![\"News](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/ecowas-flag-scaled-1-1024x571.jpeg\" "\\"2026\/07\/1784524553.webp")
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Source: The Sudan Times<\/p>\n
The project’s principal political backers are Nigeria and Morocco. Nevertheless, a broader coalition is gradually emerging, bringing together West African governments, Arab financial institutions, the United Arab Emirates, Chinese industrial companies and potential European consumers.<\/p>\n
Nigeria: Turning gas reserves into regional influence<\/p>\n
For Nigeria<\/a>, the pipeline is primarily a means of monetising its vast natural gas reserves. The country possesses Africa’s largest proven gas reserves, yet its export potential remains constrained by inadequate infrastructure, underinvestment, insecurity and recurring disruptions in the Niger Delta.<\/p>\n The new route could enable Nigeria to increase gas exports while also supplying neighbouring West African countries.<\/p>\n The gas could be used for electricity generation, fertiliser production, metallurgy, cement manufacturing and mineral processing. Abuja therefore presents the project not merely as an export route to Europe, but as a catalyst for West Africa’s industrialisation.<\/p>\n This argument was instrumental in securing ECOWAS’s support. Many countries along the proposed route suffer from chronic electricity shortages despite their proximity to major oil and gas producers.<\/p>\n The pipeline could provide access to more reliable energy supplies while supporting the development of regional industries.<\/p>\n Nigeria also has a broader geopolitical objective. Abuja has simultaneously supported discussions on the rival Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, which would run through Niger and Algeria before reaching Europe.<\/p>\n By keeping both options open, Nigeria is effectively diversifying its export routes. It is seeking to avoid becoming overly dependent on either Algeria or Morocco while preserving its position as West Africa’s leading energy power.<\/p>\n Morocco: An energy bridge between Africa and Europe<\/p>\n For Morocco<\/a>, the project carries even greater strategic significance.<\/p>\n The kingdom lacks substantial domestic gas reserves and remains heavily dependent on imported energy. The Nigeria\u2013Morocco gas pipeline could supply Moroccan power plants and industrial facilities while reducing the country’s reliance on coal and imported liquefied natural gas (LNG).<\/p>\n Some of the gas could subsequently be transported to Spain through the existing pipeline infrastructure linking Morocco with Europe.<\/p>\n However, energy security is only one element of Rabat’s broader strategy.<\/p>\n Morocco aims to establish itself as a major transport, energy and logistics hub connecting West Africa, North Africa and Europe. The pipeline complements the kingdom’s investments in ports, railways, fertiliser production, renewable energy and future green hydrogen exports.<\/p>\n Source: atalayar.com<\/p>\n The project would also expand Morocco’s political influence across West Africa. Through the pipeline, Rabat is forging long-term economic partnerships with Nigeria, Senegal, C\u00f4te d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mauritania and other coastal states.<\/p>\n The creation of shared infrastructure would deepen these countries’ economic ties with Morocco while strengthening Rabat’s diplomatic position across the region.<\/p>\n This is particularly significant given Morocco’s rivalry with Algeria and the long-running dispute over Western Sahara.<\/p>\n The pipeline should therefore be viewed as part of Morocco’s broader Atlantic strategy rather than simply as a commercial energy project.<\/p>\n In effect, Rabat is offering West African states an economic corridor that would provide access to energy, infrastructure and European markets while reducing the region’s dependence on routes controlled by Algeria.<\/p>\n The UAE: Capital and expanding influence in Africa<\/p>\n Among the external actors associated with the project, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is potentially one of its most significant financial partners.<\/p>\n Moroccan officials have previously stated that the UAE is interested in helping finance the pipeline. However, the scale and legal structure of any Emirati participation have yet to be publicly confirmed.<\/p>\n For Abu Dhabi, investing in the pipeline would align with its broader strategy of expanding its economic footprint across Africa.<\/p>\n The UAE has invested heavily in African ports, logistics, energy, agriculture and mining. Participation in a major transcontinental gas corridor would provide the Emirates with long-term commercial opportunities while enhancing its political influence across both North and West Africa.<\/p>\n The UAE also enjoys close relations with both Morocco and Nigeria. Supporting the project would enable Abu Dhabi to strengthen its position in two strategically important regions of the continent without assuming direct responsibility for managing the pipeline.<\/p>\n Islamic Development Bank and OPEC Fund<\/p>\n Two international financial institutions have already played an important role during the preparatory phase: the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and the OPEC Fund for International Development.<\/p>\n The IsDB has provided funding for engineering studies, environmental assessments and preparations related to land acquisition.<\/p>\n The OPEC Fund has also financed part of the front-end engineering and design (FEED) work.<\/p>\n These contributions are significant because they demonstrate institutional confidence in the project and help prepare the technical documentation needed to attract larger investors.<\/p>\n However, the funding committed so far remains modest compared with the estimated $25 billion required to build the pipeline.<\/p>\n It would therefore be inaccurate to claim that Saudi Arabia, OPEC member states or Islamic financial institutions have already agreed to finance the project in its entirety.<\/p>\n Their involvement has so far been confined largely to preparatory studies and early-stage project development.<\/p>\n Europe and Spain: Potential consumers, but not yet guaranteed investors<\/p>\n Europe is the project’s principal external target market.<\/p>\n Gas transported through Morocco could potentially reach Spain and other European countries via the existing pipeline network. For Madrid, the project could reinforce Spain’s ambition to become a major energy hub for southern Europe.<\/p>\n For the European Union, Nigerian gas could provide an additional source of supply while contributing to the diversification of energy imports.<\/p>\n Following the sharp decline in Russian pipeline gas supplies, European governments have increasingly turned to Africa, the eastern Mediterranean and the global LNG market for alternative sources of energy.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that the European Union has fully committed to the Nigeria\u2013Morocco pipeline.<\/p>\n European financial institutions may remain cautious because the project is unlikely to become fully operational before the 2030s, while the EU intends to reduce its consumption of fossil fuels over the same period.<\/p>\n This creates a fundamental tension.<\/p>\n The pipeline will require long-term supply contracts and decades of operation to recover its costs. At the same time, European climate policies are designed to reduce demand for natural gas.<\/p>\n As a result, the project’s financial viability may depend less on exports to Europe than its proponents currently envisage.<\/p>\n Regional demand in West Africa and Morocco could ultimately prove just as important as the European market.<\/p>\n China: An industrial supplier, but not yet a political backer<\/p>\n China also has a potential role in the project, particularly as a supplier of steel pipes, construction materials and engineering services.<\/p>\n Chinese companies are well placed to compete for contracts covering steel pipes, compressor stations, offshore construction and related infrastructure.<\/p>\n However, the involvement of individual Chinese firms should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of full political or financial backing from Beijing.<\/p>\n At this stage, China appears more interested in securing commercial contracts than in becoming the project’s principal strategic investor.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, if Western and Arab investors prove reluctant to finance the required infrastructure, Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises could assume a more prominent role at a later stage.<\/p>\n Algeria: The main geopolitical competitor<\/p>\n The Nigeria\u2013Morocco gas pipeline<\/a> is being developed in direct competition with the proposed Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP), which would link Nigeria, Niger and Algeria.<\/p>\n The Algerian route would be considerably shorter, at approximately 4,000 kilometres, and could utilise Algeria’s existing gas export infrastructure connecting the country to Spain and Italy.<\/p>\n Its planned capacity is also estimated at around 30 billion cubic metres per year.<\/p>\n![\"Imagen](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/2024042010463048872.jpg\")
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