On 23 April 2026, T\u00fcrkiye and the United Kingdom (UK) signed a
\nnew strategic partnership framework. This marked an important
\nmilestone in an already advanced and mutually beneficial
\nrelationship, which continues to thrive both on the bilateral track
\nand within various institutional frameworks which both states are
\npart of. The new framework, which highlights the start of a \u201cnew
\nera\u201d in the relationship, is designed to boost existing channels of
\ncooperation but, crucially, strengthen dialogue and understanding
\nin the context of the rapidly polarizing international
\nenvironment.<\/p>\n
A rapidly developing relationship<\/p>\n
Both countries are important NATO members \u2013 T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s military
\nis the second largest in the alliance and one of the most
\ntechnologically proficient, whereas the UK, despite not necessarily
\npossessing the same military capabilities as before, contributes
\nwith nuclear deterrence and still serves as a world-leading
\nintelligence hub. On the bilateral level, military cooperation has
\ncontinued to develop from strength to strength. It is already a
\nconsiderably institutionalized relationship, with the T\u00fcrkiye-UK
\nDefence Industry Council adopting a specification in May 2025 which
\nexpanded cooperation initiatives in the defence industry sector. In
\nOctober 2025, the sides signed a deal for T\u00fcrkiye to acquire 20
\nEurofighter Typhoon jets from the UK, with the deal worth around
\n$11 billion. The value and scope of the deal is significant and was
\ndescribed by President Erdo\u011fan as a symbolic demonstration of the
\ngrowing strategic significance of the ties between the countries.
\nIn fact, it is the largest export deal of this aircraft to date and
\nis expected to serve as the backbone of inter-state cooperation in
\nthis sphere.<\/p>\n
This momentum in the defence sector has continued to grow. In
\nMarch 2026, the sides signed another important deal, this time
\nrelated to \u2018training and support\u2019. This represents a continuation
\nof the Eurofighter Typhoon deal reached in October 2025, with the
\nmulti-billion-pound agreement now envisioning the training of
\nTurkish Air Force pilots by UK experts to fly and operate the jets,
\nexpected to be delivered to T\u00fcrkiye by 2030. Moreover, major firms
\nin the UK defence sector, including BAE Systems, will be more
\nclosely supporting T\u00fcrkiye in the production of aircraft components
\nand spares. In total, the deal envisions the creation of 20,000
\njobs in Britain in support of the agreements. Moreover, the deal
\nhas been viewed as an important boost for the British defence
\nindustry, with the UK government actively working on correcting the
\nshortcomings revealed by the Strategic Defence Review released in
\nJune 2025. Such deals, therefore, have the necessary potential to
\nrevive confidence in the British defence sector. The UK has a large
\nindustrial share in the production of the aircraft, with 37% of
\neach aircraft being manufactured in the country.<\/p>\n
The growing strategic proximity of the two countries is
\nreflected in several other developments and indicators. For
\nexample, a key component of the relationship has been a Free Trade
\nAgreement (FTA) in place between the sides, signed in December
\n2020. The agreement has resulted in comprehensive and steadily
\ngrowing trade between the nations, valued at \u00a328.3 billion in the
\n12-month period between September 2024 and September 2025 and
\nrepresenting a 5.8% increase from the previous 12-month period.
