India will have to step up its uranium imports to achieve its nuclear power target by 2047
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Adnan1 Abidi
India’s two energy policy objectives are net-zero by 2070 and inclusive Viksit Bharat by 2047. The recent war in Iran has brought to the fore a third objective of energy security. These require substantial expansion of power generation from clean energy sources, replacing petroleum products and natural gas with electricity and reducing coal use.
What role can nuclear power play in this transition? India’s nuclear ambitions are entering a new phase. With approximately 8.8 GW of installed nuclear capacity currently supplying about 3 per cent of the nation’s electricity, the government has set a target of expanding capacity to 100 GW by 2047 to replace coal-based power to reach our net-zero objective. Achieving that goal would require more than a 10-fold increase in nuclear generation capacity within two decades, demanding not only unprecedented reactor construction but also a reliable fuel supply.
A critical question emerges: will nuclear growth strengthen India’s energy security, or merely replace dependence on imported fossil fuels with dependence on imported nuclear fuel?
Historically, fuel (uranium) shortages affected the operation of nuclear power plants, as they operated at half capacity. A severe uranium shortage between 2006 and 2010 reversed those gains. PLF fell below 60 per cent, reaching a low of 34-40 per cent in early 2009. However, performance has improved considerably since 2010.
The long-term average PLF now stands at around 82 per cent, reflecting better fuel availability and improved operational performance. However, how much dependence on imports does it require? Various scenarios suggest a 100 GW nuclear fleet would require between 18,000 and 20,000 tonnes of uranium annually.
Uranium profile
Global uranium production in 2025 was approximately 62,000 tonnes of which India imported 250 tonnes. India alone would consume nearly one-third of the current world uranium output if it reaches the 100 GW target.
However, global supply can also increase, the total mineable identified reserve is 5.9 million tonnes. If the annual production is one fiftieth of the total reserves, it will be around 1,20,000 tonnes. India will continue to be a substantial consumer of global production.
India possesses an estimated 4,42,000 tonnes of natural uranium reserves. However, most domestic deposits are relatively low-grade and costly to extract and refine, even costlier than importing. There is currently no realistic scenario under which such expansion can occur without large-scale uranium imports. The consequences of fuel shortages are already well documented. Previous uranium constraints directly reduced reactor output. Under a 100 GW programme, fuel availability would become not merely an operational concern but a threat to energy security.
Following the 2008 India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement, India secured uranium supply arrangements with multiple countries, but in recent years India’s uranium import came from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Canada, creating a significant concentration of dependence. If we look at the larger picture, it seems like, unlike crude oil, where India sources imports from a broad mix of suppliers including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Russia and the UAE, uranium procurement remains concentrated. A disruption in supplies from Kazakhstan could prove considerably more difficult to replace quickly.
Kazakhstan holds approximately 14 per cent of global uranium resources and produces more than 40 per cent of global uranium output. While this gives the country substantial influence over global uranium markets. For India, this creates an additional geopolitical layer as well as shifting the dependence.
Thorium is being presented as India’s route to complete nuclear fuel independence and a way to energy security because the country holds roughly 25 per cent of the world’s thorium reserves. However, the thorium cycle is not yet fully self-sustaining because thorium itself is not fissile in nature. Rather, it absorbs neutrons as a blanket around the core of a reactor such as India’s recently developed Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) and is converted into U-233, a fissile fuel.
In principle, this creates a fully domestic and self-sustaining fuel cycle. India’s three-stage nuclear programme is designed to harness this advantage. A significant milestone was reached in April 2026 when the 500 MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam achieved first criticality. Thorium is India’s most self-reliant long-term energy option, but it is likely to be constrained by the rate at which we can build FBRs.
Energy mix
From the perspective of diversifying India’s energy mix and advancing its Net Zero ambitions, nuclear power is a logical part of the solution. Other strategies also have their own problems. Solar and wind require storage batteries or hydro power, which may be limited. Batteries will need imports of Lithium from China; biofuels require land and compete with other crops for water.
India’s target of 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 will require vast quantities of uranium every year, while the technology that promises genuine fuel independence — the thorium-fast breeder cycle — remains decades from commercial maturity. Until then, uranium procurement must be treated with the same strategic importance as crude oil.
That means building a dedicated strategic uranium reserve, securing binding long-term offtake agreements, and acquiring equity stakes in overseas uranium mines. Hence, India influences production decisions during supply disruptions. Uranium can be stored with some precautions against leakage. It also means ring-fencing funding for the fast-breeder and thorium programme, ensuring that the long-term energy-independence project is not sacrificed to meet short-term reactor construction targets. Every year of delay in scaling the PFBR-to-thorium pathway is another year of compounded exposure to uranium imports.
The true test of India’s nuclear strategy is not how often policymakers speak about thorium, but how seriously they manage uranium security over the next 15 years. A level of dependence on a single supplier that would be unacceptable for crude oil should not be accepted for the fuel expected to help replace it. India should also have concerted R&D to develop cheaper batteries than Lithium-ion ones, as also on economic technology for cellulosic ethanol. Energy independence is not a single decision; it is a carefully sequenced transition.
Saini is Senior Research Analyst; and Parikh is Chairman, IRADe
Published on August 17, 2026