The Arbitration Review of the Americas 2027 – Canada: rulings demonstrate judicial deference to arbitration

In summary

Canada is an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction with a strong legislative framework that promotes the use of arbitration and minimises judicial intervention. Canadian cities are respected seats of international arbitration, with able counsel and arbitrators situated where the rule of law is strong and supervised by an independent judiciary. This article provides an overview of international commercial arbitration in Canada and discusses developments in legislation across the country’s provinces, the implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law into provincial international commercial arbitration statutes and codes, the willingness of courts to recognise and uphold arbitration principles and recent notable developments in the case law.

Discussion pointsHistory of the implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law in CanadaBackground to the legislative framework for arbitration in Canada’s provincesList of arbitration groups and institutions throughout CanadaRecent Canadian case lawReferenced in this articleUNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial ArbitrationInFrontier AF LP v RahmaniAroma Franchise Company Inc v Aroma Espresso Bar Canada IncVento Motorcycles Inc v United Mexican StatesPeace River Hydro Partners v Petrowest CorpHusky Food Importers & Distributors Ltd v JH Whittaker & Sons LimitedSpark Event Rentals Ltd v Google LLCWilliams v Amazon.com Inc and Petty v Niantic Inc The United Mexican States v Gordon G BurrTehama Group Inc v Pythian Services Inc

International commercial arbitration in Canada operates under a well-developed legal framework designed to promote the use of arbitration and minimise judicial intervention. Canadian courts have consistently upheld the integrity of the arbitral process; recent case law has further established Canada as a leader in the development of reliable jurisprudence relating to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the Model Law) and the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) by giving broad deference to arbitral tribunals and supporting the rights of parties seeking to enforce international arbitral awards. Canadian courts have also been instrumental in supporting the arbitral process when necessary.

Legislative framework

UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law in 1985, and Canada and its provinces were the first jurisdictions in the world to enact legislation expressly implementing the Model Law. At the time, however, Canada’s provinces were not uniform in adopting the Model Law, and a number of provinces deviated from it in certain respects. The lack of complete uniformity among the provinces led to some discrepancies in how the courts addressed arbitration issues. Nevertheless, there was broad acceptance of international commercial arbitration as a valid alternative to the judicial process, and a high level of predictability for parties to international arbitrations in Canada and those seeking to enforce international awards in Canada.

In late 2011, a working group of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC) commenced a review of the existing model International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA) with a view to developing reform recommendations for a new model statute. Catalysed by the 2006 Model Law amendments, the review process also sought to reflect changes to international arbitration law and practice in the past three decades and to enhance the uniformity and predictability with which international commercial arbitral awards may be enforced in Canada. In 2014, the ULCC approved the working group’s final report, which included a proposed new uniform ICAA for implementation throughout Canada.

Among other things, the model statute adopts all of the 2006 Model Law amendments (except option II for article 7), including those that broaden the jurisdiction of courts and arbitral tribunals to order interim relief. The statute also establishes a 10-year limitation period to commence proceedings seeking recognition and enforcement in Canada of foreign international commercial arbitral awards. The model statute will become law as it is enacted by the various Canadian federal, provincial and territorial legislatures. In March 2017, Ontario was the first to adopt a new ICAA, adopting most of the ULCC’s recommendations in the proposed Uniform Act. In May 2018, British Columbia also amended its ICAA to incorporate the 2006 amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law in a manner consistent with the ULCC model statute. In April 2019, the Alberta Law Reform Institute recommended that Alberta adopt the model statute, but the province has not yet amended its ICAA. In 2023, Prince Edward Island implemented similar amendments to its ICAA.

An arbitration-friendly jurisdiction

The Model Law and the New York Convention provide narrow grounds for judicial intervention in international commercial disputes that are subject to arbitration agreements. Canadian courts have consistently expressed their approval of these principles and frequently defer to arbitral tribunals for determinations regarding the tribunal’s own jurisdiction and complex issues of fact and law. For example, in discussing the governing principles of the Model Law, one Canadian court stated that:

The purpose of the United Nations Conventions and legislation adopting them is to ensure that the method of resolving disputes in the forum and according to the rules chosen by parties, is respected. Canadian courts have recognized that predictability in the enforcement of dispute resolution provisions is an indispensable precondition to any international business transaction and facilitates and encourages the pursuit of freer trade on an international scale.

Courts across Canada have echoed these sentiments, consistently applying the competence–competence principle, showing broad deference to the decisions of arbitral tribunals and narrowly interpreting the grounds for setting aside arbitral awards. In addition, some provinces have explicitly accepted that international arbitral awards are akin to foreign judgments, providing parties with jurisdictional advantages and longer limitation periods for enforcing their award.