\nHowever, both countries share the belief that, although
\nsubstantial, this volume is still far from the full potential. For
\nthis reason, in January 2026, the T\u00fcrkiye-UK Joint Economic and
\nTrade Committee announced a 16-point plan with the aim of elevating
\nthe value of bilateral trade to \u00a340 billion. The sides have also
\nbeen engaged, for several years now, in conversations to upgrade
\nthe FTA and considerably expand its scope. Currently, it covers
\nmostly industrial goods and excludes important segments of both
\neconomies. In this light, the fourth round of talks to modernize
\nthe agreement was held in March 2026, with the sides negotiating on
\nmultiple areas such as Digital Trade, Communications, easing
\nrestrictions on the movement of businesspeople and more. There is
\nhope that a renewed agreement will bring the two economies and
\ntheir people closer, especially with the business communities
\nalready in close collaboration. Untapped potential remains, which
\nis why there is hope that a new FTA will slightly balance the
\ntrading relationship (T\u00fcrkiye exports considerably more to the UK
\nthan the other way around) and pave the way for even more foreign
\ndirect investment between the two countries.<\/p>\n
Geopolitical significance<\/p>\n
As demonstrated, the ties between the countries are
\nmulti-dimensional, with both the government and the societal level
\nin close collaboration through a range of mechanisms. This status
\nquo has been in place for some time, with both sides deriving
\nnumerous benefits from the relationship. However, over time, the
\nrelationship has gained considerable geopolitical weight, not least
\nbecause of the broader developments occurring in the system of
\ninternational relations. Against this backdrop, the ties between
\nAnkara and London are gaining strategic indispensability. Although
\nmultilateral platforms remain important forums for states to
\nconvene and discuss pressing matters, their actual weight in key
\ndecision-making processes is weaker than ever before. Instead, it
\nis bilateral relationships (and also minilateral formats) that are
\nserving as the more potent centres of influence. Only recently,
\nT\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan put forward the idea that
\npowers which are not yet in the \u2018great power\u2019 category must come
\ntogether and establish their own \u2018centre of gravity\u2019. This would
\nenable these states to protect their interests from great power
\ncompetition and make their own decisions in line with their own
\nrealities. Developments in the relationship between the UK and
\nT\u00fcrkiye, two states with a wealth of resources and both of which
\nqualify as middle powers, are a leading demonstration of this
\ntrend. Inter-state relations, particularly between actors which are
\nrecognized as both influential and trustworthy, are becoming an
\nincreasingly fundamental aspect of international relations.<\/p>\n
Three avenues for cooperation<\/p>\n
There are three important avenues which currently serve as
\nincentives for the two countries to bolster their relationship even
\nfurther. First, since the return of Donald Trump to the White
\nHouse, the United States has made key changes to its foreign policy
\napproach. This particularly concerns the assignment of less
\nimportance to strengthening transatlantic relations, of which NATO
\nis a fundamental part. Having expressed its frustration with its
\nEuropean partners over the Iran war and general defence spending
\ncommitments, the exact future role of NATO in America\u2019s foreign
\npolicy remains to be determined. Therefore, the organization
\nrequires new momentum. Here, the UK and T\u00fcrkiye, as two influential
\nmembers of the alliance, can provide vital, new impetus. Both sides
\nopenly recognize this as a strategic objective, with the newly
\nannounced partnership framework referring to NATO as a \u201chistoric
\nbasis\u201d for deeper ties. The joint statement also mentions the
\nexistence of \u201ccommon perspectives\u201d on issues of mutual interest,
\nwhich logically extends to security matters. In particular, the
\nMiddle East is mentioned, with the T\u00fcrkiye-UK partnership
\npossessing the necessary potential to both uphold the European
\nsecurity architecture and act as responsible players on the
\ndiplomatic stage, if necessary. This explains why both sides are so
\neager to deepen their ties, strengthen existing mechanisms and come
\nup with new ones, all of which are key to addressing mutual issues.
\nAs Ankara prepares to host the NATO summit in July, deepening
\ncooperation under the NATO framework presents an important
\nopportunity to cement the relationship as an important centre of
\npower for the coming years.<\/p>\n
Another factor which continues to influence the relationship is
\nthe European Union. Although both countries are not EU members,
\nthey have demonstrated enthusiasm for closer ties and integration
\nwith EU structures. The UK government has urged a reformulation of
\nthe UK-EU relationship, proposing closer integration with the
\nsingle market without pursuing re-entry. T\u00fcrkiye, on the other
\nhand, is in a customs union with the EU which is widely considered
\nto be outdated. The issue in this case appears to be an absence of
\nadequate recognition of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s strategic importance by certain
\npolitical circles in Brussels. As the EU steps up efforts to
\ndevelop strategic autonomy, T\u00fcrkiye represents an invaluable
\nopportunity through which it can fill existing capability gaps and
\ndiversify its military partnerships, reducing overreliance on the
\nUS and transatlantic relations as a whole. However, despite these
\nprospects, T\u00fcrkiye and the UK still operate on the periphery of the
\nEuropean Union. This status can actually bring the sides even
\ncloser together. Recently, both countries saw the collapse of their
\ntalks to join the EU\u2019s latest SAFE (Security Action for Europe)
\nprogram, a financial instrument designed to boost the continent\u2019s
\ndefence readiness through the provision of loans to member states.
