Prosecution Monday evening mounted a forceful final push to secure the conviction of Christopher Okello Onyum, the prime suspect in the gruesome April 2, 2026 murder of four toddlers at Ggaba Early Childhood Development Centre, dismissing his mental illness defence as untenable and insisting that the evidence on record firmly places him at the scene of the crime.
Below is a slightly abridged version of the court proceedings.
Mr Jonathan Muwaganya, Chief State Attorney: My Lord, for the record, we are as before. Thank you, My Lord, Your Lordship, ladies and gentlemen assessors.
My Lord, you will allow us to highlight our case in response to the submissions of the defence.
The accused is indicted on four counts of murder. There are four ingredients that we have the burden to prove: that a human being — or rather human beings, in this case — were killed; that the death was caused by an unlawful act, perpetrated with malice aforethought; and that it was Okello who participated in causing the said deaths.
My Lord, we have a burden to prove all four ingredients, and we have highlighted the law.
We want to emphasise that although the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt, the principle established in decided cases is that proving beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proving beyond a shadow of doubt.
We address Your Lordship on the first ingredient — that human beings died.
The law is that death can be proved either by production of medical evidence or through eyewitness testimony. In this case, we produced the evidence of PW1, through whom prosecution exhibit number four was tendered, showing that the bodies of Eteku, Sseruyange, Agenorwoth and Odeke were examined and found to have sustained deep cut injuries to the neck that resulted in their deaths.
Besides the doctor, we also led evidence from PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5, who are the biological parents of the deceased children, and who testified that these infants died and were buried.
In addition, we led evidence from PW6 and PW7, the caretakers at the daycare centre, both of whom described the death of each of the children.
Finally, we have evidence from police officers PW14 and PW15, whose testimonies were to the effect that the bodies of the deceased children were collected from the scene and Wentz Medical Centre, respectively, conveyed to Mulago KCCA Mortuary for postmortem examination, and thereafter released to their respective parents for burial.
We submit that this evidence is sufficient to prove that ingredient.
Second ingredient: Death caused by an unlawful act
The law is settled that any homicide is presumed unlawful unless it was accidental or authorised by law.
In this case, nothing rebuts that legal presumption. Nothing pointed to the homicide in issue being accidental, justifiable or lawfully caused.
Although the defence was not clear in its submissions on this particular ingredient, we did not hear any contestation that the deaths were not caused unlawfully.
We therefore submit that this ingredient has also been properly proved.
Third ingredient: Malice aforethought
Reference is made to Section 174 of the Penal Code Act, which defines malice aforethought as either an intention to cause death or knowledge that an act will probably cause death.
The question Your Lordship has to answer is whether whoever assaulted the deceased children in the manner described through the evidence of PW1 and other eyewitnesses intended to cause death, or knew that such assault would probably cause death.
Malice aforethought, being a mental element, can be inferred from circumstances.
These include the type of weapon used — and in this case, the weapon was a knife, which is a deadly weapon.
The second circumstance is the nature of injuries inflicted — in this case, deep cut wounds to the neck.
The third is the part of the body affected, which in this case was the neck, a vulnerable part of the human body.
Another consideration is the conduct of the accused person before, during or after the attack.
We have led irrefutable evidence through various witnesses regarding his meticulous execution of the plan. Part of that evidence is the testimony of PW6, to whom the accused disclosed that he had scouted the scene of the crime the day before.
We also have evidence from PW8, from whom the accused hired a motor vehicle to facilitate his scouting movements on April 1 this year.
We have further highlighted evidence to the effect that, in the process of attacking the victims, the accused scared off PW6, Ms Phoebe Namutebi, a caretaker who was attempting to rescue the children.
The same witness gave evidence that after killing the children, he threw away the knife — an act we submit was intended to conceal evidence, knowing the fatal consequences.
We submit that this evidence establishes malice aforethought.
Participation of the accused
On the fourth and final ingredient — participation — we laid both direct and circumstantial evidence not only placing the accused at the scene of the crime, but proving that he directly participated in causing the deaths of the four infants.
We again highlight the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses, PW6 and PW7.
