This week’s revelation that an Akula-class attack submarine and two Russian spy submarines spent a month hovering over vital British undersea cables must end any remaining complacency in Westminster.
These specialist boats, operated by Russia’s shadowy Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research (Gugi), were continuously tracked by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Norway within our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Yet this was no routine intelligence-gathering patrol. Vladimir Putin is leveraging the distraction of the ongoing Middle Eastern conflict to test our ability to protect our critical national infrastructure.
Russia’s strategic intent remains the dismantling of the European security architecture. Blocked from frontal assaults on Nato) members, Putin is prioritising sub-threshold warfare. By hovering over 60 fibre-optic cables carrying 99 per cent of British internet traffic, the Russians intend to warn the UK. They are mapping coordinates to inflict economic paralysis via deniable methods, such as accidental anchor dragging, without firing a shot. Target mapping today secures the option to sever them in the event of a crisis.
The uncomfortable question is whether we are actually managing to deter them. While the recent tracking operation was a successful display of monitoring Russian activity, nothing appears to have been done to stop them from carrying out their task.
Deterrence requires not just strong rhetoric, but the physical and political willpower to back it up. We saw this reality collide with political posturing just days ago. After Keir Starmer threatened to seize sanctioned Russian “shadow fleet” oil tankers in British waters, the Kremlin responded by escorting them with a Russian warship. This is not a good look; the Russians will not hesitate to push through the mush.
Russia’s kilo-class submarine Krasnodar at sea. Britain said last week it had tracked and deterred three Russian submarines on an alleged month-long covert operation in UK waters (Photo: Royal Navy)
This lack of resolve is born of a weakening Royal Navy. With the decommissioning of HMS Richmond in 2026, following the retirement of HMS Lancaster and others, the Royal Navy is expected to plummet to just six operational frigates. Due to the unforgiving mathematics of naval maintenance and training cycles, a paper strength of six means only two, perhaps three in a crisis, will actually be available to deploy at any given time.
This naval collapse must be addressed as a national emergency. While Russian ground forces have been chewed up in the Donbas, Putin’s submarine fleet remains heavily capitalised and modern. Today, the Russian fleet boasts 25 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and 21 diesel-electric submarines (SSKs), with 62 per cent of the latter commissioned in the last 15 years. We are attempting to deter a heavily armed adversary in the vast North Atlantic with a historically hollowed-out fleet.
The financial disparity driving this asymmetry is stark. By 2024, Russian defence spending had soared to roughly £110.7bn, double what it was just a decade prior. By comparison, British spending stood at £60.8bn. This asymmetry is further compounded by the UK’s glaring lack of missile defence against the proven Russian arsenal currently pounding Ukraine.
Crucially, the Kremlin is masterfully exploiting the “grey zones” of international maritime law. Technically, Russian submarines are legally permitted to loiter within our EEZ. They thrive in this ambiguity, knowing we struggle to prove hostile intent under murky legal frameworks. The Kremlin views subsea presence as a coercive tool; the proven ability to disconnect the UK is, in itself, a strategic victory.
As the First Sea Lord, General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, recently outlined, re-establishing deterrence rests in part on new concepts and capabilities. The new concepts of Atlantic Bastion (protecting the northern gap between Greenland, Iceland and Norway), Atlantic Shield (northern air defence), and Atlantic Strike (credible retaliation), will dovetail with the shift towards a “hybrid navy”. This will include new Type 26 frigates, Astute class SSNs, and a plethora of new autonomous platforms to pack out and multiply their effectiveness.
A ceremony in which the Russian nuclear submarine Khabarovsk was removed from the slipway at the Sevmash JSC Shipyard in November (Photo: Russian Defence Ministry/Anadolu)
Once the Type 26 frigates finally hit the water in the coming years, they can be scaled into a true hybrid fleet. These vessels would serve as forward command nodes, controlling the persistent autonomous networks we deploy now. To quote the First Sea Lord, the core design principle going forward must be: “uncrewed wherever possible; crewed only where necessary.”
But more resources are needed to make this happen, as well as regulatory changes to allow large new autonomous platforms to operate at sea. In particular, Treasury must acknowledge the scale of the threat. The MoD cannot operate on the promise of future reviews; the Defence Investment Plan (DIP) must be published with urgency. British shipyards and the wider industry need the financial certainty of multi-year procurement to expand production lines. Delaying the DIP only signals irresolution to the Kremlin.
This drift is exacerbated by shifting priorities in Washington. Donald Trump’s proposed Nato audit warns that European security cannot rely on American support. Whether or not the audit materialises, it proves that American protection is now transactional. If the US conditions its security guarantees on burden sharing, Britain must be capable of holding the line in Europe.
We are in a new cold war, but one which is more complex and unpredictable than the last one. Russia’s submarines are not waiting for the publication of our white papers, and they are not waiting for the Treasury to balance its books. They are mapping our vulnerabilities right now. It is time we surged political will behind the hybrid fleet, and committed a defence budget capable of cutting Russia’s ambitions short.