State and society <\/p>\n
From the 1880s a mounting sense of the limits of the liberal, regulative state became apparent. One reflection of this awareness was the increasing perception of national decline, relative to the increasing strength of other European countries and the United States<\/a>. This awareness was reinforced by British military<\/a> failures in the South African War<\/a> (Boer War) of 1899\u20131902, a \u201cfree enterprise war\u201d in which free enterprise was found wanting. One consequence of this and other developments was the growth of movements aimed at \u201cnational efficiency\u201d as a means of establishing a more effective state machine. The recognition of social problems at home\u2014such as the \u201cdiscovery\u201d of urban poverty in 1880s in the assumed presence of plenty and increasing anxiety about the \u201clabour question\u201d\u2014also raised questions about the adequacy of the state in dealing with the mounting problems of an increasingly populous and complex society. Toward the end of the century, the possibility of a violent outcome in the increasingly intractable problem of Ireland<\/a> brought existing constitutional<\/a> methods into question. Behind much of this anxiety was a sense that the Third Reform Act of 1884 (see Reform Bill<\/a>) and changes in local government were precipitating a much more democratic polity, for which the classical liberal state had no easy answers. The example of what was called at the time municipal socialism, especially as it existed in Birmingham<\/a> under the direction of its mayor, Joseph Chamberlain<\/a> (1873\u201376), indicated what the local state could accomplish. Instead of the old \u201cnatural order\u201d religion that had underpinned the state previously, different currents of thought emerged that saw the state and community<\/a> as necessary for individual self-realization. German idealism<\/a>, socialism<\/a>, and new liberalism<\/a> (see libertarianism<\/a>) all encompassed<\/a> different ways of rethinking the state.<\/p>\n This rethinking revolved around the belief that the operation of the state must incorporate consideration of the collective<\/a> characteristics of society\u2014that is, solidarity, interdependence, and common identity\u2014in a much more direct way than hitherto. Indeed, the idea of the \u201csocial\u201d came to characterize the entire period and even much later eras. Notions of a distinct social sphere, separate from the economic and political realms, had emerged much earlier, based upon the idea that the characteristics of this social realm were evident in the biological, vital characteristics of populations, so that society was very often understood in organic terms. The influence of Malthus<\/a> in the early 19th century and Darwin<\/a> in the mid-19th century contributed powerfully to this worldview, giving rise to late 19th-century representations of society in the strongly biological terms of \u201csocial eugenics<\/a>\u201d and other variations of \u201cracial\u201d thought, such as the idea of the \u201cdegeneration\u201d of the working class. From about the turn of the 20th century, the concept of the social realm as autonomous<\/a> developed alongside and partly incorporated older understandings. The social question became a sociological question, as indeed it has remained until very recently in British history. Society was now understood, unlike in earlier times, to work according to its own laws and to be divorced from moral<\/a> questions, although, in practice, political interventions were invariably designed to change moral behaviour.<\/p>\n One major result of this questioning of the state and of new conceptions<\/a> of society was the extensive social legislation of the Liberal administrations after 1905, which is widely seen as the foundation of the 20th-century welfare state<\/a>. The new Liberal government embarked upon a program of social legislation that involved free school<\/a> meals (1905), a school medical service (1907), and the Children\u2019s Act (1908). The Old Age Pensions Act (1908) granted pensions under prescribed conditions to people over age 70, and in 1908 the miners were given a statutory working day of eight hours. In 1909 trade boards were set up to fix wages in designated industries in which there was little or no trade union<\/a> strength, and labour exchanges were created to try to reduce unemployment. In 1911 the National Insurance<\/a> Act was passed, whereby the state and employers supplemented employees\u2019 contributions towards protection against unemployment and ill health. This act clearly represented a departure from the manner in which government had been carried out, as it began to be executed in supposed accordance with the social characteristics of the governed (age, family circumstances, gender, labour). Under this new dispensation, individual rights, as well as the rights of families<\/a>, were secured not by individual economic action but by state action and by the provision of pensions and benefits. These new rights were secured as social rights, so that individual rights were connected to a web of obligations, rights, and solidarities extending across the individual\u2019s life, across the lives of all individuals in a population, and between individuals across generations\u2014in short, a network of relations that was in fact one early version of society as a sui generis entity.