The integrity of the international commercial arbitration process has been further endorsed in recognition and enforcement proceedings. When faced with challenges to the recognition of foreign awards, Canadian courts have consistently emphasised the mandatory nature of the enforcement provisions in the Model Law. Similarly, article V of the New York Convention, which sets out the limited grounds on which enforcement may be refused, is narrowly interpreted, and arbitral debtors have the burden of proving any allegation of injustice or impropriety that could render an award unenforceable.

Widespread support for international commercial arbitration in Canada has also led to the establishment of a number of arbitration groups and institutions, including the Western Canada Commercial Arbitration Society, the Toronto Commercial Arbitration Society, the Vancouver Centre for Dispute Resolution and Vancouver Arbitration Chambers, Arbitration Place, the International Chamber of Commerce Canada Arbitration Committee, the Vancouver International Commercial Arbitration Centre (VanIAC, formerly the British Columbia International Arbitration Centre, which is one of the oldest modern arbitral institutions in the world, having been created in 1986), the ADR Institute of Canada, the International Centre for Dispute Resolution Canada and the Canadian Commercial Arbitration Centre. These organisations provide parties with a variety of useful resources and services, including sets of procedural rules, contact information for qualified arbitrators and meeting facilities. VanIAC has released updated International Arbitration Rules, reflecting international best practices, effective as of 1 July 2022.

Recent Canadian case law

The commitment of Canadian courts to the tenets of the Model Law and the New York Convention has been confirmed by recent case law. Significant recognition and enforcement decisions clearly demonstrate the Canadian judiciary’s respect for the integrity of the international arbitration process and the importance of deference to international arbitral tribunals. Some of these cases are summarised below.

InFrontier AF LP v Rahmani

The Ontario Court of Appeal’s recent decision in InFrontier AF LP v Rahmani involves a unique situation where the arbitral rules agreed to by the parties no longer existed by the time arbitration commenced and provides a good reminder about the importance of drafting arbitration agreements that address potential barriers to enforcement.

The chambers judge rejected Rahmani’s arguments for resisting the application. Rahmani appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the chambers judge had correctly considered the procedural rules agreed to by the parties. In particular, the Court found that the chambers judge was entitled to find that the parties had not agreed to a static set of procedural rules; rather, by referring to the DIFC-LCIA Rules, they had agreed to “such amended version of those rules” as adopted by the DIFC-LCIA Centre.

While the branches of article V 1(d) are mutually exclusive, the Court held that the law of the place of the arbitration can be considered under the first branch in some circumstances, including where the parties’ agreement about procedure makes the law of the place of arbitration relevant to the question of what rules the parties agreed to, as the Court found was the case here. Because the parties had agreed to the amended version of the DIFC-LCIA Rules that were in place at the time the arbitration was commenced, the chambers judge was entitled to take into account a decree passed by Dubai, a jurisdiction with authority over the institution that enacted the DIFC-LCIA Rules, to determine if an amendment had been effected.

The Court considered the second issue on appeal to be derivative of the first and found that it failed for the same reasons.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario has weighed in on the topic of arbitrator bias in two recent decisions, the first of which, Aroma Franchise Company Inc v Aroma Espresso Bar Canada Inc, reiterates the strong presumption of impartiality that applies to arbitrators, the backdrop against which the objective test for arbitrator bias must be applied.

In the court below, the applicants (Aroma Franchise) applied to set aside two international awards arising from a master franchise agreement (MFA) with the respondents (Aroma Espresso). Over a year after the arbitration had been initiated, the lead lawyer of the counsel team acting for Aroma Espresso asked the arbitrator to serve as the arbitrator in an arbitration that concerned a dispute between another client of the counsel’s firm and a third party. The arbitrator accepted the engagement without disclosing it to Aroma Franchise. The engagement subsequently came to the attention of Aroma Franchise after the Final Award in the Aroma arbitration had been released. Aroma Franchise asserted that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose that he had taken on the second appointment – on an unrelated matter with different parties while the Aroma arbitration was ongoing – gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

In reaching her decision that the circumstances required disclosure, there was a reasonable apprehension of bias and the arbitration awards should be set aside, the application judge relied on the fact that: (1) the MFA specified that the arbitrator appointed by the parties should have “no prior social, business or professional relationship with either party”; and (2) the parties exchanged “considerable correspondence” in which they expressed the importance of the selected arbitrator not having any professional or personal relationship with either party (none of which was provided to the arbitrator). She also applied the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (IBA Guidelines) to reach her decision.

