The challenge of territorial balance and unemployed youth
Rivalries in the liberal coalition and prospects of an Islamist rebound
Digital campaigning, dialects, and depoliticising the 2030 World Cup
Ceuta and Brussels diplomacy: shared responsibility and EU funds
Nearly 16 million Moroccan citizens are eligible to vote on Wednesday 23 September to renew their parliamentary, regional, and municipal institutions across 40,700 polling stations nationwide.
The ballot follows an electoral campaign that combined traditional door-to-door campaigning across rural provinces with active engagement on digital platforms such as Instagram and TikTok, with social inequality, youth employment, and territorial cohesion dominating the political debate.
Nourdine Mouati, geopolitical analyst and manager of Spanish-Moroccan cooperation initiatives, unpacks the nuances of this electoral contest, the competition between leading parties, and the diplomatic ramifications of the Ceuta migration crisis across European institutions.
A Moroccan family passes campaign murals showing political party logos for municipal elections in Casablanca, Morocco – AP/ ABDELJALIL BOUNHAR
The challenge of territorial balance and unemployed youth
Once again, institutional regularity frames simultaneous parliamentary, regional, and local elections in Morocco.
Indeed, significant political expectations surround these 23 September elections. Morocco operates as a constitutional monarchy with distinct institutional dynamics where, following the 2011 constitutional reforms, both the legislature and the executive branch received expanded prerogatives. Today, the Head of Government exercises substantial authority, including the power to dissolve Parliament.
These elections are critical to executing the national roadmap and delivering on the priorities set out in the Throne Day Speech delivered by King Mohammed VI on 29 July, which explicitly stressed the urgency of accelerating territorial development in neglected interior regions that lag behind coastal industrial hubs.
These social challenges to bridge the gap between dynamic cities and underdeveloped hinterlands have shaped party manifestos, particularly after the events in Ceuta, where social media calls prompted thousands of youths facing limited employment prospects to attempt crossings.
The executive branch holds direct operational accountability here. Translating royal directives into public policy falls squarely on the cabinet. In Morocco, as in several emerging economies, roughly three million young people are neither in education, employment, nor training (NEETs), presenting a systemic challenge as many hail from provinces enduring structural economic deficits.
Undoubtedly, the Kingdom has achieved tangible success in high-value sectors such as the automotive industry and aerospace manufacturing, which generate thousands of skilled industrial jobs.
However, remote areas across the Atlas Mountains and the Oriental region still face persistent socioeconomic vulnerabilities. The incoming parliamentary majority and the new Head of Government must introduce balanced development policies that provide viable livelihoods for vulnerable youth, aligning with inclusive growth targets monitored by the UN.
Aerial view of Tangier Automotive City – PHOTO/ TANGER AUTOMOTIVE CITY
Rivalries in the liberal coalition and prospects of an Islamist rebound
The outgoing legislature was led by a liberal-centre coalition (RNI, PAM, and Istiqlal) headed by Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch following the sharp electoral defeat of the Islamist PJD in 2021. Do projections point to political continuity?
Morocco maintains genuine party pluralism: over thirty political parties are registered, and 27 lists are competing in this election. Projections suggest the outgoing coalition partners—the National Rally of Independents (RNI), the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), and the Istiqlal Party—remain best placed to form a working majority.
Nonetheless, an electoral recovery by the Justice and Development Party (PJD) cannot be discounted. The PJD represents moderate, institutional political Islam, having headed the government for two consecutive terms. Despite heavy losses in 2021, its grassroots mobilisation and disciplined social base could translate into a seat resurgence in this contest.
Moroccan Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch addresses the World Economic Forum in Davos – PHOTO/MOROCCAN PRESIDENCY
Internal rivalries and leadership realignments are also visible within the governing alliance.
Aziz Akhannouch’s RNI has weathered the natural wear of incumbency alongside public criticism over the implementation of specific sector reforms.