<\/p>\n However, much of this new relationship of state and society was still recognizably liberal in the older sense, constituting<\/a> a compact of social and individual responsibility. At the heart of this compact was the belief that it was necessary to safeguard the individual from the unfettered operation of the free market<\/a>, while at the same time making sure that there must be an obligation to obtain gainful employment. Contributory pension schemes required individuals to make regular payments into them rather than providing social insurance<\/a> from general taxation. The National Insurance Act provided a framework within which workers were to practice self-help, and, although involvement was mandatory, the administration of the legislation was largely through voluntary<\/a> institutions. David Lloyd George<\/a>, who did most to push the legislation through, himself combined these characteristics of old and new liberalism<\/a>. At the same time, in practice this new formula of government emerged in a very piecemeal and haphazard way, often driven by the circumstances of the moment, not least the circumstances of party politics. Moreover, the circumstances of war were of overwhelming importance. It was World War I<\/a> in particular that fostered the idea of the increased importance of the interventionist, collectivist state. The demands of winning the war required an unparalleled intervention in a running of the economy and in the operations of social life, particularly when the radical Liberal Lloyd George<\/a> took power in 1916. Perhaps the most important factor legitimizing the increased role of the state was conscription in the armed services, and the most important general outcome was the idea that \u201cplanning\u201d (understood in many different ways) was from this point forward a fully legitimate<\/a> part of governmental enterprise. Nonetheless, despite the piecemeal nature of the change, what is striking is how this understanding of the relationship between state and society obtained across the whole political spectrum<\/a> and how it lasted so long. This increased role of the state was accompanied, after World War I, by the increasing specialization and professionalization of an expanding civil service<\/a>.<\/p>\n The political situation Gladstone and Chamberlain <\/p>\n Gladstone\u2019s second administration (1880\u201385) did not live up to the promise of its election victory. Indeed, in terms of political logic, it seemed likely in 1880 that the Gladstonian Liberal Party would eventually split into Whig and radical components, the latter to be led by Joseph Chamberlain. This development was already foreshadowed in the cabinet that Gladstone assembled, which was neither socially uniform nor politically united. Eight of the 11 members were Whigs, but one of the other three\u2014Chamberlain\u2014represented a new and aggressive urban radicalism, less interested in orthodox statements of liberal individualism<\/a> than in the uncertain aspiration<\/a> and striving of the different elements in the mass electorate. At the opposite end of the spectrum from Chamberlain\u2019s municipal socialism were the Whigs, the largest group in the cabinet but the smallest group in the country<\/a>. Many of them were already abandoning the Liberal Party; all of them were nervous about the kind of radical program that Chamberlain and the newly founded National Liberal Federation (1877) were advocating and about the kind of caucus-based party organization that Chamberlain favoured locally and nationally. For the moment, however, Gladstone was the man of the hour, and Chamberlain himself conceded<\/a> that he was indispensable.<\/p>\n The government carried out a number of important reforms culminating in the Third Reform Act<\/a> of 1884 and the Redistribution Act<\/a> of 1885. The former continued the trend toward universal male suffrage<\/a> by giving the vote to agricultural labourers, thereby tripling the electorate, and the latter robbed 79 towns with populations under 15,000 of their separate representation. For the first time the franchise reforms ignored the traditional claims of property and wealth and rested firmly on the democratic principle that the vote ought to be given to people as a matter of right, not of expediency.<\/p>\n The most difficult problems continued to arise in relation to foreign affairs and, above all, to Ireland. When in 1881 the Boers defeated the British at Majuba Hill and Gladstone abandoned the attempt to hold the Transvaal<\/a>, there was considerable public criticism<\/a>. And in the same year, when he agreed to the bombardment of Alexandria in a successful effort to break a nationalist revolt in Egypt<\/a>, he lost the support of the aged radical John Bright<\/a>. In 1882 Egypt was occupied, thereby adding, against Gladstone\u2019s own inclinations, to British imperial commitments. A rebellion in the Sudan<\/a> in 1885 led to the massacre of Gen. Charles Gordon<\/a> and his garrison at Khartoum<\/a> (see Siege of Khartoum<\/a>) two days before the arrival of a mission to relieve him. Large numbers of Englishmen held Gladstone personally responsible, and in June 1885 he resigned after a defeat on an amendment<\/a> to the budget.