{"id":66106,"date":"2026-06-08T13:29:11","date_gmt":"2026-06-08T13:29:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/66106\/"},"modified":"2026-06-08T13:29:11","modified_gmt":"2026-06-08T13:29:11","slug":"ai-regulation-in-the-chokepoint-state","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/66106\/","title":{"rendered":"AI \u2018Regulation\u2019 in the Chokepoint State"},"content":{"rendered":"

President Donald Trump\u2019s recent executive order<\/a> on artificial intelligence is being treated<\/a> as a \u201cshift\u201d in the administration\u2019s approach to tech regulation. It is welcomed<\/a> as a cautious step toward responsible risk regulation, hailed<\/a> as a qualified victory for tech critics, and framed<\/a> as the outcome of \u201cmonths of debate\u201d within the administration over important matters of principle.<\/p>\n

But this story misses the important ways that the executive order marks a continuation of the Trump administration\u2019s preferred mode of governing. Trumpian regulation is premised on broad executive discretion<\/a>, bypassing<\/a> ordinary rulemaking procedures and, as far as possible, judicial accountability. Where the coercive power of the federal government is insufficient, Trumpian regulation works by building strategic alliances<\/a> with self-interested private sector elites<\/a>. And it is premised on control over the circulation of goods<\/a>, funds<\/a>, and information<\/a>.<\/p>\n

These all-too-common regulatory techniques have roots far deeper than the current presidency, but they are particular hallmarks of the second Trump administration\u2019s approach to executive power. And they are all on display in the new AI order. Viewed in this way, the order is not a \u201cpivot\u201d<\/a> for the Trump administration, but just the latest page in the same playbook.<\/p>\n

Coordinated, Voluntary Self-Regulation<\/p>\n

The president\u2019s June 2026 order on AI purports<\/a> to avoid burdensome \u201ctop-down\u201d regulation, and instead to work \u201chand-in-hand with American industry to strike the right balance between innovation and national security.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

The order accomplishes this goal by adopting a paradigm of voluntary and coordinated industry self-regulation. The word \u201cvoluntary\u201d appears twice in the order, both times in its key operative provisions. First, the order establishes an \u201cAI security clearinghouse,\u201d which is meant to foster \u201cvoluntary collaboration with the AI industry and operators of critical infrastructure\u201d on software vulnerabilities and their remediation. Second, the order contemplates a \u201cvoluntary framework\u201d for the review and sharing of so-called \u201cfrontier models\u201d\u2014a bit of tech jargon with its own sketchy origin story<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The order makes clear that it does not create any kind of mandatory licensing or preclearance framework. But the administration could not have lawfully done such a thing without either invoking some existing statutory authority (which the order does not do) or getting Congress to pass a new law. Any attempt to implement such a permitting process, without plausible statutory backing, would be immediately frustrated by the courts. Even a Trump-aligned Supreme Court majority\u2014struggling with its own legitimacy crisis\u2014would not rush to bless a new regulatory process governing a massive and growing industry, if that process lacked even an arguable statutory basis.<\/p>\n

But the fact that regulation is \u201cvoluntary\u201d does not make it meaningless. Industry frequently commits to voluntary regulations, usually for a range of self-interested reasons. The key, then, is understanding why industry might be drawn into signing up. And, in the second Trump administration, experience tells us to look not at how industry will be restricted, but how both industry and the White House, together, will be empowered by the new order.<\/p>\n

The New Security Framework<\/p>\n

Perhaps the most important provisions of the order concern the regulatory process for new technology under section 3, framed by the order as \u201cSecure Frontier Model Deployment.\u201d Key elements in this process are undefined or inscrutable, and, as always, it is dangerous to act as if a Trump order makes any kind of clear sense. But an ambitious application of the order would empower the White House, in cooperation with federal agencies and a small set of AI developers, to restructure and control the market for emerging technologies.<\/p>\n

The actual contours of the review procedure contemplated by the order are as follows. At an initial stage, the National Security Agency (NSA), in consultation with other agencies, will conduct an \u201cassessment\u201d of \u201cthe advanced cyber capabilities\u201d of an AI model under development. On the basis of this assessment, the NSA will \u201cdetermine\u201d whether the model qualifies as a \u201ccovered frontier model.\u201d This assessment and designation will be conducted according to a \u201cbenchmarking process.\u201d The details of the process will be \u201cclassified,\u201d though the assessments themselves may be shared \u201cwith AI developers and researchers as appropriate.\u201d AI developers are also expected to \u201cengage the Federal Government to determine whether model(s) under development\u201d meet the criteria for designation.<\/p>\n