We also highlight the fact that the accused was arrested at the scene of the crime.
Further, we led evidence of PW17, whose findings were that the accused’s trousers, in PEX16, bore the blood of one of the victims.
In addition, on the recovered murder weapon — the knife — the DNA of the accused was found on the handle.
What this means is that it directly connects the accused to the use of that knife that killed the infants.
There was also evidence from the accused’s sunglasses showing DNA from body 39, belonging to one of the deceased children, Agenorwoth, while DNA belonging to Ignatius Sseruyange was found on the accused’s trousers.
That evidence, and more that we led on record, is sufficient not only to place the accused at the scene, but to prove his direct participation.
We add that throughout the hearing, the accused never denied causing the deaths of the children. He only claimed he did not believe he had the intention to cause their deaths.
He said he was distressed between January and March this year and that his killing of the four children on April 2 could have had something to do with that alleged distress.
From the accused’s defence, we understand him to be raising the issue of insanity.
This defence seeks to negate the essential ingredient of malice aforethought.
The starting point is Section 10 of the Penal Code Act, which provides that every person is presumed to be of sound mind at any time that comes into question, until the contrary is proved.
In other words, there is a legal presumption that every person is sane.
Whoever seeks to dispute that presumption bears the burden of proving otherwise.
Therefore, it is not correct for the defence to fault the prosecution for failing to lead what they term evidence of insanity.
That burden is not shouldered by the State because, as far as the law is concerned, every person is presumed sane.
This principle has been exemplified in several authorities, including Richard Misabimana vs Uganda, where the Supreme Court held that every person of the age of discretion, unless the contrary is proved, is presumed by law to be sane and accountable for his actions, and that the onus is on the defence to establish insanity on the balance of probability.
In our submissions, the defence has failed to prove the accused’s claim of insanity for two reasons.
First, the defence led no evidence to show that on April 2 this year, when these crimes were committed, the accused was suffering from a disease of the mind that deprived him of understanding the nature and consequences of his actions.
In fact, in his defence, the accused does not say he did not understand his actions. His evidence was only that he believes his actions on that day could have been influenced by distress he claimed to have suffered between January and March.
He does not say that on April 2, when he killed the infants, he was suffering distress of any kind.
The presumption of sanity is a very strong one, and to rebut it, the defence must do more than merely speculate about the possibility of mental disorder.
The defence bears the burden to satisfy the court, on a balance of probabilities, of the existence of legal insanity at the precise moment of the crime.
We submit that the defence has failed to do so.
We also rely on medical evidence.
PW11 examined the accused five days after the offence and found him to be mentally sound.
PW12 had previously examined the accused on a private basis, three months before the offence, and also found him clear-minded.
We invite the court to weigh these professional findings against unsupported allegations.
The accused’s own conduct also demonstrates awareness of his actions.
His revelations to PW15 cannot be those of a person who did not understand the nature and quality of what he had done.
The defence has also failed to prove lack of knowledge of wrongfulness.
Wrong in law means legally wrong, not morally wrong.
If the accused knew his actions were against the law, then the defence of insanity fails.
The claims of insanity are not borne out by evidence. They are allegations made by counsel at the stage of submissions — evidence from the Bar.
The defence’s references to painkillers, alleged laughter in court, or past street activity do not amount to proof of mental illness.
Likewise, arguments about the daycare centre lacking a visitors’ book or permanent security are irrelevant.
This court is trying a murder case. It is not the school management on trial. It is the person who allegedly took advantage of circumstances to commit the crime who is on trial.
The absence of a visitors’ book or permanent guard can never be a defence to murder.
We were criticised for not calling one investigating officer, but a criminal offence of this magnitude does not have only one investigator, and the law does not limit who may testify on investigative matters.
Thank you, Your Lordship, for giving us time.
Other points we have not highlighted are included in our written submissions.
It is our prayer that this court finds that we have not only proved all four ingredients of murder, but that the accused’s defence of insanity is unavailable because he has failed to discharge the legal burden placed upon him.
It is our humble prayer that Your Lordship finds the accused guilty on all four counts of murder as indicted.