reported<\/a> that Ukrainian drone experts operating from military bases in western Libya, which is controlled by the UN-recognized Government of National Unity, executed this attack. Most of them are concentrated at an airbase in Misrata, but there are others present in the capital, Tripoli, and the town of Zawiya on the coast. <\/p>\nLibya has long remained divided between the GNU under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh in the west and the Libyan National Army under Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in the east. These two sides last fought each other in a civil war that ended in an uneasy ceasefire in 2020, which has held ever since. In April, both administrations participated in the U.S. Flintlock 2026 military exercise hosted on Libyan soil, giving some hope that military reintegration is possible.<\/p>\n
Most of Ukraine\u2019s past extraterritorial drone operations, in Sudan and elsewhere, are widely believed to have relied on small, easily transportable forward-person-view drones. Conversely, the March 3 attack on the Arctic Metagaz was carried out by much larger and more sophisticated sea drones, like the homegrown models Ukraine has used so effectively against Russian naval forces in the Black Sea. <\/p>\n
Why the GNU allowed the Ukrainians\u2019 use of its territories and military bases isn\u2019t immediately clear. While there were clear benefits, there were also significant risks. <\/p>\n
Russia has maintained a presence in eastern Libya for several years, where it has supported Haftar\u2019s LNA. On the other hand, Ukraine\u2019s rival presence wasn\u2019t established overnight nor only in recent months. <\/p>\n
\u201cWhen Russian combatants first appeared near Tripoli fighting on behalf of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in September 2019, as part of his offensive against the Libyan capital, NATO adopted a clear doctrine: Tripoli must remain out of Russia\u2019s reach,\u201d Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya specialist associated with the Royal United Services Institute, told me in an interview.<\/p>\n
\u201cThat principle led Washington to endorse a massive Turkish military intervention, which resulted in the deaths of several Russian fighters between late 2019 and May 2020,\u201d Harchaoui said.<\/p>\n
\u201cAfter Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, a few sabotage operations followed on Libyan soil, including the destruction of an expensive Russian cargo plane in December 2023 in al-Jufrah Air Base,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n
\u201cThose incidents, which caused no Russian casualties, have long been suspected of being carried out in large part by Ukrainian operatives with likely help from NATO.\u201d <\/p>\n
Flash-forward to roughly the last 6-9 months, and the U.S. military has cultivated a close relationship with the GNU\u2019s Deputy Defense Minister Abdel Salam Zewbi, training his elite Battalion 80 unit. <\/p>\n
\u201cIn light of this rapprochement, it is entirely plausible that, with the knowledge and blessing of NATO powers \u2014 chiefly the United States but also the United Kingdom and Turkey \u2014 several small groups of Ukrainian operatives now maintain a presence in the greater Tripoli area,\u201d Harchaoui said.<\/p>\n
Several distinct considerations beginning in May 2025 also convinced Prime Minister Debeibeh to permit the Ukrainian presence. <\/p>\n
The RUSI expert noted that between May and December 2025, Debeibeh found himself in real danger. His country faced tensions that had nothing to do with Russia or Ukraine and their depleting conflict and everything to do with \u201clocal security dynamics\u201d in Tripoli, problems with his rival, Haftar, and concerns about Tripoli\u2019s traditional backer, Turkey, increasingly \u201ctrying to please\u201d that eastern rival. <\/p>\n
\u201cAll of this combined created a real situation of genuine danger for him,\u201d Harchaoui said.<\/p>\n
Consequently, Debeibeh sought to distinguish himself from Haftar, presenting himself as a \u201cunique and valuable\u201d leader to NATO and in the eyes of the United States. As part of these efforts, he delivered a suspect in the infamous murder of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens in September 2012. <\/p>\n
\u201cBy NATO, I mean not just Turkey but also the UK,\u201d Harchaoui said. \u201cThere\u2019s a difference between Ukraine kind of being active, having some operatives on the ground, which I think has been more or less a reality in Libya since probably early 2023 or mid 2023.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cBut then what the March 3 incident indicates to us is that things became bigger, more audacious, more brazen.\u201d<\/p>\n
The incident single-handedly demonstrated how Ukraine had gained a much larger and more visible footprint and could act with such boldness to \u201cendanger an incident as shocking\u201d as the Arctic Metagaz attack.<\/p>\n