Regarding the duty to disclose, the Court of Appeal observed that while the IBA Guidelines provide practical guidance about disclosure, they are not a legal standard. Article 12(1) of the Model Law (as incorporated into Ontario’s ICAA, 2017) imposes an objective test, which it found the application judge did not apply. An arbitrator must disclose “any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence” viewed from the perspective of a “fair-minded and informed observer”, not based on the subjective expectations of the parties, particularly if those expectations (like a desire for no prior relationship with counsel’s firm) were not clearly communicated to the arbitrator. Given that the two arbitrations involved completely different parties and unrelated issues, the Court of Appeal concluded that, objectively, the arbitrator was under no duty to disclose the second appointment.

On the issue of reasonable apprehension of bias, the Court of Appeal clarified that while a breach of a disclosure obligation is a relevant factor, it is not determinative of bias. The test for bias itself is also objective: whether a fair-minded and informed observer, considering all relevant circumstances objectively known, would conclude that the arbitrator would not decide fairly. The Court found that the mere acceptance of an unrelated appointment by the same counsel, in the absence of other factors (like a pattern of appointments suggesting financial dependence, which was not alleged here), did not, from an objective standpoint, create a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal’s decision reinforces a high threshold for setting aside awards on grounds of arbitrator bias or non-disclosure. This approach promotes the finality of arbitral awards and limits judicial intervention to cases where impartiality is genuinely and objectively compromised. As a result, the Court of Appeal reinstated the awards, subject to a remittance to the court below to address other grounds attacking the awards not related to bias.

In July 2025, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) dismissed the application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

In Vento Motorcycles Inc v Mexico, rendered only three months after Aroma, the Court of Appeal for Ontario again dealt with the issue of arbitrator bias. This time, the Court concluded that a finding of reasonable apprehension of bias in relation to one member of a three-member tribunal taints the decision of the entire panel such that it must be set aside.

In the underlying arbitration, Vento Motorcycles (Vento) brought an investment arbitration claim against the United Mexican States (Mexico) under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The claim was dismissed by a panel of three arbitrators. After the award was rendered, Vento learned of communications that took place during the arbitration between Mexican officials, including Mexico’s lead counsel in the arbitration, and Mexico’s party-appointed tribunal member. The communications included inviting the tribunal member to apply for Mexico to appoint him to future arbitration panels under different agreements and eventually appointing him to a roster of arbitrators.

Vento brought an application to the Superior Court of Ontario to set aside the award. The application judge found that the conduct of Mexico’s party-appointed arbitrator gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; however, she exercised her decision not to set aside the award on the basis that the apprehension of bias did not undermine the reliability of the tribunal’s unanimous award, nor did it result in real unfairness or practical injustice. The seriousness of the breach and the potential prejudice from redoing the arbitration were also cited as supporting the exercise of the application judge’s discretion not to set aside the award.

Vento appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. The Court held that the application judge had erred in law by failing to set aside the award once a reasonable apprehension of bias had been established. The Court emphasised in its decision that a reasonable apprehension of bias is “no minor procedural defect”; it constitutes a finding that the integrity and legitimacy of an adjudicative process have been compromised irreparably. Accordingly, the Court found that the bias of one tribunal member taints the whole tribunal and requires the decision to be set aside regardless of the unanimity of the panel. The Court acknowledged the importance of finality and efficiency in arbitration, but found that such considerations cannot override the fundamental right to a fair and impartial hearing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the award. In September 2025, the SCC dismissed the application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

In Peace River Hydro Partners v Petrowest Corp, Canada’s highest court, the SCC, emphasised the doctrine of separability’s purpose to affirm arbitration agreements and addressed the narrow fact-specific circumstances in which an arbitration agreement may be found inoperative in the context of federal bankruptcy legislation.

Within two years, Petrowest encountered financial difficulties, which resulted in the Alberta Court of King’s Bench appointing a receiver under Canada’s Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. Through that process, the receiver was authorised to, among other things, “initiate the prosecution of ‘any and all proceedings’ with respect to the debtors and their property”. In 2018, the receiver brought a civil claim against Peace River in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on behalf of Petrowest and its affiliates to collect funds allegedly owing to Petrowest under the parties’ subcontracting agreements. Peace River applied for a stay of the receiver’s claim under section 15 of British Columbia’s former Arbitration Act. The receiver opposed the application.

The chambers judge agreed with the receiver and dismissed the stay application. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia upheld the chambers judge’s ruling on the basis that the receiver was not a party to the arbitration agreements between Peace River and Petrowest within the meaning of section 15(1) of the former Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of separability permitted the receiver to disclaim the arbitration agreements and sue on the underlying contracts to recover payment for past performance. Peace River sought and was granted leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision to the SCC.

On the issue of separability, the SCC found that the Court of Appeal misapplied the doctrine. The SCC held that “separability is intended to safeguard arbitration agreements, not imperil them … [I]t is for a court … to determine whether an arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable according to the narrow statutory exceptions”.