<\/p>\n The Irish<\/a> question <\/p>\n The Irish question loomed ominously as soon as Parliament<\/a> assembled in 1880, for there was now an Irish nationalist group of more than 60 members led by Charles Stewart Parnell<\/a>, most of them committed to Irish Home Rule<\/a>; in Ireland itself, the Land League<\/a>, founded in 1879, was struggling to destroy the power of the landlord. Parnell embarked on a program of agrarian agitation in 1881, at the same time that his followers at Westminster were engaged in various kinds of parliamentary obstructionism. Gladstone\u2019s response was the Irish Land Act<\/a>, based on guaranteeing \u201cthree fs\u201d\u2014fair rents, fixity of tenure<\/a>, and free sale\u2014and a tightening up of the rules of closure in parliamentary debate. The Land Act did not go far enough to satisfy Parnell, who continued to make speeches couched in violent language, and, after a coercion act was passed by Parliament in the face of Irish obstructionism, he was arrested. Parnell was released in April 1882, however, after an understanding had been reached that he would abandon the land war and the government would abandon coercion. Lord Frederick Charles Cavendish<\/a>, a close friend of Gladstone and the brother of the Whig leader, Lord Spencer Hartington<\/a>, was sent to Dublin as chief secretary on a mission of peace, but the whole policy was undermined when Cavendish, along with the permanent undersecretary, was murdered in Phoenix Park<\/a>, Dublin, within a few hours of landing in Ireland.<\/p>\n Between 1881 and 1885 Gladstone coupled a somewhat stiffer policy in Ireland with minor measures of reform, but in 1885, when the Conservatives<\/a> returned to power under Robert Arthur Salisbury<\/a>, the Irish question forced itself to the forefront again. Henry Herbert, earl of Carnarvon<\/a>, the new lord lieutenant of Ireland, was a convert to Home Rule and followed a more liberal policy than his predecessor. In the subsequent general election of November 1885, Parnell secured every Irish seat but one outside Ulster and urged Irish voters in British constituencies\u2014a large group mostly concentrated in a limited number of places such as Lancashire<\/a> and Clydeside\u2014to vote Conservative<\/a>. The result of the election was a Liberal majority of 86 over the Conservatives, which was almost exactly equivalent to the number of seats held by the Irish group, who thus controlled the balance of power<\/a> in Parliament. The Conservatives stayed in office, but when in December 1885 the newspapers reported a confidential<\/a> interview with Gladstone\u2019s son, in which he had stated (rightly) that his father had been converted to Home Rule, Salisbury<\/a> made it clear that he himself was not a convert, and Carnarvon<\/a> resigned. All Conservative contacts with Parnell ceased, and a few weeks later, in January 1886, after the Conservatives had been defeated in Parliament on a radical amendment for agrarian reform<\/a>, Salisbury, lacking continued Irish support, resigned and Gladstone returned to power.<\/p>\n Split of the Liberal Party <\/p>\n Gladstone\u2019s conversion had been gradual but profound, and it had more far-reaching political consequences for Britain than for Ireland. It immediately alienated<\/a> him further from most of the Whigs and from a considerable number of radicals led by Chamberlain<\/a>. He had hoped at first that Home Rule would be carried by an agreement between the parties, but Salisbury had no intention of imitating Peel<\/a>. Gladstone made his intentions clear by appointing John Morley<\/a>, a Home Rule advocate, as Irish secretary, and in April 1886 he introduced a Home Rule bill. The Liberals remained divided, and 93 of them united with the Conservatives to defeat the measure. Gladstone appealed to the country and was decisively beaten in the general election, in which 316 Conservatives were returned to Westminster along with 78 Liberal<\/a> Unionists, the new name chosen by those Liberals who refused to back Home Rule<\/a>. The Liberals mustered only 191 seats, and there were 85 Irish nationalists. Whigs<\/a> and radicals, who had often seemed likely to split Gladstone\u2019s 1880 government on left-right lines, were now united against the Gladstonians, and all attempts at Liberal reunion failed.