{"id":15658,"date":"2026-05-10T21:58:26","date_gmt":"2026-05-10T21:58:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/15658\/"},"modified":"2026-05-10T21:58:26","modified_gmt":"2026-05-10T21:58:26","slug":"frieden-in-der-krise-konfliktbearbeitung-am-horn-von-afrika","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/15658\/","title":{"rendered":"Frieden in der Krise: Konflikt\u00adbearbeitung am Horn von Afrika"},"content":{"rendered":"

1<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Barry R. Posen, \u00bbCivil Wars & the Structure of World Power\u00ab, in: Daedalus, 146 (2017) 4, S.\u00a0167\u2013179.<\/p>\n

2<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Richard Gowan\/Stephen John Stedman, \u00bbThe Inter\u00adnational Regime for Treating Civil War, 1988\u20132017\u00ab, in: Daedalus, 147 (2018) 1, S.\u00a0171\u2013184.<\/p>\n

3<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settle\u00adment of Civil Wars, Princeton, N.\u00a0J.: Princeton University Press, 2002.<\/p>\n

4<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Jana Krause\/Werner Krause\/Piia Br\u00e4nfors, \u00bbWomen\u2019s Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace\u00ab, in: International Interactions, 44 (2018) 6, S.\u00a0985\u20131016, doi: 10.1080\/03050629.2018.1492386<\/a>.<\/p>\n

5<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Berechnungen nach: Allard Duursma u.\u00a0a., Introducing the\u00a0Peace Observatory: Peace Negotiations in Armed Conflicts, 1989\u20132023, 2025, <https:\/\/allardduursma.com\/uploads\/peace-observatory-introduction.pdf<\/a>> (alle URLs in den Fu\u00dfnoten dieser Studie zuletzt eingesehen am 21.4.2026).<\/p>\n

6<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Entsprechend der Definition von \u00bbstate-based conflicts\u00ab des Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) und des Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO): UCDP\/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook Version 25.1, compiled and updated by Therese Pettersson (2025), S.\u00a04f, <https:\/\/ucdp.uu.se\/down loads\/ucdpprio\/ucdp-prio-acd-251.pdf<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

7<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003So im Fall von Eritrea 1993 und von S\u00fcdsudan 2011. Somaliland erkl\u00e4rte 1991 seine Unabh\u00e4ngigkeit und verfolgte seitdem einen eigenen Staatsbildungsprozess, wurde bis\u00adlang aber nur von einem einzigen UN-Mitgliedstaat (n\u00e4mlich Israel im Dezember 2025) v\u00f6lkerrechtlich anerkannt.<\/p>\n

8<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003I. William Zartman, \u00bbUnderstanding Ripeness: Making and Using Hurting Stalemates\u00ab, in: Roger Mac Ginty\/Anthony Wanis-St.\u00a0John (Hg.), Contemporary Peacemaking. Peace Processes, Peacebuilding and Conflict, 3. Aufl., Cham 2022, S.\u00a023\u201342.<\/p>\n

9<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Ebd., S.\u00a032ff.<\/p>\n

10<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Paul Williams\/Alex J. Bellamy, Understanding Peace\u00adkeeping, 3. Aufl., Cambridge, UK\/Medford, MA 2021.<\/p>\n

11<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Posen, \u00bbCivil Wars & the Structure of World Power\u00ab [wie\u00a0Fn.\u00a01<\/a>], S.\u00a0169.<\/p>\n

12<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Williams\/Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping [wie Fn.\u00a010<\/a>], S.\u00a0262f.<\/p>\n

13<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Vgl. f\u00fcr letztere Perspektive: Edward N. Luttwak, \u00bbGive War a Chance\u00ab, in: Foreign Affairs, 78 (1999) 4, S.\u00a036\u201344, doi:\u00a010.2307\/20049362<\/a>.<\/p>\n

14<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Vgl. Kofi Annan, \u00bbTwo Concepts of Sovereignty\u00ab, in: The\u00a0Economist, 18.9.1999.<\/p>\n

15<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Giulia Piccolino, \u00bbThe Resolution of Civil Wars: Changing International Norms of Peace-Making and the Academic Consensus\u00ab, in: Civil Wars, 25 (2023) 2\/3, S.\u00a0290\u2013316.<\/p>\n

