China adopts a reserved and cautious stance towards Turkish policies that rely on “ethnic ties,” or what is known as “Turkish nationalism,” to extend its external influence, including the incentive of granting citizenship to Lebanese Turkmen. This is due to several reasons, most notably China’s firm stance against “Turkish ethnic policies” and its defense of state sovereignty. China rejects the principle of interference in internal affairs and considers the use of ethnicity as a tool of Turkish foreign policy, or what is known as Pan-Turkism, a threat to the principle of “state sovereignty.” China fears that this could become a model for intervention in other spheres of influence. Here, China’s policy of sensitivity towards “Turkish nationalism” in particular is evident. Beijing views with deep suspicion any Turkish move aimed at promoting a shared ethnic identity abroad, as this directly fuels separatist tendencies within China, specifically in the Xinjiang region (East Turkestan), inhabited by Uyghurs of Turkic origin.

China fears the precedent of granting Turkish citizenship to a number of ethnic minorities in Lebanon, as this, from the Chinese perspective, could create ethnic power centers. China views Turkey’s promises (made by its foreign minister in 2020) to grant Turkish citizenship to Lebanese Turkmen as an attempt to alter the demographic and political balance, which Beijing considers a form of “ethnic power play” that could destabilize fragile states. China fears the expansion of Turkey’s support for the principle of “Turkic ethnic unity” and its impact on the security of China’s Xinjiang region, which has a Turkic minority. China fears that the success of this Turkish policy in Lebanon or elsewhere could encourage Ankara to offer similar concessions, such as passports or residency rights, to the Uyghurs, as has already happened in previous years, leading to severe diplomatic tensions between the two countries.

Although China has not issued a direct and official statement regarding Turkey’s decision to grant citizenship to Turkmen in Lebanon or others, its implicit reservations about the Turkish decision can be inferred from several contexts, most notably Chinese sensitivity towards “Turkish identity”: China views with suspicion any policies that strengthen ties based on cross-border “Turkish identity,” given the association of this concept with the Uyghur issue in Xinjiang. The Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group whose rights Turkey sometimes defends, which Beijing considers interference in its internal affairs. Furthermore, China employs a policy of security vetting for those with ties to Turkey. Here, China imposes additional restrictions and security checks on individuals who have visited Turkey or have strong connections to it when applying for visas to enter China, reflecting a growing Chinese security concern about “ethnic activity” linked to Turkey.

China consistently adopts the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries, adhering to the principle of national sovereignty and opposing the use of ethnic identities as a tool for political influence in other nations. This is the same logic some parties have used to criticize Turkey’s actions toward the Turkmen of Lebanon, deeming it “interference in internal affairs.” However, China also pursues a pragmatic relationship with Turkey. Despite disagreements with Turkey regarding the issue of Turkic ethnic groups, both Beijing and Ankara are keen to maintain strategic and economic cooperation. The Turkish Foreign Ministry recently affirmed (January 2026) its desire for deeper cooperation with China. Nevertheless, China has become cautiously wary of Turkey’s policy of leveraging “Turkic ethnic ties” to extend its influence in Central Asia and Xinjiang, fearing internal instability despite shared economic interests. Beijing views this policy, which includes promoting Turkic and Uyghur identity, as a threat to its internal national sovereignty and, in particular, to its ethnic minorities of Turkic origin in Xinjiang. Therefore, China has been managing the resulting tension by pursuing a policy of integrating Turkey into its Belt and Road Initiative.

The most prominent point of contention for China regarding Turkey’s support for Turkic ethnic ties abroad stems from its fear of the exploitation of Turkish nationalism. China fears that Ankara’s promotion of “Turkish nationalism” could incite separatist sentiments among the Turkic-origin Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. Consequently, China places restrictions on Turkey’s relations with the “Uyghur minority” in China. Furthermore, China is concerned about Turkish influence in Central Asia through Turkish propaganda promoting Turkic ethnicity. China sees Turkey’s outreach to Central Asian republics, based on claims of Turkic ethnic expansion, as a competitor to its own economic and political influence in the region, particularly within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. Here, China is pursuing a policy of geopolitical caution towards Turkey regarding the issue of ethnicity and Turkish ethnic ties, due to the potential harm this could cause to China’s interests and influence in the Middle East. While China seeks to extend its influence through economic and developmental means via the Belt and Road Initiative, it believes that “Turkey’s ethno-religious policies” are causing polarization that hinders the stability necessary for Chinese investments.

Hence, China adopts a specific approach to managing relations with Turkey. Despite Chinese reservations regarding Turkish ethnic policies, China seeks to contain Turkey through growing economic ties and expanding trade, capitalizing on Ankara’s economic needs. This necessitates a cautious balancing act in political stances. Therefore, China sends indirect diplomatic messages to Turkey, expressing its reservations about ethnic policies and the use of ethnic identity. This is done through China’s consistent emphasis in bilateral meetings on the need to respect “territorial integrity” and “non-interference” messages, aimed at Ankara to cease supporting movements that rely on transnational ethnic identity. Thus, China does not oppose granting citizenship in general as a sovereign legal act, but it opposes the politicization of ethnicity and its use as a tool of influence. It considers “naturalization based on ethnicity” in Lebanon a red flag that directly threatens its national security, particularly in relation to the Uyghur issue.

Therefore, we understand that the Chinese position is not directed against the Turkmen of Lebanon as individuals or others, but rather it is a principled Chinese reservation against Turkish policy, which uses “Turkish ethnic ties” to extend its external influence, fearing the repercussions this might have on China’s sensitive regional and domestic interests and files in Central Asia, Xinjiang, and elsewhere.