{"id":3666,"date":"2026-01-04T21:35:54","date_gmt":"2026-01-04T21:35:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/3666\/"},"modified":"2026-01-04T21:35:54","modified_gmt":"2026-01-04T21:35:54","slug":"ethiopia-and-eritrea-risk-of-renewed-conflict","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/3666\/","title":{"rendered":"Ethiopia and Eritrea: Risk of Renewed Conflict"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The Horn of Africa\u00a0remains\u00a0among the most fragile regions globally, and the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea,\u00a0identified\u00a0in the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.visionofhumanity.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/Global-Peace-Index-2025-web.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Global Peace Index 2025<\/a>\u00a0(GPI) as one of the world\u2019s highest-risk conflict dyads.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Renewed rhetoric, geopolitical manoeuvring and unresolved structural issues have revived concerns that peace in the region could unravel.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Ethiopia\u2019s renewed push for direct access to the Red Sea has\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/10\/21\/ethiopia-eritrea-tigray-horn-east-africa\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">sparked renewed tensions with Eritrea.<\/a>\u00a0Addis Ababa\u2019s demand for maritime access is framed as an \u201cexistential matter\u201d by Ethiopian leaders, and some officials have raised the possibility of securing the southern port of Assab through military means should diplomatic efforts fail. A war in this region could disrupt maritime traffic, threaten Red Sea port infrastructure, and\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/thesoufancenter.org\/intelbrief-2025-november-7\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">draw in outside powers<\/a>\u00a0invested\u00a0in the area, while also further destabilising a region already contending with multiple crises.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The renewed tension has its backdrop in the legacy fallout from the northern Ethiopia war (2020\u20132022) and\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2025\/11\/de-escalation-needed-prevent-ethiopia-and-eritrea-going-war\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Ethiopia\u2019s ambitions for access to the sea<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Ethiopia formally notified the United Nations Secretary-General that Eritrea was \u201cactively preparing for war.\u201d Addis Ababa alleged that Eritrea was collaborating with non-state actors to destabilise Ethiopia \u2013 charges that further inflamed tensions and triggered renewed mobilisation at the border. There are concerns that these frustrations over sea access, unresolved border disputes and the ongoing fallout from internal Ethiopian conflicts are combining to create an environment where miscalculation or escalation, even if not intended, could lead to renewed hostilities.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>When the GPI 2025\u00a0identified\u00a0Ethiopia\u2013Eritrea as one of the four global dyads \u201cat highest risk of rapid and severe escalation,\u201d it did so\u00a0based\u00a0on structural factors: historical grievances, unresolved border demarcation, persistent militarisation, and the legacy of past wars. The recent escalation underscores how those structural vulnerabilities can re-emerge when political, economic or security circumstances change. In this case:\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Ethiopia\u2019s internal conflicts as a risk multiplier<\/p>\n<p>A key insight from the GPI 2025 is that internal instability within Ethiopia significantly elevates the dyad\u2019s overall risk profile. Although the conflict in the northern region concluded with a peace agreement, violence in other parts of the country, including Amhara and Oromia, continues to result in loss of life, internal displacement, and the disruption of essential services.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>These internal pressures compound the country\u2019s peace challenges. Ethiopia ranks 138th out of 163 countries in the GPI 2025, placing it among the least peaceful nations globally and the\u00a0lowest-ranked\u00a0in Africa. This position reflects deteriorations across multiple indicators, including ongoing conflict,\u00a0safety\u00a0and security concerns, and heightened political instability.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Domestic conflict can weaken state institutions, strain security forces, and create openings for armed groups to\u00a0operate\u00a0with greater autonomy. In such contexts, border management becomes more difficult and political attention becomes inwardly focused, increasing the likelihood that unresolved issues with neighbouring states may resurface. The Ethiopia\u2013Eritrea relationship is particularly sensitive to these dynamics.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Eritrea\u2019s peace profile<\/p>\n<p>Eritrea ranks 132nd globally in GPI 2025, also placing it in the lower quartile of the index. While the country experiences lower levels of internal armed conflict compared with some of its neighbours, it faces challenges across indicators related to militarisation, political stability, and relations with surrounding states.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The combination of two low-ranking states sharing a long and historically contested border contributes to the dyad\u2019s fragility. In such relationships, conflict risk tends to be influenced heavily by structural factors such as political distrust, competing regional alliances, and the presence of militarised zones or disputed territories.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The GPI 2025\u2019s risk identification does not reflect active\u00a0hostilities, but\u00a0highlights the vulnerability of relationships where peace\u00a0remains\u00a0highly dependent on political decisions, external pressures, and the capacity of institutions to manage tensions effectively.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>These developments do not guarantee war, but they\u00a0greatly increase\u00a0the probability of miscalculation and destabilising escalation, as the GPI warns.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Implications for the Horn of Africa and beyond<\/p>\n<p>If tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea were to escalate further, the consequences would\u00a0likely be\u00a0severe and far-reaching:\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Humanitarian risk: Given the legacy of mass displacement,\u00a0destruction\u00a0and civilian harm during past wars, especially the 2020\u20132022 conflict in northern Ethiopia, renewed conflict could trigger large-scale humanitarian crisis, with displacement, food insecurity, and refugee flows across borders.\u00a0<br \/>\nRegional instability: Conflict over access to the Red Sea could draw in external actors and not only neighbouring countries, but Gulf and Red Sea powers with strategic interests in maritime routes, trade, and security.\u00a0<br \/>\nEconomic disruption: A conflict around major seaports such as Assab would jeopardise maritime trade lanes,\u00a0impacting\u00a0not only Ethiopia but global shipping, imports, and regional economies dependent on stable trade flows.\u00a0<br \/>\nPeace-building setbacks: Renewed war would risk unravelling fragile gains made since the 2018 rapprochement and the 2022 peace accord, setting back efforts for reconciliation, regional cooperation, and long-term stability.\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The Horn of Africa\u00a0remains\u00a0among the most fragile regions globally, and the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea,\u00a0identified\u00a0in the\u00a0Global Peace&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":3667,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[25],"tags":[1983,65],"class_list":{"0":"post-3666","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-ethiopia","8":"tag-eritrea","9":"tag-ethiopia"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3666","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3666"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3666\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3667"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3666"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3666"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/africa\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3666"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}