16<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution, 4.\u00a0Aufl., Los Angeles 2015, S.\u00a08.<\/p>\n

17<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Hans-Joachim Giessmann\/Oliver Wils, \u00bbSeeking Compromise? Mediation through the Eyes of Conflict Parties\u00ab, in:\u00a0Beatrix Austin\/Martina Fischer\/Hans-Joachim Giess\u00admann\u00a0(Hg.), Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Opladen\/Framington Hills, 2011, S.\u00a0188, <https:\/\/berghof-foundation.org\/library\/seeking-compromise-mediation-through-the-eyes-of-conflict-parties<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

18<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Sara Hellm\u00fcller, \u00bbBroadening Perspectives on Inclusive Peacemaking: The Case of the UN Mediation in Syria\u00ab, in: Third World Quarterly, 45 (2024) 5, S.\u00a0963\u2013980, doi: 10.1080\/ 01436597.2023.2299802<\/a>.<\/p>\n

19<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Stabilisation Unit, The UK Government\u2019s Approach to Stabilisation. A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners, London 2018, <https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/publications\/the-uk-governments-approach-to-stabilisation-a-guide-for-policy-makers-and-practitioners<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

20<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003S\u00e9verine Autesserre, \u00bbInternational Peacebuilding and Local Success: Assumptions and Effectiveness\u00ab, in: Interna\u00adtional Studies Review, 19 (2017) 1, S.\u00a0114\u2013132; Oliver P. Rich\u00admond\/Edward Newman\/Roland Paris (Hg.), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, Tokio\/New York: United Nations University Press, 2009.<\/p>\n

21<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Roland Paris, At War\u2019s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.<\/p>\n

22<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Vgl. Benjamin Zyla, \u00bbThe International Peace- and State-Building Intervention in Afghanistan: Distilling Lessons to Be\u00a0Learned\u00ab, in: Ethics & International Affairs, 39 (2025) 1, S.\u00a03\u201325, doi: 10.1017\/S0892679425100026<\/a>.<\/p>\n

23<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Richard Gowan, \u00bbThe Treatment of Civil Wars in a Frag\u00admenting International Order\u00ab, in: Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 30 (2024) 2, S.\u00a0203\u2013213.<\/p>\n

24<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Ole W\u00e6ver, \u00bbPolarity Is What Power Does When It Becomes Structure\u00ab, in: Nina Gr\u00e6ger u.\u00a0a. (Hg.), Polarity in International Relations, Cham 2022, S.\u00a034, 36.<\/p>\n

25<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Fonteh Akum\/Denis M. Tull, Strategic Competition and Cooperation in Africa, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Poli\u00adtik, 2023 (Megatrends Policy Brief Nr. 13), <https:\/\/www.swp-berlin.org\/publikation\/policy-brief-13-strategic-competition-and-cooperation-in-africa<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

26<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Harry Verhoeven\/Michael Woldemariam, \u00bbWho Lost Ethiopia? The Unmaking of an African Anchor State and\u00a0U.\u00a0S. Foreign Policy\u00ab, in: Contemporary Security Policy, 43\u00a0(2022) 4, S.\u00a0622\u2013650.<\/p>\n

27<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Posen, \u00bbCivil Wars & the Structure of World Power\u00ab [wie\u00a0Fn.\u00a01<\/a>], S.\u00a0174.<\/p>\n

28<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Malte Brosig\/John Karlsrud, \u00bbHow Ad hoc Coalitions De\u00adinstitutionalize International Institutions\u00ab, in: International Affairs, 100 (2024) 2, S.\u00a0771\u2013789, doi: 10.1093\/ia\/iiae009<\/a>.<\/p>\n

29<\/a><\/p>\n

\u20032025 trugen internationale Geber zu rund 58\u00a0Prozent des AU-Gesamtbudgets bei. \u00bbThe Funding of the AU from Member States Is a \u203aFarce\u2039, Mo Ibrahim\u00ab, Amani Africa, 10.6.2025, <https:\/\/amaniafrica-et.org\/the-funding-of-the-au-from-member-states-is-a-farce-mo-ibrahim\/<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

