{"id":363843,"date":"2026-08-05T02:30:34","date_gmt":"2026-08-05T02:30:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/363843\/"},"modified":"2026-08-05T02:30:34","modified_gmt":"2026-08-05T02:30:34","slug":"how-a-widening-iran-war-puts-egypts-suez-canal-at-risk","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/363843\/","title":{"rendered":"How a widening Iran war puts Egypt’s Suez Canal at risk"},"content":{"rendered":"

In an ominous development that suggests the expanding regional Iran war could endanger Egypt, a potentially devastating drone attack struck two gas vessels last week in the Egyptian port city of Damietta<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The move indicated that Iran and its allied regional militias like the Houthis in Yemen<\/a> could seriously threaten Egyptian ports and the vital Suez Canal if they chose.<\/p>\n

The unprecedented 29 July drone attack sparked fires on a US-owned floating storage and regasification unit and a Greek-owned LNG tanker. Marine officers who fought the fires feared that the entire port and parts of the adjoining city could have exploded<\/a>.<\/p>\n

It was the first attack of its kind in the area and comes after repeated attacks targeting tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab<\/a> chokepoints.<\/p>\n

Iran closed the former<\/a> following the start of the US-Israel air war against Tehran on 28 February. The Houthis have threatened the latter and recently imposed a blockade on Saudi-linked shipping using the Red Sea. Tensions and clashes between the two sides have since ensued, endangering the 2022 ceasefire between them following a devastating seven-year war.<\/p>\n

Today, there are fears that the Suez Canal and the Sumed pipeline used by Saudi Arabia could now be in Tehran and the Houthis\u2019 crosshairs. Nevertheless, neither has claimed responsibility for this consequential attack.<\/p>\n

Usual suspects<\/p>\n

It\u2019s both unclear who launched the drones and from where. After Iran attempted to reestablish direct flights<\/a>\u00a0between Tehran and the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital Sanaa in early July, Riyadh and the internationally recognised Yemeni government objected.<\/p>\n

When a plane returned from Tehran on 13 July, Riyadh bombed the runway<\/a> at that airport, forcing the plane to reroute and the Houthis to retaliate against a southern Saudi airport.<\/p>\n

The two sides have since traded clashes<\/a> with Saudi warplanes targeting Hodeidah in late July and the Houthis targeting Saudi energy infrastructure in Jizan and Tanbu.<\/p>\n

After Saudi Arabia came under attack from drones launched from Iraq at the end of the month, which targeted its critical Abqaiq processing facility, it took the unprecedented step of retaliating against Iran-backed militias in Iraq alongside the US. It was the first joint attack of its kind.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s possible that the drones that descended on Damietta took off from either Iraq or Yemen.<\/p>\n

Alex Almeida, security analyst at political risk consultancy Horizon Engage who conducted on-the-ground fieldwork embedded with UAE and Yemeni forces in Yemen, believes it\u2019s more likely the drones took off from western Iraq<\/a> rather than Yemen.<\/p>\n

The drone attack last week on Damietta Port was the first of its kind in the area and comes after repeated strikes targeting tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab chokepoints. [Getty]<\/p>\n

He noted that it\u2019s approximately 900 kilometres \u201cas the crow flies\u201d from Iraq\u2019s western Anbar province to Damietta compared to the 2,000km distance from northern Yemen. Nevertheless, he also noted that the Houthis have demonstrated a capability to use drones to hit Israel, which is a comparably short 300km closer to Yemen.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt\u2019s a calculated expansion of the \u2018if we don\u2019t export, no one does\u2019 strategy that Tehran seems to be implementing,\u201d Almeida told The New Arab.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe strike out of Iraq on Abqaiq and the hits on Jizan and Yanbu fit within that horizontal escalation by proxy strategy Iranians seem to have turned to over the last week or so,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n

\u201cSo, a strike on tankers transiting Suez from Yanbu, or even some other energy target in the Eastern Mediterranean, isn\u2019t impossible if the intent in Tehran is to really drive that point,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n

\u201cOutsourcing these attacks to Iran\u2019s regional proxies also keeps the pressure on global energy markets and limits the Trump administration\u2019s room for manoeuvre while evading painful US counterstrikes on mainland Iran.\u201d<\/p>\n

Nicholas Heras, Interim Executive Director at the Middle East Policy Council and Senior Director at the New Lines Institute, assessed that Egypt happens to be a target due to its geography.<\/p>\n

