Welcome to Foreign Policy\u2019s Africa Brief. <\/p>\n
The highlights this week: Benin\u2019s failed coup highlights a network of pro-Russian actors across the continent, the dispute over Zambia\u2019s fraught election continues, and the Tanzanian government suspends an independent newspaper.<\/p>\n
Africa Brief will take a break for the next two weeks. Our regular programming will return on Wednesday, Sept. 16.<\/p>\n
A coup thwarted in Benin last year has highlighted a network of pro-Russian actors in Africa, according to new details that have emerged from an ongoing extradition trial in South Africa.<\/p>\n
The December mutiny, which was led by Lt. Col. Pascal Tigri and included the temporary seizure<\/a> of the national broadcaster, collapsed within hours following military intervention<\/a> from neighboring Nigeria. However, subsequent legal proceedings have shed light on how local pro-Russian influencers and movements work to achieve shared aims across African borders.<\/p>\n In its bid to prosecute those involved in the failed coup, Benin filed extradition requests for individuals in a number of African countries. This included Tigri, who fled to Togo<\/a>\u2014though his exact whereabouts remain unknown<\/a>\u2014and pro-Russian social media influencer Kemi Seba, who escaped to South Africa<\/a>.<\/p>\n In April, South African police arrested<\/a> Seba (whose real name is Stellio Gilles Robert Capo Chichi), who is wanted by Benin for \u201cinciting\u201d the coup. South African prosecutors allege that Russia funded and orchestrated an illegal escape plan for the 45-year-old Seba.<\/p>\n According to South African police, Seba was arrested with more than $18,000. Pretoria\u2019s intelligence has suggested that the cash originated from Russia and was to be paid to Francois van der Merwe, a leader within the Afrikaner white nationalist group Bittereinders, to facilitate cross-border transport<\/a> of Seba and his 18-year-old son from South Africa into Zimbabwe and on to Europe to carry out terror attacks, according to court documents revealed<\/a> earlier this month. Seba and his legal team reject the accusations.<\/p>\n All three individuals\u2014Seba, his son, and Merwe\u2014were arrested together. Merwe had previously attended a September<\/a> gathering of neofascists in St. Petersburg, Russia.<\/p>\n Despite growing up in France, Seba, who has about 1.5 million Facebook followers, has been a highly vocal critic of French neocolonialism in Francophone Africa on social media<\/a>. He was stripped of his French nationality in July 2024 after he had previously been arrested for allegedly inciting anti-French and antisemitic<\/a> sentiment. A month later, Niger appointed<\/a> Seba as a special advisor to Nigerien President Abdourahamane Tchiani and gave him a diplomatic passport.<\/p>\n In December, on the day of the Benin coup attempt, Seba posted a video<\/a> that he later deleted, which hailed the mutiny as a \u201cday of liberation\u201d and praised the fall of \u201ca clan of predators preying on the economy and freedoms.\u201d He has also widely praised Russia on social media.<\/p>\n Russia has fostered close ties with Benin\u2019s neighboring junta-led nations of Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Analysts have suggested<\/a> that Seba\u2019s pro-coup posts were part of a highly coordinated network<\/a> of African diaspora influencers that worked to amplify the putschists\u2019 messaging to create a false impression of popular support for the coup.<\/p>\n This appears to be a trend not just in the Sahel, but also across Africa. In 2022, the U.S. State Department accused<\/a> Russia\u2019s defunct paramilitary Wagner Group of using Seba and other influencers to spread pro-Kremlin narratives. In some cases, fake journalists<\/a> wrote hundreds of pro-Russian articles in more than a dozen African countries, from Senegal to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<\/p>\n While it may be tempting to dismiss Benin\u2019s coup plot and other destabilizing events in Africa as simply Russian orchestrated, Moscow seeds its influence by tapping into systemic problems with democratic backsliding. Benin\u2019s mutineers cited<\/a> then-President Patrice Talon\u2019s cuts to health care, the cancellation of state-funded kidney dialysis, and crackdowns on political activities as reasons for their insurrection.<\/p>\n Last year\u2019s failed putsch was the second<\/a> coup attempt against Talon, who had been widely accused<\/a> of dismantling<\/a> one of West Africa\u2019s once-vibrant democracies and jailing political opponents<\/a>.<\/p>\n Talon stepped down this April after completing his two-term limit\u2014but not before changing the constitution<\/a> to extend presidential and legislative terms from five to seven years and creating a new Senate. Since his term ended, Talon has occupied the Senate presidency<\/a>, Benin\u2019s third-highest-ranking office.