<\/p>\n Chamberlain, the astute<\/a> radical leader, like many others of his class and generation, ceased to regard social reform as a top priority and worked in harness with Hartington<\/a>, his Whig counterpart. In 1895 they both joined a Salisbury<\/a> government. The Liberals were, in effect, pushed into the wilderness, although they held office briefly and unhappily from 1892 to 1895. Gladstone, 82 years old when he formed his last government, actually succeeded in carrying a Home Rule bill in the Commons<\/a> in 1893, with the help of Irish votes (Parnell\u2019s power had been broken as a result of a divorce case in 1890, and he died in 1891), but the bill was thrown out by the Lords. He resigned in 1894, to be succeeded by Archibald Primrose, earl of Rosebery<\/a>, who further split the party; in the general election of 1895, the Conservatives could claim that they were the genuinely popular party, backed by the urban as well as the rural electorate. Although Salisbury usually stressed the defensive aspects of Conservatism<\/a>, both at home and abroad, Chamberlain and his supporters were able to mobilize considerable working-class as well as middle-class support for a policy of crusading imperialism<\/a>.<\/p>\n Imperialism and British<\/a> politics <\/p>\n Imperialism was the key word of the 1890s, just as Home Rule<\/a> had been in the critical decade of the 1880s, and the cause of empire was associated not merely with the economic interests of businessmen looking for materials and markets and the enthusiasm of crowds excited by the adventure of empire but also with the traditional lustre of the crown. Disraeli had emphasized the last of these associations, just as Chamberlain emphasized the first. In the middle years of the century it had been widely held that colonies<\/a> were burdens and that materials and markets were most effectively acquired through trade. Thus, an \u201cinformal empire\u201d had been created that was as much dependent on Britain as the formal empire was. Nonetheless, even during these years, as a result of pressure from the periphery<\/a>, the process of establishing protectorates or of acquiring colonies had never halted, despite a number of colonial crises and small colonial wars in Africa<\/a>, Asia<\/a>, and the Pacific. Most of the new acquisitions were located in tropical areas of the world and were populated mainly by non-Europeans.<\/p>\n There were further crises during the 1880s and \u201990s, when the Liberals were divided on both tactics and objectives, and public opinion<\/a> was stirred. When Chamberlain chose to take over the Colonial Office in 1895, he was acknowledging the opportunities, both economic and political, afforded by a vast<\/a> \u201cundeveloped estate.\u201d The same radical energies that he had once devoted to civic improvement were now directed toward imperial problems. The argument about empire assumed an increasingly popular dimension. Boys\u2019 books<\/a> and magazines<\/a>, for example, focused on the adventure of empire and the courage and sense of duty of empire builders, and textbooks often taught the same lessons. So also did the popular press. In consequence, the language of imperialism<\/a> changed.<\/p>\n However, it was difficult to pull the empire together politically or constitutionally. Certainly, moving toward federation was a challenging task since the interests of different parts were already diverging, and in the last resort only British power\u2014above all, sea power<\/a>\u2014held the empire together. The processes of imperial<\/a> expansion were always complex, and there was neither one dominant theory of empire nor one single explanation of why it grew. Colonies that were dominated by people of British descent, such as Canada<\/a> or New Zealand<\/a> and the states of Australia<\/a>, had been given substantial powers of self-government since the Durham<\/a> Report of 1839 and the Canada Union Act of 1840. Yet India<\/a>, \u201cthe brightest jewel in the British crown,\u201d was held not by consent but by conquest. The Indian Mutiny<\/a> of 1857\u201358 was suppressed, and a year later the East India Company<\/a> was abolished and the new title of viceroy was instituted. Imperial control was tightened too, through the construction of a network of railways. Thomas Macaulay<\/a>\u2019s dream that India would one day be free and that such a day would be the happiest in British history seemed to have receded, although the nationalist movement that emerged after the first Indian National Congress<\/a> in 1885 was eventually to gain in strength. Meanwhile, given the strategic importance of India to the military establishment, attempts were made to justify British rule in terms of benefits of law and order that were said to accrue<\/a> to Indians. \u201cThe white man\u2019s burden,\u201d as the writer and poet Rudyard Kipling<\/a> saw it, was a burden of responsibility.<\/p>\n It was difficult for the British voter to understand or to appreciate this network of motives and interests. Chamberlain himself was always far less interested in India than in the \u201ckith-and-kin dominions\u201d (populated primarily by those of British descent) and in the new tropical empire that was greatly extended in area between 1884 and 1896, when 2.5 million square miles (6.5 million square km) of territory fell under British control. Even he did not fully understand either the rival aspirations<\/a> of different dominions or the relationship between economic development in the \u201cformal\u201d empire and trade and investment in the \u201cinformal\u201d empire where the British flag did not fly.