The Houthis, he outlined, are the \u201cbest positioned\u201d to contribute to Iran\u2019s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps\u2019 broader strategy of making the Red Sea<\/a> a dangerous transit route. This in turn would put \u201cenormous pressure on the Suez trade and would have cascade effects on Egypt’s economy when it is weakened and liable to lead to widespread unrest,\u201d he told The New Arab.<\/p>\n

More broadly, Heras described Egypt as a \u201cregional swing state\u201d that\u2019s becoming increasingly uncomfortable with Israel\u2019s insistence on having \u201ca final showdown\u201d with Iran\u2019s leadership.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Iranian leadership sees Egypt as a state that is not a friend per se, but as a potential partner of convenience by putting pressure on the US to restrain Israel,\u201d Heras said.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Suez Canal is the key conduit for the vital global trade through the Red Sea, and the IRGC in particular wants to pressure that region to create additional, intolerable pressure on the international economy,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n

As tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have increased, the Bab al-Mandab has become a critical chokepoint rather than a secondary one. [Getty]<\/p>\n

Mohammed Al-Basha of the Basha Report, a Virginia-based Risk Advisory, observed that the relationship between the Houthis and Iran has continued to strengthen<\/a> following the regional wars that began after the 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel. The current conflict has only further deepened that partnership.<\/p>\n

\u201cOne of the clearest signs came at the United Nations, where Iran publicly treated the Houthis as Yemen\u2019s legitimate authority,\u201d Al-Basha told The New Arab.<\/p>\n

\u201cRather than inviting Houthi representatives already based in Oman, Iraq, or Lebanon, Iran challenged the Saudi-led coalition and the internationally recognised Yemeni government to allow a flight into Sana\u2019a to bring a Houthi delegation to the UN and return them afterwards,\u201d he noted.<\/p>\n

It was a symbolic and political step that highlighted the growing ties between Iran and the Houthis.<\/p>\n

\u201cAt the same time, weapons shipments have not stopped. Dhows continue to transport arms into Yemen, while maritime interceptions and interdictions have increased,\u201d Al-Basha told The New Arab.<\/p>\n

\u201cThis suggests that Iran\u2019s supply network remains active despite the conflict.\u201d<\/p>\n

Coalition of the willing<\/p>\n

Regional countries are not sitting idle amidst all of this. Since these renewed hostilities, Saudi Arabia has called for a multinational coalition to keep the Red Sea open to shipping.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Saudi naval coalition concept represents an interesting potential inflection point in the region’s history because if it is organised and succeeds, it will represent a step forward in the US desire for its regional partners to take on a greater burden for regional security,\u201d Heras told The New Arab.<\/p>\n

\u201cEgypt would be a key component of this effort.\u201d<\/p>\n

Almeida believes that there\u2019s \u201cless than meets the eye\u201d to this fledgling Saudi coalition.<\/p>\n

\u201cApart from Saudi Arabia, only two countries within the coalition – Egypt and Turkey – are militarily capable countries with real navies,\u201d he said. \u201cI also suspect they\u2019ll be reluctant to tangle with Houthi anti-shipping in the Red Sea, when even the US Navy got burned going up against the Houthis,\u201d the analyst added.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt\u2019s also notable the coalition doesn\u2019t include the UAE, which is militarily capable and has extensive experience operating in Yemen and the Red Sea environment.\u201d<\/p>\n

Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and an expert on naval operations and wargaming, recently told The New Arab<\/a> that one option the Houthis could use is maritime mines. \u201cHouthi mining of the strait of Bab al-Mandab would be most challenging for the US and allies but would also prevent the Houthis from charging tolls,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n

In late July, reports<\/a> indicated that the Houthis were considering imposing fees on ships using the Red Sea, something the group has since denied<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Strengthened leverage<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Houthis also appear to have chosen this moment to escalate because the strategic importance of the Bab al-Mandeb has grown,\u201d Al-Basha said.<\/p>\n

\u201cAs tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have increased, the Bab al-Mandab has become a critical chokepoint rather than a secondary one,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n

\u201cBy threatening shipping through the Bab al-Mandab, including roughly 4 million barrels of Saudi oil bound for China each day, the Houthis can increase pressure on Saudi Arabia and strengthen their leverage in any future negotiations.\u201d<\/p>\n

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs<\/p>\n

Follow him on X:\u00a0@pauliddon<\/a><\/p>\n

Edited by Charlie Hoyle<\/p>\n