Abhijeeta Casshyap
For decades, India has approached Pakistan as a problem to be managed — through dialogue, deterrence, isolation, or calibrated retaliation. That assumption itself is flawed.
Pakistan is not a conventional foreign policy challenge amenable to diplomatic persuasion or military signalling. It is a structural condition, shaped by a persistent civil–military imbalance, ideological radicalisation, and dependence on external patrons. No amount of Indian statecraft can fundamentally alter that internal architecture.
Recognising this is not defeatism. It is strategic realism.
South Asia’s prolonged instability cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of global indulgence. Major powers, particularly the United States, repeatedly prioritised short-term geopolitical utility over long-term accountability.
Pakistan was indulged during the Cold War as a conduit against the Soviets; excused after 9/11 as indispensable to counterterrorism; and protected during the Afghan conflict as “too important to alienate”. Each phase deferred reform and normalised ambiguity.
The outcome was predictable. Militant proxies were selectively tolerated, extremist narratives gained institutional space, and deniability became a governing principle. Terrorism in the region did not arise accidentally; it flourished in an environment that reduced costs for destabilising behaviour.
What distinguishes Pakistan from other unstable states is not merely the presence of extremist groups, but the depth of ideological penetration into society and institutions, combined with nuclear capability.
This makes traditional deterrence fragile and reform-from-without implausible. It also explains the international reluctance to confront destabilising rhetoric or conduct. The concern is less about provocation than about the risk of internal collapse.
However, repeated silence carries consequences. When escalation goes unchallenged, restraint is not preserved; it is eroded. Over time, avoidance shades into enablement.
India’s policy choices vis-à-vis Pakistan are structurally capped.
Military action is limited by escalation thresholds. Diplomatic isolation is diluted by global hedging. Economic coercion is ineffective against a state already sustained by bailouts and external assistance.
None of these instruments can induce internal transformation. Expecting them to do so is not strategy; it is habit dressed up as resolve.
This is not a failure of Indian policy. It is a misclassification of the problem.
Where India Has Agency
India’s real leverage lies inward.
History suggests that states rarely defeat dysfunctional neighbours directly; they outgrow them. Economic expansion, institutional resilience, and social cohesion provide strategic depth that episodic deterrence cannot.
As India strengthens internally, Pakistan’s actions matter less — not rhetorically, but materially. Growth, governance, and integration into global supply chains insulate India from the volatility of its neighbourhood.
This inward focus is not disengagement. It is prioritisation.
Obsession confers relevance. Reaction grants centrality. A confident power does neither.
The most destabilising signal India can send is not escalation, but continuity: steady growth, institutional stability, and refusal to be drawn into permanent reaction. Strategic indifference is not passivity; it is the privilege of rising powers.
Pakistan’s security doctrine depends on confrontation and parity. An India that no longer defines itself in opposition undermines that logic more effectively than episodic crises ever could.
Conclusion:
Pakistan may remain an enduring complication in India’s neighbourhood. But treating it as a problem to be “fixed” only perpetuates distraction.
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India’s future will be shaped less by events across the Line of Control than by decisions made at home — in classrooms, factories, courts, and institutions. Strategic maturity lies in knowing which battles define the future, and which merely demand attention.