South Asian States Seek Cooperation—Without India – Foreign Policy

On a visit this month to Dhaka, Bangladesh, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar reiterated his government’s interest in forging a new regional organization that included Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan. The idea was first discussed during a trilateral meeting in Kunming, China, in June. If it materialized, the proposed grouping would sidestep the all-but-moribund South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

The brainchild of former Bangladeshi President Ziaur Rahman, SAARC was created in Dhaka in 1985 with the aim of fostering regional cooperation. The organization was partly styled after the successful Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Its original members were Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; Afghanistan joined in 2007.

On a visit this month to Dhaka, Bangladesh, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar reiterated his government’s interest in forging a new regional organization that included Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan. The idea was first discussed during a trilateral meeting in Kunming, China, in June. If it materialized, the proposed grouping would sidestep the all-but-moribund South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

The brainchild of former Bangladeshi President Ziaur Rahman, SAARC was created in Dhaka in 1985 with the aim of fostering regional cooperation. The organization was partly styled after the successful Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Its original members were Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; Afghanistan joined in 2007.

Despite joining SAARC, India was an early skeptic. The leadership in New Delhi feared that smaller states would use the new institution to gang up against the region’s principal power. India ensured that the organization’s charter asserted that “bilateral and contentious issues” would remain outside its remit. Nevertheless, over the years, policymakers from India and Pakistan held informal meetings on the sidelines of SAARC summits that helped ameliorate tensions.

Unfortunately, for most of the last decade, SAARC has not provided a venue for such discussions and has become mostly defunct. The organization held its last summit in 2014 in Kathmandu, home of the SAARC Secretariat. The next meeting was scheduled for 2016 in Islamabad, but it was called off after a terrorist attack in India caused a few members to pull out.

Since then, the organization has been in the doldrums—mostly held hostage by the steady deterioration of India-Pakistan relations. And in recent years, India’s ties with Bangladesh and China have also taken a turn for the worse, leaving it with nettlesome neighbors on three sides and further shifting regional dynamics.

This year, a series of terrorist attacks on Indian soil attributed to various organizations based in Pakistan and the brief but intense military conflict between the two countries in May have led to a virtual impasse. Furthermore, though India-China relations have resumed a semblance of normalcy, they remain fraught since the major border clash in the Galwan Valley in 2020.

Finally, India has found itself at odds with the interim government in Bangladesh since the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina last year. The current leadership in Dhaka under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has set aside Bangladesh’s historic grievances with Pakistan. It has not only restored a normal diplomatic relationship with Islamabad but also moved closer to it, including by reviving military-to-military ties.

The move to forge a trilateral regional organization therefore must be seen against this political backdrop. Formalizing a larger grouping that would enhance connectivity and economic cooperation ties doesn’t seem realistic in the near future. It’s also far from certain that other South Asian states would readily join this proposed entity even if they were disillusioned with SAARC’s dysfunction; their ties to India, after all, remain robust.

Still, India has considerable reason to be concerned about the effort to create a new regional organization. China and Pakistan are its two principal adversaries, and India’s relations with Bangladesh are now far from cordial. Based on statements released so far, there are preliminary indications that New Delhi would likely be excluded from the grouping. India can ill-afford to see its other, smaller neighbors turn toward the new entity.

Such a prospect bodes ill both for the future of SAARC and for India’s standing in the region. Despite its current irrelevance, the existing organization still has the potential to foster unofficial dialogue. Since 1992, it enabled visa-free travel for certain individuals, an important first step toward regional integration; it was also instrumental in creating the South Asian University in New Delhi that allows students from the region to enjoy a common educational experience.

These steps were not extraordinary, but they constituted small moves toward promoting regional amity and understanding. A more exclusive organization that seeks to keep India at bay would amount to a regressive development.

SAARC aside, if efforts to create a new regional organization take flight, India will find itself more isolated than it already is. A Bangladesh-China-Pakistan nexus could also have implications for Indian security. China and Pakistan have long had a robust security partnership and occasionally colluded against India, as during the May crisis. Ultimately, India’s options to counter this development are limited.

Given the asymmetry of the material resources that India has at its command compared with China, it will need to find ways to prevent the continued erosion of its influence in smaller South Asian states. To that end, India must assuage the misgivings among its neighbors that have undermined bilateral ties, such as New Delhi’s seeming insensitivity toward trade liberalization.

India will also need to fashion a diplomatic strategy that addresses its neighbors’ fears, both real and imagined—and it will need to do so with alacrity. For some time, China has sought to expand its footprint in South Asia at India’s expense, and by some measure, it has already succeeded. A new initiative with Bangladesh and Pakistan—and the prospect of bringing more states on board—could enable Beijing to achieve its goal.