\u201cI mean, even from an environmental perspective, it\u2019s really, really disastrous,\u201d Harchaoui said of that attack. \u201cI think any proper analysis should recognize that in the months preceding it, there was a situation in Tripoli where Prime Minister Dbeibeh really felt huge pressure on himself and was in all likelihood desperate to show that he was different from Haftar.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cAnd one way of being different from Haftar, who is pro-Russia, is to be anti-Russia.\u201d<\/p>\n
In doing so, the prime minister could distinguish Tripoli and his government as an island out of Russia\u2019s reach. In addition to remaining beyond Moscow\u2019s reach, it welcomed commercial companies from Ukraine, including those specializing in drone development and deployment. Doing so served Ukraine\u2019s \u201cagenda of hurting Russia outside of Ukraine, in Africa in general, and Libya, in particular.\u201d <\/p>\n
More broadly, establishing ties with Ukraine is beneficial, given its rapid rise to become what Harchaoui dubbed the \u201cdrone capital of the world.\u201d Since Russia\u2019s 2022 invasion in particular, Kyiv has repeatedly shown \u201cvivacity and dynamism and initiative\u201d in all things pertaining to drones. From small loitering munitions and FPV drones launched in their hundreds on the frontlines to the large sea drones that have proven devastatingly effective. <\/p>\n
\u201cThere\u2019s so much dynamism in that sector that it has created commercial endeavors,\u201d Harchaoui said. \u201cIn other words, small companies whose legal entity might be based in Bulgaria or in Serbia or perhaps even in Russia, Turkey, or Ukraine, obviously.\u201d <\/p>\n
These entities have Ukrainian technicians specializing in their various indigenous systems and munitions. They can also \u201cdeploy and give advice and bring somebody up to speed in whichever part of the world, once they pay up,\u201d Harchaoui noted.<\/p>\n
In return for helping Libya enhance its drone capability, it\u2019s understandable that Ukraine may have sought a quid pro quo. Kyiv would undoubtedly have welcomed, if not actively sought, leeway to conduct \u201cextracurricular activities\u201d from Libyan soil. If Tripoli objected, Kyiv could simply threaten to leave and take its increasingly sought after expertise elsewhere.<\/p>\n
\u201cThere\u2019s probably a little bit of that, but we should not exaggerate it,\u201d Harchaoui said.<\/p>\n
\u201cI don\u2019t think Dbeibeh knew that the March 3 incident was going to be that big and that embarrassing, with several weeks of drift afterward going ironically in the pro-Russian part of Libya,\u201d he added. <\/p>\n
The dramatic incident, aside from the above-mentioned environmental damage, was a clear affront to Russia and potentially saw Tripoli facing retaliation.<\/p>\n
Notably, Dbeibeh met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Turkey on April 18, 2026, on the sidelines of the 5th Antalya Diplomacy Forum.<\/p>\n
Harchaoui believes the Libyan premier probably apologized for the incident during that meeting but noted that without minutes or an official readout it\u2019s impossible to determine if that was the case. Nevertheless he believes it\u2019s more likely than not that this was what he did given the widespread attention and coverage the incident has continued to receive in the subsequent weeks.<\/p>\n
\u201cUnfortunately, for Tripoli, the vessel didn\u2019t just sink, it started drifting, so it drew much more world attention from the press,\u201d he said. \u201cAnd then you end up with the Associated Press article, which confirmed that Ukraine was responsible for the attack.\u201d<\/p>\n
Again, had he known this would be the ultimate outcome of allowing the Ukrainians to conduct such operations from his country\u2019s soil, the Libyan leader may well have made different decisions.<\/p>\n
\u201cI don\u2019t think Dbeibeh sat in his office and said, \u2018I know what is going to happen and I approve of it.\u2019 It just happened,\u201d Harchaoui said.<\/p>\n
\u201cAnd I don\u2019t think he\u2019s going to approve it again.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"This aerial photo taken on March 15, 2026 shows the wreck of Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) carrier…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":224622,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[34],"tags":[91469,4712,114352,49004,15695,79029,6204,75744,6203,114351],"class_list":{"0":"post-224621","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-libya","8":"tag-abdul-hamid-dbeibeh","9":"tag-government-of-national-unity","10":"tag-jalel-harchaoui","11":"tag-khalifa-haftar","12":"tag-libya","13":"tag-libyan-national-army","14":"tag-russia-ukraine-war","15":"tag-russian-shadow-fleet","16":"tag-ukraine","17":"tag-ukrainian-drones"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@africa\/116538165697455270","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/224621","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=224621"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/224621\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/224622"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=224621"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=224621"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=224621"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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