Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico’s recent post on X reveals much about how regional politics is shifting after Viktor Orbán was voted out of office following 16 years in power. ‘Three musketeers are waiting for the fourth and the revival of V4,’ Fico captioned a photo of himself with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, clearly referring to incoming Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar.
The warm tone of the post, alongside the call to revive the Visegrád Four format—traditionally an effective framework for Central European cooperation to balance pressure from Western European member states in EU decision-making—signals a broader recalibration of Fico’s foreign policy, which had been fundamentally shaken by Orbán’s electoral defeat.
Three musketeers are waiting for the fourth and the revival of V4 💪🏼 🇸🇰🇨🇿🇵🇱🇭🇺
Photo by @AndrejBabis pic.twitter.com/P1MK7lol7C
— Robert Fico 🇸🇰 (@RobertFicoSVK) May 4, 2026
Most Reliable Strategic Partner Lost
Since Fico’s return to power, he and Orbán operated as a de facto Central European ‘blocking tandem’ within the EU, converging around shared scepticism toward EU sanctions against Russia, military support for Ukraine, and deeper European integration. The two leaders framed their alignment in terms of sovereignty, economic and energy pragmatism, and a commitment to peace. This practical cooperation allowed Fico and Orbán to reinforce each other’s veto threats, particularly on decisions related to the war in Ukraine and Russian energy. A notable example was the dispute involving Hungary, Slovakia, and Ukraine over the flow of Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline.
With Orbán now out of power, Fico has lost his most reliable strategic partner within the EU, resulting in immediate political exposure for Slovakia. Positions that were previously shared with Budapest now appear increasingly unilateral. In this context, Fico risks being portrayed as a ‘fifth column of Putin’ within the European Union. His continued engagement with Moscow—including his planned participation in Russia’s World War II commemorations—now carries significantly higher reputational costs without Orbán’s political cover.
‘With Orbán now out of power, Fico has lost his most reliable strategic partner within the EU’
This dynamic is forcing Fico to recalibrate his Russia policy—not by abandoning ties with Moscow, but by adjusting tone, sequencing, and diplomatic signalling. A clear example is his recent meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on 4 May in Yerevan, Armenia.
During the talks, Fico departed from his previous opposition to Ukraine’s EU accession and even offered assistance based on Slovakia’s own accession experience. A shift is also visible on the Ukrainian side: Fico is no longer treated solely as an obstructive or hostile actor, but as a pragmatic—if difficult—partner willing to engage under evolving regional conditions.
A Revived V4?
At the same time, Fico must rebalance Slovakia’s broader alignment within the EU to avoid isolation. His post on X fits into this pattern. Relations with Tusk have been strained in recent years, and tensions with Péter Magyar have also been evident. Yet Fico is now signalling openness to reviving the V4 framework, which has been effectively frozen since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine due to divergent positions among member states.
The appeal to a renewed V4—now including a more EU-aligned Hungary under Magyar—offers Fico a way to re-anchor Slovakia within a regional coalition rather than remaining isolated on issues related to Russia and Ukraine. Importantly, this approach could allow him to avoid a direct realignment with Brussels, which could carry domestic political costs.
However, with Magyar assuming office, Slovak–Hungarian relations are entering a more conflictual phase than under Orbán. During his first international press conference, Magyar sharply criticized the Beneš Decrees—Czechoslovak laws that imposed collective punishment on Germans and Hungarians by stripping citizenship, confiscating property, and enabling expulsions, and which formally remain in effect. He also placed minority rights at the centre of bilateral relations, linking future negotiations to guarantees for the Hungarian community in Slovakia. The Orbán government had largely avoided such confrontations, partly due to the aforementioned ‘blocking tandem’ dynamic with Slovakia.
Meanwhile, Fico and his government appear committed to their existing position on the Beneš Decrees and minority issues, with officials increasingly accusing Magyar of ‘historical revisionism’. From a domestic political perspective, this stance is understandable, as concessions on these issues could drive voters toward more nationalist parties. However, it risks once again undermining meaningful cooperation within the V4 framework.
From Magyar’s perspective, there is little political downside in confronting Fico’s government on these issues. Such positions may strengthen his support among the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and could even attract voters from Orbán’s traditional base.
Ultimately, Fico’s call for a revived V4 cannot be separated from his broader recalibration on Russia policy in the post-Orbán landscape. While maintaining visible ties with Moscow, he is simultaneously adjusting his diplomatic posture to avoid full isolation within the European Union. His outreach to regional partners, combined with his engagement with Zelenskyy and a softer tone on Ukraine’s EU accession, reflects a strategy of hedging rather than full realignment.
In this context, reviving the V4 offers Fico a potential buffer against isolation, allowing him to distribute the political costs of his Russia policy across a regional framework. Yet this strategy is undermined by the very tensions it seeks to manage: with Péter Magyar elevating minority rights and challenging the Beneš Decrees, Slovak–Hungarian relations risk becoming the central fault line within the bloc.
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