30<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Richard Gowan, \u00bbThe Twilight of International Peacemaking Institutions?\u00ab, Br\u00fcssel: International Crisis Group, 24.7.2025, <https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/global\/twilight-international-peacemaking-institutions<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

31<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Telefoninterview, internationaler Diplomat, 26.8.2025 (\u00dcbersetzung aus dem Englischen durch den Autor).<\/p>\n

32<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003\u00c4thiopien war 2020 der gr\u00f6\u00dfte truppenstellende Staat f\u00fcr UN-Friedensmissionen, lag hier 2025 \u2013 mit rund 77\u00a0Pro\u00adzent weniger Truppen \u2013 aber nur noch auf dem elften Platz. UN Department of Peace Operations, Troop and Police Contri\u00adbutors, <https:\/\/peacekeeping.un.org\/en\/troop-and-police-contributors<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

33<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Wolfram Lacher, Die politischen Kosten europ\u00e4ischer Migra\u00adtionspolitik in Libyen. Konsolidierung des Internierungssystems, Auf\u00adwertung von Gewaltakteuren, Ablehnung durch die libysche \u00d6ffentlichkeit, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2025 (SWP-Aktuell 41\/2025), doi: 10.18449\/2025A41<\/a>.<\/p>\n

34<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Gerrit Kurtz\/Wolfram Lacher\/Stephan Roll, Die destabilisierende Rolle der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate in afrikanischen Konflikten, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Mai 2026 (SWP-Aktuell 22\/2026), doi: 10.18449\/2026A22v02<\/a>.<\/p>\n

35<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insur\u00adgent Violence, Cambridge\/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.<\/p>\n

36<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Magnus Lundgren\/Isak Svensson, \u00bbThe Surprising De\u00adcline of International Mediation in Armed Conflicts\u00ab, in: Research & Politics, 7 (2020) 2, doi: 10.1177\/2053168020917243<\/a>.<\/p>\n

37<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Denis M. Tull\/Wolfram Lacher, \u00bbKonflikte ohne Bearbeitung\u00ab, in: Internationale Politik, Spezial Nr. 2 (2025), S.\u00a026\u201329.<\/p>\n

38<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Jason Quinn\/Matthew Hauenstein, \u00bbGlobal Termination and Recurrence Macro Trends: A Follow-Up to Licklider and Dixon\u00ab, in: Civil Wars, 25 (2023) 2\/3, S.\u00a0268f.<\/p>\n

39<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The\u00a0Armed Conflict Survey 2025, London 2025, S.\u00a05\u20138.<\/p>\n

40<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Aljoscha Albrecht\/Judith Vorrath, Neue Kriege 2.0. Die massive Gewalt gegen die Zivilbev\u00f6lkerung in andauernden bewaff\u00adneten Konflikten erfordert politisches Umdenken, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2025 (SWP-Aktuell 38\/2025), doi: 10.18449\/2025A38<\/a>.<\/p>\n

41<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003\u00bbIn Hindsight: The Security Council in 2025 and the Year Ahead\u00ab, Security Council Report, 30.12.2025, <https:\/\/www. securitycouncilreport.org\/monthly-forecast\/2026-01\/in-hindsight-the-security-council-in-2025-and-the-year-ahead.php<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

42<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003UN Department of Peace Operations, Monthly Summary of\u00a0Military and Police Contributions to United Nations Operations, 31.12.2025, verf\u00fcgbar unter: UN Department of Peace Opera\u00adtions, Troop and Police Contributors, <https:\/\/peacekeeping.un. org\/en\/troop-and-police-contributors<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

43<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Hier und im Folgenden: Melissa Li\/Maximilian Bil\u00adler\/Philipp Rotmann, Peace and Security Aid in Crisis, Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 2025.<\/p>\n

44<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Der \u2013 engere \u2013 Titel im Einzelplan 05 des Bundeshaushalts (\u00bbKrisenpr\u00e4vention, Stabilisierung und Frie\u00addensf\u00f6rderung, Klima- und Sicherheitspolitik\u00ab) sank von 574\u00a0Millionen Euro 2022 (Ist) auf 353 Millionen Euro 2026 (Soll), das hei\u00dft um rund 39\u00a0Prozent.<\/p>\n

