What next after a good year for UK-German relations?

Ahead of the first German state visit to the UK in 27 years, Jannike Wachowiak looks at British-German relations. She argues that while the two sides are more proactively pursuing closer bilateral ties, some issues such as the UK-EU reset may block significant progress. 

It has been a good year for British-German relations. This week’s state visit by German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier – the first in 27 years – is the icing on the cake.

The highlight of the year was the signing of the Kensington treaty (or, as many prefer to call it, the British-German friendship treaty). Whilst this provides the structures for developing deeper cooperation over time, there is no guarantee that the two sides will use these to push for more ambition. What is more, whether its potential will be realised depends in no small measure on the evolution of UK-EU relations.

Much has changed in Britain’s relationship with Europe and with Germany since Queen Elizabeth II hosted German President Roman Herzog at Windsor Castle in 1998. Then, she emphasised the importance of both countries belonging to international organisations, ‘headed by the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’.

These shared institutional spaces meant that the two countries had little need to invest in bilateral structures. Trade relations, research, and mobility were largely facilitated through the EU. Security and defence were dealt with by NATO.

However, when one of these pillars fell away after Brexit, German-British ties suddenly looked rather threadbare. Friedrich Merz himself expressed surprise that no bilateral agreement had been signed since 2016.

The treaty therefore fills a gap: it creates opportunities for dialogue – which had not been an issue when German and British Ministers saw each other regularly in Brussels. New structures include a German-British summit every other year (‘governmental consultations’) and various ministerial dialogues.

The Kensington treaty is often described as the missing piece in the triangle that is German-British-French relations. However, it is less ambitious than either its Franco-German or Franco-British counterparts.

The Franco-German relationship involves regular meetings between cabinet ministers in the Ministerial Council, a Parliamentary Assembly which brings together 100 parliamentarians, and a Youth Office that facilitates exchanges between young people. Franco-British relations on security and defence rest on a defence partnership that was first formalised under the 2010 Lancaster Treaties and recently refreshed.

What is more, the UK and Germany still need to implement much of what they have agreed, not least the seventeen ‘lighthouse projects’ contained within the Treaty.

In November, the UK changed its immigration rules to allow children coming to the UK as part of a German school trip to travel on national identity cards (rather than passports) and without applying for a visa. The Business Forum, bringing together governments and businesses, will be convened for the first time next year.

Other lighthouse projects, however, are vaguer. In some cases, ideas for cooperation are yet to be developed (‘to identify mutually agreeable solutions to UK and German mobility issues’ and ‘to identify and deliver new people-to-people initiatives’).

Going forward, the new structures could be used to achieve more. The two sides have committed to use the biennial summit to ‘endorse an Implementation Plan of projects under the Treaty for the following two-year period’. In the mix could be scholarships for internships in the Bundestag and House of Commons (similar to this German-US programme), secondments for civil servants, or any ideas that emerge from the Joint Expert Group on mobility that is expected to hold its first meeting before Christmas.

But whether 2026 will be another good year for the relationship doesn’t depend solely on Berlin and London. The UK’s reset negotiation with the EU is underway and it is fair to say that things could be going better. Talks on the EU’s €150bn defence fund (Security Action for Europe, or SAFE) collapsed over money, and the respective positions of the two sides on a youth experience deal remain very different.

The British side acknowledge that Germany has tried to play a positive role in these talks. Whilst France was pushing for a very high – some would say unreasonable – UK contribution to SAFE, Germany prioritised getting an agreement done. But not, as it turned out, to the point of wanting to get into an open fight with Paris.

And in other files, notably youth mobility, Germany will likely be at the forefront of member states pushing for an ambitious agreement – no matter how uncomfortable this is for the UK government. There is therefore a risk that UK-EU disagreements could sour the mood at bilateral level.

The last state visit was a long time ago, but some things are worth recalling. Back then, the BBC’s William Horsley described the relationship as one of ‘pragmatic partnership’. This, it seems, has not changed. Going forward, pragmatism (and political willingness) will also be needed if the two sides want to fulfil the potential that the treaty holds and ensure a difficult EU reset does not dampen the appetite to come back for more.

By Jannike Wachowiak, Research Associate at UK in a Changing Europe.