\nThis was primarily due to member state objections, underlining that
\neven if both remain EU partners, their defence sectors remain
\ninsufficiently integrated with EU structures. This has and will
\ncontinue to open up new incentives for closer bilateral
\ncooperation.<\/p>\n
In addition to the NATO and EU avenues, T\u00fcrkiye and the UK also
\nshare mutual partners in neighbouring regions. In the South
\nCaucasus, for example, Azerbaijan has a military alliance with
\nT\u00fcrkiye and a developing strategic partnership with the UK, which
\nspans several sectors. Moreover, as the regional security
\narchitecture evolves and Azerbaijan and Armenia edge closer to
\npeace, fresh opportunities for T\u00fcrkiye and the UK to make
\nlong-lasting contributions will only grow further. This is
\nparticularly applicable to the Middle Corridor, in which Azerbaijan
\nis increasingly establishing itself as a regional transport and
\nlogistics hub. In recent months, the UK has expanded its interest
\nin the Central Asian region, establishing a consultative track at
\nthe level of Foreign Ministers. Moreover, London has repeatedly
\nstressed its desire to contribute to the Corridor, with UK firms
\npossessing the necessary experience which, if applied to the
\nopportunities on the ground, can seriously accelerate progress.
\nWith T\u00fcrkiye playing a leading role in the Organization of Turkic
\nStates (OTS), jointly supporting evolving interregional
\nconnectivity projects is another way T\u00fcrkiye and the UK can come
\ntogether and advance mutual interests. Additionally, pursuing more
\nstructured cooperation with Azerbaijan in the military and security
\nspheres is equally logical. Baku has an advanced military alliance
\nwith T\u00fcrkiye and is rapidly developing engagement with the UK in
\nthe defence industry and broader military sectors. More pronounced
\ncooperation between the three countries in these directions would
\nbe an important step in further solidifying regional security and
\nminimizing the resurgence of new instability.<\/p>\n
A moment of unique opportunity<\/p>\n
The current moment is one of strategic reflection but also of
\nopportunity for both T\u00fcrkiye and the UK. The interests of the sides
\nappear to be overlapping as much as ever before. In addition to the
\nbilateral agenda, which is traditionally active, the sides, in
\ntheir own ways, are experiencing a process of adaptation to
\nchanging geopolitical realities. In this complex and unpredictable
\nprocess, where traditional alliances appear less resilient than
\nbefore, the ability of states to work together with their partners
\nand overcome mutual challenges will determine their place in the
\nnew international order. In this regard, the Ankara-London
\npartnership has the necessary potential to act as a new source of
\ninfluence in international relations, adding much-needed stability
\nand predictability to an increasingly volatile international
\narena.<\/p>\n
Author: Huseyn Sultanli, Advisor at the Center of
\nAnalysis of International Relations (AIR Center)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"On 23 April 2026, T\u00fcrkiye and the United Kingdom (UK) signed a new strategic partnership framework. This marked…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":23046,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[4],"tags":[10425,10414,345,1498,10422,10423,8794,254,10426,10415,10419,10416,8853,14,10421,10424,10420,10417,5,6,10418,46],"class_list":["post-23045","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-uk","tag-analytics","tag-azerbaijan39s-news","tag-breaking-news","tag-business-news","tag-caspian-news","tag-central-asia","tag-company-news","tag-economy","tag-financial-news","tag-georgia39s-news","tag-iran39s-news","tag-kazakhstan39s-news","tag-oil-and-gas-news","tag-politics","tag-the-caspian-sea","tag-the-cis-news","tag-turkey39s-news","tag-turkmenistan39s-news","tag-uk","tag-united-kingdom","tag-uzbekistan39s-news","tag-world-news"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@UnitedKingdom\/116476108267405526","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23045","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=23045"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23045\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/23046"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=23045"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=23045"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=23045"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}