45<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Cuts in Official Development Assistance: OECD Projec\u00adtions for 2025 and the Near Term, Paris 2025 (Policy Brief), <https:\/\/www.oecd.org\/en\/publications\/cuts-in-official-development-assistance_8c530629-en\/full-report.html<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

46<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, \u00bbMulti-Year Appeal 2023\u201326\u00ab, 31.12.2025, <https:\/\/dppa. un.org\/en\/funding<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

47<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Piccolino, \u00bbThe Resolution of Civil Wars\u00ab [wie Fn.\u00a015<\/a>], S.\u00a0309.<\/p>\n

48<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Linda Kinstler, \u00bbWhy Wars Don\u2019t End Anymore\u00ab, in: New York Times, 8.8.2025, <https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/08\/08\/ magazine\/ceasefires-peace-gaza-ukraine-thailand.html<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

49<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003David Lewis\/John Heathershaw\/Nick Megoran, \u00bbIlliberal Peace? Authoritarian Modes of Conflict Management\u00ab, in: Cooperation and Conflict, 53 (2018) 4, S.\u00a0492, doi: 10.1177\/ 0010836718765902<\/a>.<\/p>\n

50<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Christine Bell\/Jan Pospisil, \u00bbNavigating Inclusion in Transitions from Conflict: The Formalised Political Unsettle\u00adment\u00ab, in: Journal of International Development, 29\u00a0(2017)\u00a05, S.\u00a0576\u2013593.<\/p>\n

51<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Roger Mac Ginty, \u00bbThe Liberal Peace is Over and It is Not Coming Back: Hybridity and the Emerging International Peace System\u00ab, in: Third World Quarterly, 2025, S.\u00a01\u201320, doi: 10.1080\/01436597.2025.2559376<\/a>.<\/p>\n

52<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Deutscher Bundestag, Zwischenbericht der Enquete-Kommis\u00adsion Lehren aus Afghanistan f\u00fcr das k\u00fcnftige vernetzte Engagement Deutschlands, Drucksache 20\/10400, Berlin, 19.2.2024, <https:\/\/ dserver.bundestag.de\/btd\/20\/104\/ 2010400.pdf<\/a>>; Denis M. Tull, Lernf\u00e4hige deutsche Krisenpolitik? Lehren aus Mali (2013\u20132023), Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Sep\u00adtember 2024 (SWP-Studie 21\/2024), doi: 10.18449\/2024S21<\/a>.<\/p>\n

53<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003\u00bbFunding Crisis Forces Deep Cuts to UN Peacekeeping Missions\u00ab, UN News, 16.10.2025, <https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/ story\/2025\/10\/1166122<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

54<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003David E. Sanger\/Anton Troianovski, \u00bbTrump Bets on Diplomacy Without Diplomats\u00ab, in: The New York Times, 17.2.2026, <https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/02\/17\/us\/politics\/ trump-witkoff-kushner-diplomacy.html<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

55<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Johannes Thimm, Systemsprenger \u2013 Donald Trump und die Erosion der Demokratie in den USA, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Januar 2026 (SWP-Studie 2\/2026), doi: 10.18449\/2026S02<\/a>.<\/p>\n

56<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Gerrit Kurtz, \u00bbNachhaltiges Friedensengagement in Zeiten kurzlebiger \u203aDeals\u2039\u00ab, in: Barbara Lippert\/Stefan Mair (Hg.), Mit, ohne, gegen Washington: Die Neubestimmung der Bezie\u00adhungen Europas zu den USA, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Januar 2026 (SWP-Studie 3\/2026), S.\u00a042\u201346, doi: 10.18449\/2026S03<\/a>.<\/p>\n

57<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003\u00c4thiopien, Dschibuti, Eritrea, Kenia, Somalia, Sudan, S\u00fcdsudan, Uganda.<\/p>\n

58<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Sharath Srinivasan, When Peace Kills Politics: International Intervention and Unending Wars in the Sudans, London 2021.<\/p>\n

