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THE term red line has been used in a number of contexts over the years. A geopolitical ‘red line’ is a non-negotiable boundary or action that, if crossed by an adversary, will trigger a specified and severe response — whether diplomatic, economic or military. A country draws a red line to maintain the status quo and to prevent a negative change. Understanding the dynamics surrounding geopolitical red lines and the outcomes of crossing the lines is crucial to navigate foreign affairs and global peace. A red line is drawn as a matter of formal foreign policy.
In geopolitics, red lines are not merely rhetorical threats. The crossing of a red line does not mean recognising it as a simple trigger but as a risky event with potentially far-reaching consequences. The primary purpose of geopolitical red lines is to clearly communicate what actions are considered intolerable, thereby defining the limits of acceptable behaviour in a crisis.
An adversary — for example, Taiwan — is another country which may either engage in behaviour or policies which have the potential to harm the interests of the first country, that is, China. The drawing of a red line would seem to be an act of strength of the first country. The consequences for exceeding a given red line are categorically spelt out very specifically in advance.
Examples of red lines in geopolitics
The US and Cuba: In 1962, president Kennedy declared the then Soviet Union’s possible deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba a red line. This event is popularly known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. A 13-day stand-off led to the US president’s announcement of blockade and threat of military action. This eventually forced the Soviet Union to withdraw the plan of deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba. This reinforced the importance of a clear threshold in preventing nuclear war.
The US and Syria: In 2012, president Barack Obama stated that the use of chemical weapons by Syria’s Assad regime a red line. Crossing a ‘red line’ would prompt US military intervention. In 2017, after chemical attack, the US launched missile strikes in Syria, demonstrating the catastrophic potential of approaching such a red line.
Russia and Ukraine: President Vladimir Putin repeatedly drew red lines concerning NATO expansion and military support in Ukraine. While western powers continued to expand military aid to Ukraine, including advanced weapons systems, Russia treated these actions as red lines. Ukraine’s crossing the red lines led up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Russia and the west: On the other hand, western leaders repeatedly warned Russia that an invasion of Ukraine would trigger severe sanctions. When Russia crossed this red line — that is, invaded Ukraine — in 2022, it led to unprecedented economic penalties and a prolonged war, reshaping European security dynamics.
China and Taiwan: The Chinese government states that the declaration of independence state by the Taiwanese government would be crossing a ‘red line.’ The fact that China considers Taiwanese independence a non-negotiable red line, warning of severe consequences if foreign powers intervene militarily or politically in the issue. Chinese invasion is an expectation or possibility of the consequences of the red line being crossed by Taiwan. China has given the message (warning) to Taiwan and the west. If Taiwan attempts to declare independence, such declaration will be treated by China as crossing the red line. Accordingly, China will have no other option but to invade the island and annex it as a part of China.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE: On December 30, 2025, Saudi Arabia bombed a base in Hadramout. Moreover, the Saudi government warned that the United Arab Emirates and Southern Transitional Council forces activities near the kingdom’s borders threaten its national security and the stability of Yemen. Saudi Arabia urged the United Arab Emirates to comply with Yemen’s request to withdraw its forces from Yemeni territories within 24 hours. The kingdom said that ‘any threat to its national security is a red line and the kingdom will not hesitate to take all necessary steps and measures to confront and neutralise any such threat.’ In response, the UAE decided to withdraw its forces from Yemen, denying the shipment contained weapons. This reinforced the importance of a clear red line in preventing any further military escalation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and in the region.
Bangladesh, adversaries: navigating red lines
BANGLADESH continues to pursue a balanced foreign policy, maintaining close ties with neighbouring counties like India, Myanmar and Pakistan while safeguarding its national interests. After the July 2024 uprising, the ouster of the Hasina regime has plunged bilateral ties between Bangladesh and India into a period of deep uncertainty and suspicion. As a result, Bangladesh sought to diversify with other countries.
The majority of people in Bangladesh perceive India’s blind support for the Hasina regime as an endorsement of her authoritarian rule. Consequently, the July uprising was not just a domestic movement against the regime but also an anti-India sentiment due to its approval of the three controversial and non-participatory elections held under the Hasina government. The recent voice of Bangladeshi people against Indian hegemony should be heard and the rationale behind such anti-Indian rhetoric need to be addressed by the Indian government.
The fact that both the countries are blaming each other and drawing perceived red lines against each other, without highlighting, at least openly, the possible consequences of violating red lines. A strong warning about undesirable behaviour may sometimes be as effective as a red line. Tough talk and aggressive language, hostile media narratives, mutual summoning of ambassadors, protests around diplomatic missions and visa suspension are likely lead to a situation where observers perceive that a red line has been drawn even though no official has explicitly declared a red line.
Recently, Bangladeshi national security adviser visited India to attend the Colombo Security Conclave and met the Indian national security adviser to discuss key bilateral issues, possibly highlighting their red lines. Although there is no explicit red line that has been drawn by either side, but intuitively a red line is, indeed, in place. It is essential to navigate the dangers of perceived red lines. Bangladesh has to draw its red lines and communicate them to its adversary — in this context, India. At the same time, the government should navigate the perceived red lines that India may have drawn against us.
Bangladesh considers the status of deposed prime minister Hasina and the rhetoric surrounding her presence in India a ‘red line.’ She uses Indian soil to make political statements that destabilise the interim government. Many believe that the most immediate red line involves the activities of undercover Indian intelligence networks based in Bangladesh to destabilise the administration and create unrest. Although India is bigger and stronger than Bangladesh, the stability in Bangladesh is essential to India for its own strategic and security interests. Both the countries share a long and porous border.
As ties between Bangladesh and India cooled, the interim government initiated to have deep relations with Pakistan. Bangladesh’s recent engagement with Pakistan and Turkey on security-related issues and infrastructure initiatives may raise alarms in India about losing influence in the Bay of Bengal and overland routes to India’s north-east, popularly known as seven sister states. India may consider any such engagement as a threat to the security of the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow strip connecting the mainland India to its north-east, a non-negotiable red line. At the moment, India has no valid reason to express any concern expressed regarding Bangladesh’s growing engagement with Pakistan and Turkey. But, India adopts a cautious approach, closely monitoring developments. Bangladesh has to assess and enhance its defence capability if an adversary attempts to have a surgical strike on its key points installations.
The relationship between Bangladesh and India is at their lowest point in decades since the July uprising. Analysts argue that once the interim government transfers power to a new government in Dhaka, pragmatic engagement will help restore public trust. The institutional dialogues will be reactivated and, thereby, their relationship will be normalised provided there is no Indian hegemony. Recently, high-level delegations from South Asia — Bhutan’s foreign minister DN Dhungel, India’s external affairs minister S Jaishankar, Maldives minister of higher education Ali H Ahmed, Nepal’s foreign minister Bala N Sharma, Pakistan’s national assembly speaker Sardar A Sadiq and Sri Lankan minister of foreign affairs Vijitha Herath — have attended the funeral of former prime minister Khaleda Zia to pay their respect. Let us believe that this visit will help South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation member-countries to become closer for regional peace and, thereby, they will not have to draw red lines against each other.
Dr Sajjad M Jasimuddin is a professor, Kedge Business School and head of Geopolitics Strategy Lab (France). He previously taught at the University of Dhaka and several universities in Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates and China.