The consequences of designation appear to follow a two-step sequence. First, the \u201cFederal Government\u201d will be given access to the model for a 30-day period. The purpose of this 30-day access period is not expressly stated in the order, but press coverage suggests<\/a> it is \u201cto give officials time to identify and address potential vulnerabilities before they are released publicly.\u201d In the public reporting, the length of this period was said<\/a> to be a major sticking point, and cutting the time from an originally planned 90 down to 30 days was said to be critical for mollifying industry skepticism.<\/p>\n

Second, something happens at the end of that 30-day period, but what happens is not entirely clear. The order expects that AI developers will give designated models to the government 30 days \u201cbefore they plan to release such models to other trusted partners.\u201d The term \u201ctrusted partner\u201d is never defined; the order simply says that developers will \u201ccollaborate\u201d with the government to \u201cselect trusted partners that will have early access to covered frontier models.\u201d The order also never says how long this \u201cearly\u201d access will last, nor does it provide parameters for when and under what terms anyone who is not a \u201ctrusted partner\u201d can access the model. Nor is it clear what happens to the government\u2019s access at the end of this 30-day period: presumably, government access could cease, or the developer might agree with the government to extend its access beyond that period. And it is at least possible that the government and a developer might never decide to release a model broadly to the public, keeping the model instead under the control of the government and a few \u201ctrusted partners.\u201d<\/p>\n

The implications here are stark. The NSA, acting according to a secret procedure, can designate any emerging AI technology as \u201ccovered frontier models.\u201d Once designated, the Executive Branch can collaborate with AI developers to keep that model controlled within a circle of \u201ctrusted partners,\u201d who may enjoy privileged access for an indefinite period. Suggestions in the press that the order simply provides for a 30-day review period before models are released \u201cto the public\u201d are either mistaken, or they have an idiosyncratic understanding of what the \u201cpublic\u201d means.<\/p>\n

If industry signs up to this procedure, then it provides a mechanism for potentially indefinite control of the market. But that means all this depends on the willing cooperation of industry. So, what\u2019s in it for them?\u00a0<\/p>\n

Coordinated Regulation in the Chokepoint State<\/p>\n

In forthcoming work, I argue that the second Trump administration has consolidated a mode of governing I call the \u201cChokepoint State.\u201d Political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, in their landmark study<\/a> of networked power, describe the \u201cchokepoint effect\u201d as the ability of privileged states to control third parties\u2019 access to crucial nodes in economic or information networks. In the Chokepoint State, I argue, administrative capacity is increasingly arranged around controlling these nodes in order to reward allies, punish enemies, and set rules.<\/p>\n

The techniques of the Chokepoint State are not new, but their uptake and proliferation have accelerated under Trump. The AI executive order itself, for example, resembles both Trump and Biden-era chokepoint policies in some ways. By attempting to ring-fence the market for emerging technology, the new executive order reflects the \u201csmall yard, high fence\u201d strategy<\/a> of using export controls to structure the global market for semiconductors. And by offering \u201cearly access\u201d to \u201ctrusted partners,\u201d the order mimics the Compact for Higher Education\u2019s offer<\/a> of privileged \u201caccess\u201d to federal funding in exchange for accepting new quasi-legal obligations<\/a> on a wide range of issues.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The difference, of course, lies in the AI order\u2019s explicitly voluntary nature. U.S. export controls rely on a web<\/a> of regulations, statutes, and (for a large part of their history) emergency powers that enable the Executive Branch to control foreign commerce under the threat of civil and criminal penalties. The Compact for Higher Education, though formally voluntary, relied on explicit and implicit threats<\/a> that leveraged the Executive\u2019s power over spending, grantmaking, and visa approvals. Here, the new executive order invokes no statute and disclaims any pretension<\/a> to impose a \u201cmandatory\u201d regime.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The order thus shows how voluntary and coordinated self-regulation might work in the Chokepoint State. The leading tech firms, having leveraged<\/a> billions of dollars on AI, would naturally seek U.S. government protection from forces that would erode their dominant position. Under these conditions, it makes sense for these firms to seek a partnership with the White House. Under the framework of this order, or a similar regulation, the leading firms can establish joint public\/private control over advanced AI technology, rebranding industry leaders as \u201ctrusted partners,\u201d and entrenching their market and political power.<\/p>\n

This perhaps accounts for the muted reaction from AI moguls. OpenAI founder Sam Altman posted<\/a> a brief positive endorsement on X. And, the same day as the executive order, his company released a nine-page policy paper<\/a> on the governance of \u201cfrontier AI.\u201d The paper diverges from the executive order in many of its details, indicating that Altman & co. view the final shape of the administration\u2019s regulatory process as open to negotiation.\u00a0<\/p>\n