59<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003John Young, The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process, London\/New York 2012, S.\u00a095.<\/p>\n

60<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Telefoninterview, internationaler Diplomat, 26.8.2025 (\u00dcbersetzung aus dem Englischen durch den Autor).<\/p>\n

61<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Johan Brosch\u00e9\/Allard Duursma, \u00bbHurdles to Peace: A\u00a0Level-of-Analysis Approach to Resolving Sudan\u2019s Civil Wars\u00ab, in: Third World Quarterly, 39 (2018) 3, S.\u00a0560\u2013576, doi:\u00a010.1080\/01436597.2017.1333417<\/a>.<\/p>\n

62<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Alex De Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power, Cambridge 2015, 84.<\/p>\n

63<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Peter Adwok Nyaba, South Sudan. The State We Aspire To, 2.\u00a0Aufl., Wanneroo 2016, S.\u00a010 (\u00dcbersetzung durch den Autor).<\/p>\n

64<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Brosch\u00e9\/Duursma, \u00bbHurdles to Peace\u00ab [wie Fn.\u00a061<\/a>].<\/p>\n

65<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Edward Thomas, \u00bbThe Past & Future of Peace\u00ab, in: John\u00a0Ryle u.\u00a0a. (Hg.), The Sudan Handbook, Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2011, S.\u00a0301.<\/p>\n

66<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Young, The Fate of Sudan [wie Fn.\u00a059<\/a>].<\/p>\n

67<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Laurie Nathan, Foxes Guarding the Henhouse? The IGAD Mediation for South Sudan, 2013\u201315, Notre Dame, IN: Univer\u00adsity of Notre Dame, 2024, <https:\/\/curate.nd.edu\/articles\/ report\/Foxes_Guarding_the_Henhouse_The_IGAD_Mediation _for_South_Sudan_2013-15\/27392769\/1<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

68<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Eli Stamnes\/Cedric de Coning, The Revitalised Agreement on\u00a0the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R\u2011ARCSS), Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2022 (FAIR Case Brief Nr. 6).<\/p>\n

69<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003De Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa [wie Fn.\u00a062<\/a>].<\/p>\n

70<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Alex de Waal\/Benjamin Spatz\/Aditiya Sarkar, Situating the Contribution of the Political Market Framework to Peace Processes, Edinburgh: Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, 2023, S.\u00a010.<\/p>\n

71<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Ebd., S.\u00a04 (\u00dcbersetzung aus dem Englischen durch den Autor).<\/p>\n

72<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003De Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa [wie Fn.\u00a062<\/a>], S.\u00a026f.<\/p>\n

73<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Vgl. International Crisis Group, South Sudan\u2019s Splintered Opposition: Preventing More Conflict, Juba\/Nairobi\/Br\u00fcssel, 25.2.2022 (Africa Briefing Nr.\u00a0179).<\/p>\n

74<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Der Anf\u00fchrer des Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Geibril Ibrahim, wurde Finanzminister, Minni Minnawi wiederum, der das Sudan Liberation Movement (SLA-MM) leitete, Gouverneur der Region Darfur. Insgesamt erhielten die Unterzeichnergruppen ein Viertel der Kabinettssitze.<\/p>\n

75<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Das JPA enthielt Protokolle f\u00fcr Darfur, S\u00fcdkordofan und Blauer Nil, Ostsudan, das Zentrum und den Norden Sudans.<\/p>\n

76<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Einige Beobachter sprachen von einem \u00bbpayroll peace on steroids\u00ab. Willow Berridge u.\u00a0a., Sudan\u2019s Unfinished Democracy: The Promise and Betrayal of a People\u2019s Revolution, London 2022 (African Arguments), S.\u00a0120.<\/p>\n

77<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Tom Gardner, The Abiy Project: God, Power and War in the New Ethiopia, London 2024.<\/p>\n

78<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Die TDF wurden w\u00e4hrend des Krieges aus den regionalen Sicherheitskr\u00e4ften Tigrays, \u00dcberl\u00e4ufern der \u00e4thiopischen Armee und einer gro\u00dfen Zahl neu rekrutierter Mitglieder aufgestellt. Sie verf\u00fcgten \u00fcber eine breitere politische Basis als die TPLF. Als Teil des Friedensprozesses handelten hoch\u00adrangige Milit\u00e4rs der TDF und der \u00e4thiopischen Armee nach dem politischen Pretoria-Abkommen die Details der Sicherheitsfragen in Nairobi aus.<\/p>\n

