO member could be invaded and nobody else would join the war directly.

   The ‘peace plan’ also isn’t finalised, but a broad set of points. I’d wager that russia themselves would want enforcement mechanisms, given Putin’s seeming afffinity for treaties akin to the cold war era ones between the USSR and US (such as CFE).

   > In prioritizing Russia’s imperial fantasy over Ukraine’s democratic will, Trump’s plan avoids the question of reconstruction – the fifth main issue.

   No they don’t? There’s little detail and it involves the US making a load of money, but there are most assuredly clauses regarding ‘reconstruction’

   > The last, and perhaps most fundamental, problem is process. What we know about history is that securing a durable peace settlement requires involving all concerned parties. Recall that after World War I, the countries regarded as aggressors were shut out of the most critical part of the peace negotiations – a decision that contributed to the outbreak of World War II.

   Not wrong per se. *Imposing* the deal on Ukraine would be counterproductive. Assuming Russia was heavily involved in creating the proposals, it’s better to frame them as ‘terms on which we’d be happy to end the war’. Nobody is obliged to accept them of course. And nobody is ever happy about making concessions in order to achieve peace, which is why more often than not peace terms need to be ‘enforced’ by one party onto the other. Consider that the purpose of the war in the first place. I’m not sure there’s a scenario where Ukraine isn’t upset by the peace settlement.

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   The fundamental problem i guess is that a lot of people have convinced themselves that this war doesn’t actually have any purpose beyond personal glory for Putin, and if they just wait long enough he’ll get bored and just throw his hands up and say ‘well i’m bored now so we’ll call it quits’. Which is frankly a pretty preposterous narrative that lives in the 18th century. This should have been thrown into the narrative dustbin in March 2022 when the peace demands aligned with his public statements, or in October 2022 when despite things looking dicey he doubled down, partially mobilised and dug in whilst adding territorial concessions to those same peace demands.

2. I’m brand new here. I’ve been hanging out in low quality reddit political forums.

   My first exposure to Snyder was a NY Times article “The American Abyss” which I think was a solid analysis. My other exposures have been listening to him on Democracy Now! **I can’t stand his take on the current phase of the Russo-Ukrainian War because his position seems to rely completely on the false notion that the US and NATO can do no wrong- they’re just forced to do innocent World Policeman duties.** I believe what Noam Chomsky says- that Russia screwed up by invading Ukraine, and that’s what the US wanted, to keep it succinct.

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