{"id":349706,"date":"2026-07-27T03:14:09","date_gmt":"2026-07-27T03:14:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/349706\/"},"modified":"2026-07-27T03:14:09","modified_gmt":"2026-07-27T03:14:09","slug":"two-tamar-partners-sign-non-binding-mou-for-up-to-usd-20-bn-to-send-egypt-more-gas-from-2031","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/349706\/","title":{"rendered":"Two Tamar partners sign non-binding MoU for up to USD 20 bn to send Egypt more gas from 2031"},"content":{"rendered":"

Two partners in Israel\u2019s Tamar gas field signed a non-binding MoU with an unnamed Egyptian buyer for a potential USD 20 bn contract \u2014 which would mark the offshore field\u2019s third long-term supply agreement with Egypt, according to an Israeli stock exchange filing from Israeli producer Isramco<\/a> and reporting by Mees (pdf)<\/a>. Isramco and Abu Dhabi state-owned Mubadala Energy signed the MoU to supply up to 80 bcm of gas from Tamar between 2031 and 2038, extending automatically through 2043 if Tamar\u2019s production lease is renewed.<\/p>\n

The USD 20 bn figure needs unpacking \u2014 it isn\u2019t stated outright. Isramco\u2019s filing puts its own take at USD 5.75 bn, the revenue its 28.75% stake would earn if Tamar sells the full 80 bcm. Grossed up across the consortium, that implies roughly USD 20 bn \u2014 but only if every Tamar partner signs on. The filing says the full volume would be supplied only if all partners join, so both the contracted volumes and the total value could fall proportionately if some opt out.<\/p>\n

Two in, four undecided: The MoU has so far been signed by Isramco and Mubadala Energy (11%), which together hold 39.75% of Tamar. The remaining partners \u2014 operator Chevron (25%), Tamar Petroleum (16.75%), Union Energy (14.5%), and Dor Gas (4%) \u2014 have not publicly confirmed they will join. Mees reports the buyer is not Blue Ocean Energy, suggesting Tamar\u2019s partners have lined up a different Egyptian counterparty.<\/p>\n

Priced off Brent, with a floor: Pricing would track Brent crude, carry a price floor, and keep take-or-pay provisions broadly in line with Tamar\u2019s earlier export agreements with Egypt. The agreement implies an average realized price of some USD 7 per mn British thermal units (Btu) over its life, Mees said, based on Isramco\u2019s revenue estimates \u2014 slightly below the USD 7.60\/mn Btu Egypt paid on average in 2025 for gas from Tamar and the neighboring Leviathan field<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This would become Tamar\u2019s third long-term supply agreement with Egypt: It follows a 25.3 bcm contract signed with Dolphinus in 2018 (which was assigned to state-backed Blue Ocean Energy and amended in 2019), covering deliveries from the 2H 2020, and a further 43 bcm agreement signed in 2024<\/a> tied to Tamar\u2019s production expansion and new export infrastructure, including the Nitzana pipeline<\/a> and expanded Arab Gas Pipeline route via Jordan.<\/p>\n

Rather than replacing the existing contracts, the proposed agreement would gradually layer on top of them, Mees reported. Deliveries would start with relatively modest annual volumes in 2031 while the earlier agreements run, then ramp up as those contracts approach expiry.<\/p>\n

BACKGROUND- The proposed Tamar agreement comes almost a year after Egypt and the Leviathan consortium amended their existing gas export agreement to secure an additional 130 bcm of gas through 2040 in a USD 35 bn agreement<\/a>. Earlier this year, Leviathan partners and NewMed Energy said all conditions precedent for that agreement have been satisfied, clearing the way for Chevron and its partners to move ahead with a USD 2.4 bn expansion<\/a> that will nearly double the field\u2019s production capacity to 21 bcm a year by 2029, and gradually increase exports to reach some 2.1 bcf\/d.<\/p>\n

Cairo\u2019s gateway play<\/p>\n

This is about more than extra supply. Every long-term Israeli gas contract routed through Egypt reinforces Cairo\u2019s push to position itself as the Eastern Mediterranean\u2019s gas gateway. Rather than build its own liquefaction \u2014 which would cost up to USD 10 bn<\/a> \u2014 Israel keeps monetizing much of its export surplus through Egypt\u2019s LNG plants at Idku and Damietta, lifting utilization of infrastructure even as Egyptian output lags.<\/p>\n

The proposed agreement would also let the buyer market gas outside Egypt, unlike the existing Blue Ocean contracts, Mees reports \u2014 so any surplus could be redirected through Egypt\u2019s two LNG terminals for re-export, with Tamar\u2019s partners sharing the gains. Government sources previously maintained that imported Israeli gas can be re-exported<\/a> after entering the domestic system, but rising local demand meant those volumes were consumed at home instead.<\/p>\n

A transit hub: Beyond LNG exports, Egypt has sought to use its pipeline network to supply neighboring markets through the Arab Gas Pipeline. Previous gas export agreements to Lebanon<\/a> and Syria<\/a> have fueled speculation that some of those volumes could ultimately include Israeli gas once commingled with Egypt\u2019s grid.<\/p>\n

Local market flexibility: Imported gas can be sent where it earns most \u2014 consumed at home to ease shortages, liquefied for export when margins are good, or fed to energy-intensive industry. That last use matters more as fertilizer investment grows (as seen with Indorama<\/a> and others<\/a>). Egypt produces roughly 12 mn tons of fertilizer annually<\/a>, over 4% of global output, and it\u2019s one of the country\u2019s key export industries<\/a>. Securing reliable feedstock has become an industrial priority as much as an energy one.<\/p>\n

REMEMBER- Israeli imports carry risk: Fields are prone to sudden shutdowns when regional tensions escalate<\/a>, halting exports several times this year and cutting supply to energy-intensive industries.<\/p>\n

OUR TAKE- The bigger picture is one of optionality. LNG imports<\/a>, long-term pipeline imports, and infrastructure \u2014 like liquefaction facilities and regasification vessels<\/a> \u2014 widen Egypt\u2019s ability to choose where imported gas ends up, a flexibility that is increasingly becoming one of Egypt\u2019s biggest competitive advantages. A decade ago, the ambition was to be a major producer around Zohr. Today it\u2019s about controlling infrastructure<\/a> and trade flows.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s next: The MoU is non-binding and remains subject to regulatory sign-off \u2014 including an export permit from the Energy Ministry \u2014 plus board and tax approvals and the remaining partners\u2019 participation. Mees expects a decision to be deferred until after Israel\u2019s October parliamentary elections. With the Knesset dissolved and a caretaker government in office, the MoU will most likely be left for the next administration. It is set to expire after about two months absent a binding agreement, though the parties could extend it \u2014 the outcome Mees sees as most likely.<\/p>\n

\n\tRelated<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Two partners in Israel\u2019s Tamar gas field signed a non-binding MoU with an unnamed Egyptian buyer for a…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":349707,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[21],"tags":[1982,1144,168436,2263,19355],"class_list":["post-349706","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-egypt","tag-egypt","tag-energy","tag-energy-watch","tag-lng","tag-oil-gas"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@africa\/116989766037055101","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/349706","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=349706"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/349706\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/349707"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=349706"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=349706"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=349706"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}