79<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Pan-African Agenda, Three Years into the Pretoria Agreement: Where Does It Stand? The Pretoria Agreement Implementation Report, Oakland 2026.<\/p>\n

80<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003\u00c4gypten\/Saudi-Arabien\/Vereinigte Arabische Emi\u00adrate\/Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, \u00bbJoint Statement on Restoring Peace and Security in Sudan\u00ab, Washington, D.\u00a0C.: United States Department of State, 12.9.2025, <https:\/\/www. state.gov\/releases\/2025\/09\/joint-statement-on-restoring-peace-and-security-in-sudan\/<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

81<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003\u00bbSaudi Arabia Arms Deal for Sudan, a New Engagement\u00ab, Ayin Network, 10.2.2026, <https:\/\/3ayin.com\/en\/saudi-arabia-\/<\/a>>; Jared Malsin\/Benoit Faucon\/Robbie Gramer, \u00bbHow U.\u00a0A.\u00a0E. Arms Bolstered a Sudanese Militia Accused of Geno\u00adcide\u00ab, in: Wall Street Journal, 28.10.2025, <https:\/\/www.wsj. com\/world\/how-u-a-e-arms-bolstered-a-sudanese-militia-accused-of-genocide-781b9803<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

82<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Mateja Peter\/Haley Rice, Non-Western Approaches to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding, Edinburgh 2022 (PeaceRep).<\/p>\n

83<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Online-Interview mit Jeffrey Feltman, 15.9.2025 (\u00dcbersetzung aus dem Englischen durch den Autor).<\/p>\n

84<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Declan Walsh, \u00bbForeign Drones Tip the Balance in Ethiopia\u2019s Civil War\u00ab, in: The New York Times, 20.12.2021, <https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/12\/20\/world\/africa\/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

85<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Hintergrundgespr\u00e4ch, sudanesischer Politiker, Nairobi, November 2024.<\/p>\n

86<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003\u00bbThe African Union Commission Chairperson Welcomes Sudan\u2019s UNSC Peace Initiative, Calls for Comprehensive Dialogue and International Support\u00ab, Presseerkl\u00e4rung, Addis Abeba, 30.12.2025, <https:\/\/au.int\/en\/pressreleases\/20251230\/ auc-chairperson-welcomes-sudans-unsc-peace-initiative-calls-dialogue<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

87<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Abdul Mohammed, Mediation Fiddles as Sudan Burns (Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, 2025), <https:\/\/ sudantransparency.org\/mediation-fails-as-sudan-bleeds\/<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

88<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Vgl. de Waal\/Spatz\/Sarkar, Situating the Contribution of the\u00a0Political Market Framework to Peace Processes [wie Fn.\u00a070<\/a>].<\/p>\n

89<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Martin Plaut\/Sarah Vaughan, Understanding Ethiopia\u2019s Tigray War, London 2023.<\/p>\n

90<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, UN\u00a0Doc. A\/HRC\/54\/55, Genf: United Nations, 2023.<\/p>\n

91<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Informelle Milizen, die lokale amharische Interessen verfolgen. Die Ank\u00fcndigung der \u00e4thiopischen Regierung, die formellen amharischen Regionalkr\u00e4fte zu demobilisieren, f\u00fchrte 2023 zum Ausbruch des Krieges in Amhara. Damals schlossen sich zahlreiche Mitglieder der regionalen Sicherheitskr\u00e4fte den Fano-Milizen an.<\/p>\n

92<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Gerrit Kurtz, \u00c4thiopiens Chance auf Frieden sichern. Das Ende des Krieges im Norden sollte der Auftakt f\u00fcr grundlegende Reformen der Regierungsf\u00fchrung sein, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, M\u00e4rz 2023 (SWP-Aktuell 14\/2023), doi: 10.18449\/ 2023A14<\/a>.<\/p>\n