But the continuities are more striking than the differences. OpenAI\u2019s proposals also imply the existence of a network of U.S.-approved trusted partners. One executive told Politico<\/a> that OpenAI \u201cplans to push policymakers in Washington to create mandatory evaluation processes for AI companies that develop advanced systems,\u201d adding, \u201c[w]e don\u2019t think any specific lab should be making that decision unilaterally.\u201d As these statements suggest, cooperative, voluntary regulation allows the major players to borrow the legitimacy of the state, positioning themselves as the adults in the room while guarding the door to keep out potential competitors.<\/p>\n

In this political-economic context, a process built on ad hoc executive discretion may suit insiders just fine. Regulation by executive order, discretion, and \u201cdealmaking\u201d\u2014often just a euphemism for corruption<\/a>\u2014is the preferred mode of this administration. And, so long as they are confident of their access and influence, large private-sector players stand to gain more from shaping executive discretion than they might get from comprehensive federal regulation. Converting this process into a mandatory regime would only further lock in these dynamics, leading to what one firm has warned<\/a> could be \u201ca tiered system\u201d in the market for emerging technology.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, smaller players will struggle to catch up. One of the more insightful analyses<\/a> produced in the first twenty-four hours after the order came from the law firm A&O Shearman. The authors note the complete absence of criteria for identifying \u201ctrusted partners.\u201d And they urge companies to engage \u201cproactively\u201d with relevant agencies to position themselves favorably \u201cfor trusted-partner designation.\u201d Although it may be coincidence, it is not shocking that the lawyers at A&O Shearman\u2014one of the firms that capitulated<\/a> to White House bullying in 2025\u2014know a patronage relationship when they see one.<\/p>\n

Beyond rewarding allies and punishing adversaries, the group that controls a chokepoint can also set lasting rules of the road. This is a self-evident purpose of the new executive order. In addition to the secret rules for making \u201cfrontier model\u201d designations, the order also expects that the government-review and trusted-partner procedures will be part of a \u201cvoluntary framework\u201d that is designed by Treasury and other agencies \u201cwith AI developers.\u201d No other group is mentioned.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The result is that the rules for deciding who gets \u201cearly\u201d (likely meaning \u201cprivileged and indefinite\u201d) access to state-of-the-art technology will be devised by, and for the benefit of, a small group of self-interested firms and their partners in the administration. And these rules may develop largely outside the procedures required of legislation or administrative rulemaking.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Beyond State versus Market<\/p>\n

These important dynamics are missed and obscured by framing the new order as a step toward \u201cregulation\u201d of AI. And this framing is pervasive. Politico trumpeted<\/a> the new order with the headline \u201cTrump\u2019s AI order is a blow against laissez-faire,\u201d and quoting such \u201cAI safety hardliners\u201d as Steve Bannon. This framing poses a stark alternative between government \u201cintervention\u201d and a free market in which innovation occurs spontaneously.<\/p>\n

But we have never been laissez-faire. The relevant question is not whether regulation takes place, but how a regulatory scheme shapes the distribution of public and private power. By placing significant discretion in the hands of an increasingly unaccountable executive, the Chokepoint State obviously enhances the power of the White House. At the same time, executive leverage over chokepoints can enhance the power of private actors who enjoy privileged access to the Oval Office.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The latest AI executive order may come to nothing. If anything can be said with certainty about this administration, it\u2019s that a great many Trump initiatives start with a big media splash before dying a quiet and unceremonious death. But by providing a platform for close cooperation between the White House and industry insiders to control access to emerging technology, the order shows off this administration\u2019s predilection for the techniques of the Chokepoint State.<\/p>\n

FEATURED IMAGE: U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to the media during an event in the Oval Office of the White House on June 3, 2026, in Washington, DC. (Photo by Kevin Dietsch\/Getty Images)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"President Donald Trump\u2019s recent executive order on artificial intelligence is being treated as a \u201cshift\u201d in the administration\u2019s…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":66107,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[24,25,111,37379,1069,5969,313,28336,1161,37380],"class_list":["post-66106","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-ai","tag-ai","tag-artificial-intelligence","tag-artificial-intelligence-ai","tag-artificial-intelligence-and-emerging-technologies-initiative","tag-big-tech","tag-cyber","tag-cybersecurity","tag-executive-orders","tag-silicon-valley","tag-trump-administration-second-term"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66106","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66106"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66106\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/66107"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66106"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66106"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ai\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66106"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}