<\/p>\n Queen<\/a> Victoria<\/a>\u2019s jubilees in 1887 and 1897 involved both imperial pageantry and imperial conferences, but, between 1896 and 1902, public interest in problems of empire was intensified not so much by pageantry as by crisis. British-Boer relations in South Africa<\/a>, always tense, were further worsened after the Jameson raid of December 1895, and, in October 1899, war<\/a> began. The early stages of the struggle were favourable to the Boers, and it was not until spring 1900 that superior British equipment began to count. British troops entered Pretoria in June 1900 and Paul Kruger<\/a>, the Boer president, fled to Europe<\/a>, where most governments had given him moral support against the British. Thereafter, the Boers employed guerrilla tactics, and the war did not end until May 1902. It was the most expensive of all the 19th-century \u201clittle wars,\u201d with the British employing 450,000 troops, of whom 22,000 never returned. Just as the Crimean War<\/a> had focused attention on \u201cmismanagement,\u201d so the South African (Boer) War led to demands not only for greater \u201cefficiency\u201d but also for more enlightened<\/a> social policies in relation to health and education.<\/p>\n While the war lasted, it emphasized the political differences within the Liberal Party<\/a> and consolidated Conservative-Liberal Unionist strength. The imperialism of the Liberal prime minister<\/a>, Lord Rosebery, was totally uncongenial to young pro-Boer Liberals like Lloyd George. A middle group of Liberals emerged, but it was not until after 1903 that party rifts were healed. The Unionists won the \u201ckhaki election\u201d of 1900 (which took its name from the uniforms of the British army<\/a>, a reflection of its occurrence in the middle of the war) and secured a new lease of power for nearly six years, but their unity<\/a> also was threatened after the Peace of Vereeniging<\/a>, which ended the war in May 1902. Salisbury retired in 1902, to be succeeded by his nephew, Arthur Balfour<\/a>, a brilliant man but a tortuous and insecure politician. There had been an even bigger break in January 1901 when the queen died, after a brief illness, at age 81. She had ruled for 64 years and her death seemed to mark not so much the end of a reign as the end of an age.<\/p>\n There were significant changes in terms of the impression organized labour<\/a> made on politics. Some of the new union leaders were confessed socialists<\/a>, anxious to use political as well as economic power to secure their objectives, and a number of socialist organizations emerged between 1880 and 1900\u2014all conscious, at least intermittently, that, whatever their differences, they were part of a \u201clabour movement.\u201d The Social Democratic<\/a> Federation, influenced by Marxism, was founded in 1884; however, it was never more than a tiny and increasingly sectarian organization. The Independent Labour Party<\/a>, founded in Bradford<\/a> in 1893, had a more general appeal, while the Fabian Society<\/a>, founded in 1883\u201384, included intellectuals<\/a> who were to play a large part in 20th-century labour politics. In February 1900 a labour representation conference was held in London<\/a> at which trade unionists and socialists agreed to found a committee (the Labour Representation Committee), with Ramsay MacDonald<\/a> as first secretary, to promote the return of Labour members to Parliament. This conference marked the beginning of the 20th-century Labour Party<\/a>, which, with Liberal support, won 29 seats in the general election of 1906. Although until 1914 the party at Westminster for the most part supported the Liberals, in 1909 it secured the allegiance<\/a> of the \u201cLib-Lab\u201d miners\u2019 members. Financially backed by the trade unions, it was eventually to take the place of the Liberal Party as the second party in the British state.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"State and society From the 1880s a mounting sense of the limits of the liberal, regulative state became…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":934,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[623,13,622,621,620,6],"class_list":{"0":"post-933","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-britain","8":"tag-article","9":"tag-britain","10":"tag-britannica","11":"tag-encyclopeadia","12":"tag-encyclopedia","13":"tag-united-kingdom"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/933","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=933"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/933\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/934"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=933"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=933"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/britain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=933"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}