93<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Gerrit Kurtz, \u00bbPower Struggle in Tigray\u00ab, African Arguments, 29.10.2024, <https:\/\/africanarguments.org\/2024\/10\/ power-struggle-in-tigray\/<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

94<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Gerrit Kurtz, Die Spoiler von Darfur. Im Schatten des gescheiterten \u00dcbergangsprozesses versch\u00e4rft sich die Konfliktsituation in Sudans Westen, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2022 (SWP-Aktuell 54\/2022), doi: 10.18449\/2022A54<\/a>.<\/p>\n

95<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003UN Panel of Experts, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, UN Doc. S\/2022\/48, New York: UN Security Council, 2022, <https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/s\/2022\/48<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

96<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Joshua Craze, Pay Day Loans and Backroom Empires. South Sudan\u2019s Political Economy since 2018, Genf: Small Arms Survey, 2023 (Briefing Paper).<\/p>\n

97<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003UN Panel of Experts, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on\u00a0South Sudan (2021), UN Doc. S\/2022\/359, New York: UN Security Council, 2022, S.\u00a02, <https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/s\/ 2022\/359<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

98<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Gerrit Kurtz, \u00bbHier herrscht ein Krieg mit System\u00ab, Zenith, 3.2.2026, <https:\/\/magazin.zenith.me\/de\/politik\/ eskalation-der-gewalt-im-suedsudan<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

99<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003UN Panel of Experts, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan (2021) [wie Fn. 97<\/a>].<\/p>\n

100<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Joshua Craze, \u00bbIs This the End of the Peace Process?\u00ab, African Arguments, 28.3.2025, <https:\/\/africanarguments.org\/ 2025\/03\/is-this-the-end-of-the-peace-process\/<\/a>> (\u00dcbersetzung durch den Autor).<\/p>\n

101<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003\u00bb\u203aWe Are Not at War\u2039, South Sudan Says\u00ab, Radio Tamazuj, 27.1.2026, <https:\/\/www.radiotamazuj.org\/en\/ news\/article\/we-are-not-at-war-south-sudan-says<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

102<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Caroline A. Hartzell\/Matthew Hoddie, Power Sharing and\u00a0Democracy in Post-Civil War States: The Art of the Possible, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.<\/p>\n

103<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003UNITAMS hatte auch den Vorsitz der Permanent Ceasefire Commission in Darfur, die unter dem JPA gebildet wurde.<\/p>\n

104<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003UN Security Council, Meeting Records, 9980th Meeting, UN\u00a0Doc. S\/PV.9980, New York 2025; UN Security Council, Meeting Records, 9898th Meeting, UN Doc. S\/PV.9898, New York 2025.<\/p>\n

105<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Lessons Learned Report from the AU-Led Peace Process for the Tigray Region of Ethiopia, Addis Abeba: African Union, 2025.<\/p>\n

106<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003\u00bbAfrica\u2019s Most Secretive Dictatorship Faces an Existential Crisis\u00ab, in: The Economist, 2.10.2025, <https:\/\/www. economist.com\/middle-east-and-africa\/2025\/10\/02\/africas-most-secretive-dictatorship-faces-an-existential-crisis<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

107<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Julia Fath\/Wolfram Lacher\/Ann-Marie Verhoeven, \u00bbThe Changing Face of Foreign Intervention in African Conflicts\u00ab, in: Christine Hackenesch\/Tobias Heidland\/Denis M. Tull (Hg.), Leverage and Limits: What African Actors Make of the New Multi\u00adpolarity, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Oktober 2025 (Megatrends Afrika, Working Paper 21), S.\u00a013\u201321, doi:\u00a010.18449\/2025MTA-WP21<\/a>.<\/p>\n

108<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Gerrit Kurtz\/Wolfram Lacher\/Denis M. Tull, The Myth of\u00a0the Gamechanger: Drones and Military Power in Africa, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, M\u00e4rz 2025 (Megatrends Afrika, Policy Brief Nr. 33), doi: 10.18449\/2025MTA-PB33<\/a>.<\/p>\n

