There are several urgent questions that must be answered by Algerian authorities. Namely, what precise agreement governs the FBI’s activities in Algeria? writes Rachid Sekkai.
A seemingly unassuming post on X by the U.S. Embassy in Algiers announced last month that an FBI law-enforcement attaché sub-office had opened.
Several Algerian media outlets reported the announcement. Some tried to explain what the office would do; others asked why the FBI was returning to Algiers now. However, to my surprise, the wider debate remained limited, as did the details of this new sub-office.
That said, this is likely because Algerian journalists have little freedom to interrogate decisions involving national security, foreign intelligence and sensitive diplomatic arrangements.
Old partners
It is important to point out that this isn’t the first time that the FBI has set up base in Algiers. The United States already had a full legal attaché office in Algeria following 9/11. Around 2010, when Algeria was considered safer and wealthier, it was moved to Tunisia, where Washington had a vested interest post-revolution.
The Tunisian authorities were also seeking support from several Western countries as they attempted to reform their judicial and security institutions, according to analyst Akram Kharief.
Nevertheless, the return of the FBI in Algeria is likely due to the efforts led by Ali Badaoui, who was appointed Director General of National Security in 2024. Soon after he started his role, the US was one of his major foreign engagements. He travelled there to meet with then head of the FBI’s New York Field Office, James Smith, to discuss transnational organised crime, law-enforcement cooperation and new operational methods.
This seems to fit into Badoui’s interest in extending practical police cooperation with foreign partners, including with Britain’s Home Office and National Crime Agency, Slovenia’s national police and Italy’s police leadership. The relationships cover biometric identification, criminal data exchange, forensic work, cybercrime, organised crime, and irregular migration.
What could Algeria gain?
In reality, criminal networks no longer respect national borders. Cybercrime, cryptocurrency fraud, terrorism financing, trafficking and money laundering frequently involve people, accounts and evidence spread across several countries.
A permanent FBI liaison officer could therefore make it easier for Algerian investigators to request information held in the US, trace suspicious financial transactions or coordinate cases involving American companies and digital platforms. The sub-office would be another liaison channel with the Algerian police, gendarmerie and ministry of justice.
Algerian authorities could also be seeking to benefit from the FBI’s specialist training and technical expertise.
Additionally, there may be a financial dimension to recent developments. Washington is possibly seeking to improve the international transparency of Algeria’s banking system. This would make sense given just last year Badoui was involved in the agreement signed between Algeria’s Directorate General of National Security (DGSN) and the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit over the exchange of information on money laundering, terrorist financing, and the financing of weapons proliferation.
Furthermore, when the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) decided to remove Algeria from its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring, it was a highly mediatised event for the North African country.
The FBI sub-office was announced almost exactly one month later.
Whilst the timing does not prove that the two developments were part of the same agreement, it does suggest that financial crimes are likely to feature prominently in the new relationship.
Transparency?
Whilst partnerships related to policing and intelligence sharing may be increasingly common across borders, this does not remove the need for scrutiny.
There are several urgent questions that must be answered by Algerian authorities. Namely, what precise agreement governs the FBI’s activities in Algeria? Which Algerian institutions negotiated it? What information can be exchanged? Who authorises the release of citizens’ personal or financial data? Can information supplied to the FBI be passed to other American agencies or to a third country?
There is also the matter of parliamentary involvement in the FBI’s presence.
Not every form of diplomatic or police cooperation requires a parliamentary vote. Nevertheless, elected representatives should at least be able to establish the legal basis of a permanent foreign law-enforcement presence, the limits placed on it and the safeguards protecting Algerian citizens.
National security cannot be used to exclude the public and parliament from every discussion.
Ultimately, whilst the immediate reasons for the new FBI office may be operational rather than geopolitical, technical cooperation does not take place outside politics.
Even a limited American security presence fosters closer institutional relationships, regular exchanges and greater familiarity among officials on both sides.
This does lead us to question whether Algeria is therefore abandoning its traditional foreign policy or veering towards the Washington camp.
On the other hand, Algeria may simply be widening its diplomatic options and working with Washington where cooperation serves its interests. Nonetheless, Algerian authorities need to explain exactly what the country has agreed to, and who will ensure that the limits of the arrangement are respected.
Indeed, the FBI’s return is perhaps just a case of business as usual in diplomatic terms, but this does not make parliamentary scrutiny or public accountability any less necessary.
Rachid Sekkai is a journalist, media coach, and PhD researcher in identity and belonging.
Follow Rachid on X: @RachidSekkai
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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.