The lexicon governing the conduct of hostilities is not a static collection of synonyms but a dynamic field of ideological contestation. For centuries, the body of international law that regulates the behaviour of belligerents and protects victims of conflict has been identified by three primary descriptors: the law of war; the law of armed conflict; and international humanitarian law. While contemporary discourse often treats these terms as interchangeable, a rigorous examination of their historical origins, the mechanisms of their introduction, and their reception within State practice reveals deep-seated tensions regarding the nature and purpose of the law.<\/p>\n
The transition from the classical \u201claw of war\u201d to the modern \u201cinternational humanitarian law\u201d represents more than a linguistic evolution; it signifies a profound shift in the conceptualization of warfare, moving from a State-centric model defined by sovereign rights to a person-centric model defined by humanitarian imperatives.<\/p>\n
Early Evolutions<\/p>\n
In our book, Law, Language and Warfare<\/a>, we chart this history and evolution and interrogate the practice of the changing terminology of the law of armed conflict. Why has the terminology evolved and how, what impact has that had, and how has language been used to include and exclude people within the law?<\/p>\n The classical foundations of modern warfare regulation are of course well known. Starting with seminal works from Vitoria, Gentili, and Grotius, the legal framework was known exclusively as the law of war (jus belli). During this era, \u201cwar\u201d was a formal legal state, the commencement of which was signalled by a declaration. The terminology of \u201cwar\u201d was thus inextricably linked to the Westphalian system of statehood, where the use of force was a legitimate tool of State policy, subject only to the rules of honour and reciprocity among equals.<\/p>\n The 18th century scholars such as Vattel continued this tradition, viewing the law of war as a set of rules emerging from State practice to moderate the inevitable brutalities of conflict. The ensuing formulation of the extant law was strictly bound to the terminology of \u201cwar\u201d as a sovereign act.<\/p>\n Revelations from the Lexicon <\/p>\n The early treaty law of armed conflict reflects the centrality of the idea of \u201cwar.\u201d The Lieber Code<\/a>, 1864 Geneva Convention<\/a>, and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions<\/a> all make repeated reference to the term \u201cthe law of war.\u201d However, by the end of the Second World War in 1945, it was clear that the legal sophistry that had taken place in the inter-war years needed to be addressed. Attempts to prohibit warfare by the League of Nations was met with linguistic manoeuvring by States like Japan and Italy, who called their invasions of China<\/a> and Ethiopia<\/a> \u201cincidents\u201d or something other than war, so as to avoid<\/a> League sanctions and rules of neutrality.<\/p>\n In response to these linguistic and legal evasions, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) <\/a>advocated for a shift toward a factual rather than a formal trigger for the law. This culminated in the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which replaced \u201cwar\u201d with the broader term \u201carmed conflict.\u201d <\/a>\u00a0The move to \u201carmed conflict\u201d was a deliberate attempt by civil society, specifically the ICRC, to expand the protective reach of the law, and to remove the need for the formalistic step of declaration of war, in hopes that the law would apply based on objective rather than procedural grounds<\/a>.<\/p>\n By the 1960s, arguably the most transformative change in the language came with the introduction of the term \u201cinternational humanitarian law<\/a>.\u201d Unlike the previous shifts, which could be considered technical or clarifying, the introduction of IHL was a concerted effort (again by the ICRC) to \u201chumanize\u201d the laws of war.<\/p>\n