109<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Ruben De Koning, \u00bbContested Corridors. The Illicit Transnational Supply Chains Sustaining Sudan\u2019s Con\u00adflict\u00ab,\u00a0Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 20.11.2025, <https:\/\/globalinitiative.net\/analysis\/the-illicit-transnational-supply-chains-sustaining-sudans-conflict\/<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

110<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Kurtz, \u00bbNachhaltiges Friedensengagement in Zeiten kurzlebiger \u203aDeals\u2039\u00ab [wie Fn.\u00a056<\/a>].<\/p>\n

111<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003\u00bbAnkara Declaration by the Federal Democratic Repub\u00adlic of Ethiopia and the Federal Republic of Somalia facilitated by the Republic of T\u00fcrkiye\u00ab, Republic of T\u00fcrkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11.12.2024, <https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.tr\/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

112<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003International Crisis Group, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray: A\u00a0Powder Keg in the Horn of Africa, Br\u00fcssel\/Nairobi 2026 (Africa Briefing Nr. 210), <https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/brf\/africa\/ ethiopia-eritrea\/b210-ethiopia-eritrea-and-tigray-powder-keg-horn-africa<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

113<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Malaz Emad, \u00bbAs Sudan Army Gains Drive Mass Re\u00adturns, Mutual Aid Groups Begin to Rebuild\u00ab, The New Humanitarian, 30.4.2025, <https:\/\/www.thenewhumanitarian.org\/ news-feature\/2025\/04\/30\/sudan-army-gains-drive-mass-returns-mutual-aid-groups-begin-rebuild<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

114<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003UNDP Sudan, Bridging Divides. Local Peace Initiatives in Sudan, Port Sudan: UN Development Programme\/Voluntas, 2025.<\/p>\n

115<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), Challenges and\u00a0Opportunities for Khartoum State Emergency Response Room, 16.10.2026 (Thematic Report), <https:\/\/www.acaps.org\/ fileadmin\/Data_Product\/Main_media\/20251016_ACAPS_ Sudan_-_Challenges_and_opportunities_for_Khartoum_ state_emergency_response_rooms_.pdf<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

116<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Vgl. \u00bbThe RSF\u2019s Business Network in the UAE\u00ab, The\u00a0Sentry, Oktober 2025, <https:\/\/thesentry.org\/wp-content\/ uploads\/2025\/09\/SudanRSF-TheSentry-Oct2025.pdf<\/a>>; Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, Plundering a Nation: How Rampant Corruption Unleashed a Human Rights Crisis in South Sudan, UN Doc. A\/HRC\/60\/CRP.5, Genf: UN Human Rights Council, 16.9.2025; Claire Wilmot\/Ashenafi Endale, \u00bbA Crisis of Colossal Scale\u00ab: The Illegal Gold Rush Tearing Ethiopia Apart, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 13.11.2025, <https:\/\/www.thebureauinvestigates.com\/stories\/2025-11-13\/inside-ethiopias-illegal-gold-trade<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

117<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2003Im Bundeshaushalt 2026 stellen sich die Anteile an den Gesamtausgaben wie folgt dar: humanit\u00e4re Hilfe 0,2\u00a0Pro\u00adzent; Krisenpr\u00e4vention, Stabilisierung und Friedensf\u00f6rderung, Klima- und Sicherheitspolitik 0,07\u00a0Prozent; Haushalt des Bundesministeriums f\u00fcr wirtschaftliche Zusammen\u00adarbeit und Entwicklung 1,92\u00a0Prozent.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"1 \u2003Barry R. Posen, \u00bbCivil Wars & the Structure of World Power\u00ab, in: Daedalus, 146 (2017) 4, S.\u00a0167\u2013179.…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":15659,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[29,112,110,113,109,108,114,111],"class_list":{"0":"post-15658","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-afrika","8":"tag-afrika","9":"tag-aussenpolitik","10":"tag-deutsches-institut-fuer-internationale-politik-und-sicherheit","11":"tag-sicherheitspolitik","12":"tag-stiftung-wissenschaft-und-politik","13":"tag-swp","14":"tag-unabhaengiges-forschungsinstitut","15":"tag-wissenschaftliche-politikberatung"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@afrika\/116552525886891352","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15658","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15658"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15658\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/15659"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15658"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15658"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/afrika\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15658"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}