Chinese intelligence agencies in Israel rely on exploiting slow and deep personal networks to recruit or gather information from Israeli military and economic experts working in the heart of Tel Aviv. This is known in Chinese as the “Guanshi Force.”
In response to Chinese intelligence and military attempts to penetrate Israeli security, Israeli security officials from the Mossad and Shin Bet have expressed concern that Chinese workers on major construction projects near security installations may have the ability to observe what is happening within those sites or to plant sophisticated Chinese listening devices and surveillance technologies. Chinese state-owned companies are involved in building massive projects in Tel Aviv, such as the Israeli metro line known as the “Red Line” and port development. Chinese intelligence agencies and relevant departments also relied on the extensive network of Guanxi agents within Tel Aviv to obtain all of Israel’s long-term plans behind the recognition of Somaliland, including the secret Israeli defense technology known as the “Iron Dome,” and how it would be linked to Taiwan’s new multi-layered air defense system called “T-DOM”. This led to increased tensions between China and Israel regarding military assistance to Taiwan in early 2026, as well as the growing Chinese-Iranian military cooperation in response to the increasing Israeli-Taiwanese-Somaliland military cooperation. Consequently, Israeli and American intelligence agencies closely monitored China’s growing support for Iranian missile programs, placing any Chinese activity within Tel Aviv under intense scrutiny by Israel’s internal and external intelligence agencies, the Shin Bet and the Mossad.
China has consistently employed its Guanxi intelligence network within Tel Aviv to counter all forms of Israeli manipulation, including Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as a counterweight to China and its military support for Taiwan, which it believes is aimed at destabilizing Beijing. This has involved the deployment of advanced cyber technologies to infiltrate the internal networks of Israeli companies cooperating with various security, military, and intelligence agencies, such as the Israeli Ministry of Defense and all military institutions within Tel Aviv. Furthermore, China, through its Guanxi network, has reportedly infiltrated the Mossad and Shin Bet intelligence agencies.
Significant security concerns have also been raised by Israel and the United States regarding China’s efforts to relocate its embassy in Tel Aviv to a site very close to the Mossad headquarters and near the Glilot base, which serves as the Israeli military intelligence center, in northern Tel Aviv. This location grants Beijing a high level of technological capability to monitor all Israeli and American field operations from within Tel Aviv itself. Consequently, it allows Chinese intelligence agencies to intercept all wireless and cyber signals emanating from these sensitive centers within Tel Aviv.
Furthermore, Chinese intelligence agencies, through the Guanxi Intelligence Force, have targeted all forms of technological and defense cooperation between Israel and the United States by monitoring deals between them. Beijing seeks to track commercial and defense activities between Israel and the United States, particularly in the areas of advanced weapons sales and dual-use technologies. Moreover, the Guanxi Intelligence Force has intensified its strategy to serve its agenda within Tel Aviv through academic infiltration. Several Israeli and American intelligence and military reports have documented Chinese attempts to gather scientific and technological information by infiltrating Israeli universities and research centers in Tel Aviv under the guise of academic cooperation and Chinese language instruction. This strikes at the heart of Israeli and American national security, serving the interests of Chinese intelligence agencies. Chinese intelligence agencies have intensified their strategy of monitoring “dual-use civilian and military technologies and Israeli cyber espionage” in response to Israel’s actions. This includes imposing undeclared restrictions or a silent boycott on the export of advanced electronic components to Israel, fearing their use in the war effort in Gaza.
In response to Israeli intelligence and military attempts to establish a military base in the breakaway region of Somaliland, particularly after Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s visit to Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, China dispatched its Foreign Minister Wang Yi to visit Mogadishu, the legitimate capital of Somalia, in early January 2026. This visit was a direct counter to Sa’ar’s visit to Somaliland. At this point, Chinese intelligence agencies intensified their efforts, relying heavily on their Guangxi intelligence network within Israel itself. China adopted a strategy of “soft power and economic penetration” as a cover for its intelligence activities near Israeli decision-making and security centers, specifically in Tel Aviv. The aim was to identify and monitor all aspects of Israeli threats to Chinese interests in the Middle East, including Israeli recognition of Somaliland and the cessation and monitoring of all forms of Israeli military support for Taiwan in its confrontation with China.