Conversely, the PAM has gained political momentum following the high-profile integration of Fouzi Lekjaa, the current president of the Royal Moroccan Football Federation and Minister Delegate for the Budget, whose profile resonates across wide demographics and whom many view as a credible contender for the premiership. A direct political contest has emerged between the RNI and the PAM to anchor the next parliamentary majority.
Furthermore, Morocco’s electoral code constitutionally mandates generational renewal and gender representation: of the 395 seats in the House of Representatives, 90 are reserved exclusively for women and young candidates, leading to a record presence of female and youth contenders on regional candidate slates.
Fouzi Lekjaa, Minister Delegate in charge of the Budget of Morocco – PHOTO/ Wikipedia
Digital campaigning, dialects, and depoliticising the 2030 World Cup
Campaign speeches sparked debate regarding the host venue for the 2030 World Cup final, with some figures claiming it for Casablanca before walking back remarks to defer to FIFA criteria.
Those statements reflect standard campaign rhetoric and domestic political posturing on both sides of the Strait, similar to sporting debates in Spain.
However, serious observers and citizens recognise that the final decision rests exclusively with FIFA through independent technical evaluation committees operating under strict regulatory standards. These are partisan distractions that often cause bewilderment within world football’s governing body.
FIFA President Gianni Infantino with Fouzi Lekjaa, President of the Royal Moroccan Football Federation (FRMF), 19 July 2025 – PHOTO/X/@FRMFOFFICIEL
Regarding campaign channels, traditional local canvassing coexists with sophisticated campaigns across Instagram, TikTok, and messaging in the Amazigh language.
The 2021 elections initiated a digital shift that this cycle has consolidated, marked by an audience transition from Facebook toward Instagram. Candidates with established public followings, such as the mayor of Azrou—a former world kickboxing champion—leverage visual social formats to engage tens of thousands of followers.
Similarly, Abdelilah Benkirane and the PJD effectively utilise social media to connect with voters through direct addresses in Moroccan Darija. Concurrently, the constitutional status of Amazigh as an official language has featured prominently: candidates such as Akhannouch, originally from the south, delivered tailored messages in Amazigh to voters across the Souss-Massa and Tafraout regions. While digital campaigning enhances direct engagement, it also requires vigilance against disinformation and polarization.
Digital tools foster proximity but require caution against polarized debates and misinformation – Depositphotos
Ceuta and Brussels diplomacy: shared responsibility and EU funds
To conclude, how should the recent European Parliament resolution on migration events in Ceuta be evaluated following diplomatic clarifications from Rabat?
Contrary to alarmist predictions, the European resolution avoided assigning unilateral blame or criminalising Morocco. It explicitly acknowledges the complexity of contemporary migration pressures and hybrid border challenges confronting Europe’s external frontiers, debated under the scrutiny of the European Parliament.
Brussels recalls previous migration crises vividly, including the Syrian exodus along the Greek frontier—which saw over one million transit in a single year—and the ongoing reception pressures on Lampedusa. The tragedy in Ceuta represents an unacceptable humanitarian crisis that must not recur, yet European institutions recognize Morocco is simultaneously a destination and transit country facing identical pressures, coordinating closely with the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
European Parliament – REUTERS/ YVES HERMAN
The European Parliament’s text must also be read through the prism of domestic Spanish party politics reflected across parliamentary groups. The adopted text enshrines a core principle: border governance requires operational co-responsibility and sustained bilateral cooperation.
Misconceptions frequently circulate regarding EU funding: that the European Union “commits” funding does not mean immediate budgetary disbursements, but rather opens multi-stage financial instruments subject to strict administrative conditions.
Compared to partner countries such as Turkey or Egypt, Morocco receives one of the lowest proportions of direct EU funding for border management, and Rabat has consistently reiterated that it will not act as Europe’s frontier gendarme absent a comprehensive structural partnership.
Consequently, the policy orientation pursued by Ursula von der Leyen and the European Commission continues to regard Morocco as an indispensable strategic partner across the Mediterranean basin.