While participating in a conference on December 6, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar was asked, “What’s your reading of the extreme concentration of power that we’re seeing in Islamabad under the new chief of defence forces, and is that to India’s advantage or disadvantage?”
Jaishankar said, inter alia, “The military has either been overtly, covertly, or in a hybrid manner… Essentially, it’s been in command. In some cases, it’s more visible and naked in a way. In some cases, it is less so… for us the reality of the Pakistani army has always been, and much of our problems actually emanate from there. When you look at the terrorism, when you look at the training camps, when you look at the sort of policy of, I would say, almost ideological hostility towards India… it comes from the army.”
India has declared that it will treat every terrorist attack from Pakistan as an act of war. Indirectly referring to this declaration, the questioner asked Jaishankar, “Are we diplomatically boxed into a corner where General Asim Munir can whenever he chooses trigger a terror attack at some part in India, and you’ve already de facto announced to your world or signalled to the world your intent that you will strike back some way or the other?”
Jaishankar responded thus: “… I’m not sure where you get your admiration for him from. I have no admiration for him. I’m quite disgusted by some of what he’s… At the end of the day, look at the state of Pakistan, and you see the differentials and the capabilities and, frankly, the reputation on either side. I think, look, we should not get over-obsessed and hyphenate ourselves with them. Yes, there is a challenge. There are issues there. We’ll deal with it. So, you know, relax.”
On December 7, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not surprisingly, rejected Jaishankar’s comments about the army. Defending the army, it stated, “All institutions, including armed forces, are a pillar of national security, dedicated to safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.” Predictably it called Jaishankar’s remarks “part of a propaganda campaign” and went on to remark on India’s present ruling dispensation.
The Pakistani response concluded by predictably declaring, “Pakistan believes in co-existence, dialogue and diplomacy. However, it stands united and resolute in its intent and ability to safeguard its interests and sovereignty.” Pakistan’s reaction really can be ignored, for it only reinforces the belief that the army is the country’s main institution.
It is good that Jaishankar focused on the approaches of the Pakistan army towards India. He was also correct in noting the unchanging reality about Pakistan’s polity. Except for brief interludes, Pakistan has been in the iron grip of the army. The institution has cast a shadow on all major aspects of the country’s national life since 1958, when General Ayub Khan overthrew the constitution and took direct control of Pakistan.
While the army has the last say on all major decisions on national policy, it has always had total control over the country’s security policy. It does not allow the elected leadership—even when the country has been under ostensible civilian rule—any real involvement in this area. Thus, Jaishankar was right in asserting that the Pakistan army is responsible for Pakistan’s terrorism against India. However, what can be added is that Pakistan’s political class has not opposed the army’s policy of sponsoring terrorism against India. Thus, it is complicit in it.
There is also a need to go beyond Jaishankar’s remarks to understand Pakistan’s polity and its ideological moorings, which are responsible for its implacable hostility against India. For this purpose, it is necessary to go to the ideology of Pakistan, which lies in the Pakistan Muslim League’s view that within British India there were two nations—one Hindu and the other Muslim.
The League, once Mohammad Ali Jinnah became its Qaid-e-Azam, went further to declare that these nations were irreconcilable. And, therefore, there could not be, after the end of British rule, a single country but two in the Indian subcontinent. These two would have to be created on the basis of religion. The term the League used for its view was the ‘two-nation theory’.
The leaders of the Indian Freedom Movement did not ideologically ever accept the League’s view that religion could be the basis of Indian nationalism. They rejected the idea of the division of India on the basis of faith even after the Muslim League announced that once the British left, Pakistan had to be created in the Muslim majority areas of British India.
However, the League remained obdurate, and the British concluded that the partition of India would be in their security interest after the end of their Indian empire. The reason was that they felt that they could rely on the League leadership to protect their interests but were convinced that an independent Indian leadership would pursue an independent policy; hence, it could not be relied on as the Pakistani leadership could be.
The Pakistani people and its political class are committed to the two-nation theory. The army holds it close to its heart. It has always stated that it is the foundational principle of Pakistan. Further, the Pakistan army has asserted that it is the protector of the frontiers as well as the ideology of Pakistan.
Thus, Jaishankar is right in stating that the Pakistani army is ideologically hostile to India. However, it would be wrong to believe that it is only the Pakistan army which is ideologically hostile to India. The fact is that the foundation of Pakistan itself is based on ideological hostility to such an India as defined in the Indian constitution.
Hence, it would always be futile to think that a commitment to the two-nation theory is confined only to the Pakistan army. It flows through the Pakistan state and its people. They have always also rejected an idea that Pakistan has now matured enough to move from its foundational basis of two-nation theory to territorial nationalism.
Jaishankar is correct in categorically stating that India should never seek to hyphenate itself with Pakistan. There was a time when the world sought to do so. However, now India is so far ahead of Pakistan that no country does that. There is a point here which also needs to be stated. In addition to the fact of Indian progress being far beyond Pakistan, India should always also emphasise that the principles of the Indian constitution, which are the cornerstone of the Indian state, directly contradict Pakistan’s foundational principle of faith-based nationalism.
India has not been wrong in asserting that acts of Pakistani terrorism against India will be considered by it as acts of war. The question put to Jaishankar was whether by doing so India had boxed itself into a corner. The world gets very concerned if there is kinetic action between India and Pakistan because both have nuclear weapons. The point that India needs to make is that if the great powers wish to avoid any anxiety on this score, they have to ensure that Pakistan gives up the use of terror as a part of its security doctrine against India.
India should mount a diplomatic campaign so that the international community accepts the proposition that a terrorist act sponsored or carried out by one nuclear state against another is the beginning of escalation. Hence, if the major powers wish that India does not take kinetic action against Pakistan, they have to ensure that no escalation is undertaken by Pakistan through the use of terror. This campaign will require subtle diplomacy, but it needs to be undertaken.
There is, all in all, a need to build on Jaishankar’s response to the questions posed to him on Pakistan on December 6.
(The writer is a former Indian diplomat who served as India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan and Myanmar, and as secretary, the Ministry of External Affairs. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)
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