<\/p>\n Measures to suppress<\/a> public dissent have expanded considerably in the eight months since the coup. Talon\u2019s successor, President Romuald Wadagni<\/a>, faced just one challenger after many opponents failed to secure enough of the required endorsements from lawmakers to run.<\/p>\n For now, Seba\u2019s lawyers have filed for asylum for him in South Africa, saying that he fears for his life if sent to Benin. The extradition trial<\/a> will continue on Sept. 23.<\/p>\n Friday, Aug. 28: The ratings agency Moody\u2019s reviews its credit rating for Tanzania.<\/p>\n Sunday, Aug. 30: Guinea-Bissau holds a constitutional referendum that would increase presidential power.<\/p>\n Wednesday, Sept. 2: The Council of the European Union\u2019s Africa Working Party holds a meeting in Brussels.<\/p>\n Zambia\u2019s disputed election. Nearly two weeks after the country\u2019s Aug. 13 presidential elections<\/a>, Zambians are still contesting incumbent President Hakainde Hichilema\u2019s victory against opposition leader Brian Mundubile.<\/p>\n On Monday, Zambian authorities closed<\/a> the country\u2019s courts, a day before the deadline for Mundubile to file a petition against the election outcome. Critics argued<\/a> that this was a calculated move by the government to prevent Mundubile, who is in hiding due to alleged threats against him, from formally challenging the vote.<\/p>\n According to the official tally, Hichilema secured a second five-year term with 61 percent of the vote. The Christian Churches Monitoring Group found inflated turnouts<\/a> in 30 constituencies, though election observers whom I spoke with said that despite the apparent ballot rigging, Hichilema would likely still have won.<\/p>\n Regardless, the optics of the vote\u2014as well as the arrest of opposition politicians and the fatal shooting of Mutotwe Kafwaya<\/a>, an opposition member and former cabinet minister, during an election night raid on Mundubile\u2019s home\u2014has damaged Hichilema\u2019s legitimacy in what was one of Africa\u2019s most resilient democracies. Zambian authorities claimed<\/a> they acted on intelligence about a potential insurrection and that they recovered high-grade weapons during the operation.<\/p>\n \u201cThe securitization of Zambia has been something that\u2019s been ongoing for a very long time\u2014and the use of security apparatus and also the narrowing of the political space,\u201d Menzi Ndhlovu, a lead analyst at Signal Risk, told Foreign Policy.<\/p>\n Expect any pressure from the international community to be limited as this plays out due to Zambia\u2019s strategic importance in a fierce race between China and Western nations for critical minerals.<\/p>\n Tanzanian repression. The Tanzanian government suspended independent newspaper Mwanahalisi\u2019s operations for six months starting last week after it reported that Vice President Emmanuel Nchimbi had rejected calls to resign following a falling out with President Samia Suluhu Hassan. (Nchimbi later resigned<\/a> on Tuesday.)<\/p>\n Authorities claimed<\/a> that the story lacked balance and care in editing, including an error in a photograph caption, which incorrectly identified the information minister as Nchimbi.<\/p>\n The move is the latest crackdown on civic space in Tanzania. Last month, security forces arrested<\/a> 130 people for allegedly \u201cinciting criminal acts\u201d around the time of a planned July 7 protest, which the government banned. This follows last October\u2019s demonstrations against Hassan\u2019s reelection<\/a>, when more than 500 Tanzanians were killed<\/a>.<\/p>\n Despite the political climate, U.S.-backed Orion Critical Mineral Consortium is negotiating a deal to invest more than $500 million<\/a> in a large nickel project in Tanzania.<\/p>\n Zimbabwe\u2019s new senators. Last week, Zimbabwean lawmakers approved<\/a> 10 new senators appointed by President Emmerson Mnangagwa, following a new constitutional amendment that expanded the country\u2019s upper chamber from 80 to 90 members.<\/p>\n Most of the appointees are loyalists<\/a> or political financiers for Mnangagwa\u2019s ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, including oil and mining tycoon Kudakwashe Tagwirei, who has long been linked to allegations of corruption and cronyism<\/a> in Zimbabwean politics. Some analysts believe that Tagwirei<\/a> is likely to become Mnangagwa\u2019s handpicked successor.<\/p>\n The constitutional amendment, which was passed in June, also replaced<\/a> direct elections of the president with parliamentary appointment and allows Mnangagwa to stay in office until 2030 by extending presidential terms from five to seven years. Last year, leaders in Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, and Guinea-Bissau also changed laws to extend their terms or remove barriers to future reelection, according to a new Freedom House report<\/a>.<\/p>\n