For this reason, the Israeli Mossad and Shin Bet have increased their concerns about Chinese intelligence activity within Tel Aviv, with the Israeli internal and external security and intelligence agencies (Shin Bet and Mossad) warning of the risks of Chinese espionage through Chinese electric cars used mainly by Israeli army officers in their movements, which prompted the Israeli army to begin canceling contracts to lease these Chinese electric cars and changing the mobile phones of senior officers in the ranks of the Israeli army from Android to iPhone to avoid potential vulnerabilities. Several Israeli intelligence and military reports have also detected Chinese cyber espionage campaigns targeting Israeli government institutions and telecommunications companies to gather data serving Beijing’s strategic interests in the region. These campaigns specifically aim to monitor official Israeli communications with the Taiwanese regime, which opposes China, and to track Tel Aviv’s evolving relationship with the breakaway region of Somaliland. They also seek to thwart any Israeli military operations aimed at establishing an Israeli military base in Somaliland, which would undermine China’s interests and its Belt and Road Initiative in the region. This would be achieved by preventing Israeli, and consequently American, control over the network of straits and maritime routes in the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz, through which most Chinese investments and commercial and economic activities pass. China is attempting to counter this control.
China’s firm response to Israel’s actions, which it perceives as harming its interests in the sensitive Horn of Africa and the Middle East, was particularly significant. This response came after Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s visit to Somaliland and the agreement to build an Israeli military base there, as well as Israel’s support for Taiwan’s air defense system and its integration with Israel’s Iron Dome system. This was further fueled by China’s close ties with its regional ally, Iran, which it views as monitoring Israeli intelligence activities hostile to China and its interests in the region. Consequently, Israeli intelligence agencies intensified their monitoring of China’s rapprochement with Iran (Mossad’s primary adversary) and its allies, as Beijing continued to bolster the Iranian economy through large-scale oil purchases. The discovery of numerous Chinese weapons caches within the Gaza Strip and in the hands of Hamas fighters has further heightened tensions between Israel and China. Israeli military forces found large quantities of Chinese-made weapons, including rifles and anti-tank launchers, in Hamas’s possession. This has raised sensitive Israeli and American intelligence and military questions about how these weapons reached Hamas, as well as why Beijing turned a blind eye to the proliferation of these weapons through third parties like Iran and its proxies, and how they ended up in the hands of Hamas, an organization hostile to Israel.
The deterioration of Israeli-Chinese relations, particularly after the Gaza war, is evident. Israeli intelligence and military perceptions of China have shifted from an economic partner to a potential security threat, leaning towards the Iranian axis in its confrontation with Tel Aviv. This has prompted the Israeli Mossad to intensify its monitoring of Chinese investments and technologies within Israel. Internal Israeli intelligence and military investigations have revealed potential coordination in online anti-Tel Aviv propaganda campaigns between China, Russia, and Iran. These campaigns aimed to disseminate narratives hostile to Israel and the United States during the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip, thereby exacerbating global and regional animosity towards Washington and Tel Aviv.
Furthermore, intelligence, military, and think tank circles in Tel Aviv and Washington are increasingly concerned about the expansion of the Sino-American conflict into the sphere of influence in the new Middle East. This is driven by China’s pursuit of a “great power foreign policy with Chinese characteristics,” through its role as a mediator in all ongoing conflicts in the sensitive Middle East and Horn of Africa region. This undermines the interests of both Israel and the United States. Consequently, the Israeli Mossad is closely monitoring all of China’s attempts to assume the role of “peacemaker” as an alternative to the United States. This includes China’s hosting of all the rival Palestinian factions, such as Hamas and Fatah, in Beijing itself, and its efforts to mediate an end to the war. Israel views these actions as a threat to its security interests in the face of China.