In a narrow majority (five justices to four), the SCC held that the receiver had established the arbitration agreements were inoperative under section 15(2) on the basis that the arbitration agreements would impair the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act’s objective of an “orderly and efficient resolution of the receivership”. Accordingly, the SCC concluded that a stay in favour of arbitration could not be granted and the appeal was dismissed. The Court stressed that this was a highly fact-specific result, and while it may apply to other areas of law where public policy objectives override parties’ freedom of contract, “courts should generally hold parties to their agreements to arbitrate, even if one of them has become insolvent”.

Following the SCC’s decision in Peace River Hydro Partners v Petrowest, the Court of Appeal for Ontario was asked to determine whether the test for granting a stay application under Ontario’s ICAA was the same as for domestic arbitrations commenced under the Arbitration Act.

In 2014, Husky Food Importers & Distributors Ltd (Husky Food) and JH Whittaker & Sons Limited (JH Whittaker) entered into a distribution agreement that was both oral and written. Between 2016 and 2020, the parties attempted to negotiate a formal, long-term distribution agreement. The agreement was never signed. In the summer of 2020, Husky Food alleged that JH Whittaker wrongly diverted two shipments. Husky Food subsequently commenced an action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in June 2021. JH Whittaker applied to stay Husky Food’s action in favour of arbitration pursuant to section 9 of Ontario’s ICAA. Husky Food opposed the application on the basis that it had never agreed to arbitrate disputes that might arise under the parties’ distribution agreement.

The application judge held that JH Whittaker’s submissions were sufficient to establish that “looking at the language of the Alleged Distribution Agreement alone, the Arbitration Clause is not rendered inoperative by the other sections contained in it” and granted JH Whittaker’s stay application. Husky Food appealed the application judge’s decision to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. One of the grounds of appeal was that the application judge had applied the incorrect test for a stay application.

The Court of Appeal held that although the SCC’s framework for stay applications was “crafted in the context of domestic arbitration legislation”, it applies equally in respect of international commercial arbitration agreements. The four technical prerequisites are: (1) an arbitration agreement exists; (2) court proceedings have been commenced by a party to the arbitration agreement; (3) the court proceedings are in respect of a matter that the parties agreed to submit to arbitration; and (4) the party applying for a stay in favour of arbitration does so before taking any “step” in the court proceedings. The Court of Appeal held that the application judge applied the correct “arguable case” standard to establish the technical prerequisites for a mandatory stay and accordingly dismissed Husky Food’s appeal.

The Court of Appeal for British Columbia’s decision in Spark Event Rentals Ltd v Google reaffirms the commitment of Canadian courts to the competence-competence principle.

In Spark, Spark Event Rentals Ltd (Spark) started a class action against Google LLC (Google) and other defendants, alleging that Google had engaged in a conspiracy with Apple that caused the price Spark paid for Google ads to be higher than it otherwise would have been. The agreements Spark entered into with Google for the ad services contained a mandatory arbitration clause.

Google applied to the Supreme Court of British Columbia to stay the class action in favour of arbitration under section 8 of BC’s ICAA, which requires BC courts to grant stays in favour of arbitration unless the arbitration agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”. Spark opposed the application on the basis that the arbitration agreement in the agreements was void because it was unconscionable or contrary to public policy.

The application judge considered the two challenges Spark raised to the arbitration process: (1) the agreement prohibited Spark from initiating arbitration; and (2) requiring the action to be resolved in arbitration (rather than a class action) would be cost-prohibitive. On the first issue, the application judge found that Spark had not established a reasonable prospect that it did not have the ability to initiate arbitration. On the second issue, the application judge agreed with Google that the arbitrator(s) appointed to hear the dispute were best positioned to determine whether the dispute could be resolved through arbitration and none of the exceptions to the competence-competence principle applied to justify the court deciding the validity of the arbitration clause.

The application judge granted Google’s application to stay in favour of arbitration, a decision that was upheld by the Court of Appeal on appeal. Spark’s application to the SCC was dismissed.

The Ontario courts reached a different result in Lochan v Binance Holdings Limited, another decision involving an application to stay a proposed class action in favour of arbitration rendered six months after Spark. The facts in Lochan differed significantly from Spark. In particular, the proposed class in Lochan was comprised of small-scale Canadian crypto investors on the cryptocurrency platform, Binance; Binance prompted investors to open accounts in “under 30 seconds” despite the agreement, which included an arbitration clause, being roughly 50 pages; and the seat of the arbitration was in Europe or Asia. Accordingly, the Superior Court of Ontario refused Binance’s application to stay the class action in favour of arbitration, finding that a limited exception to the competence-competence principle applied: there was a very real possibility that the challenge to the validity of the arbitration clause would never be resolved if referred to the arbitral tribunal. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal for British Columbia’s companion decisions in Williams v Amazon.com Inc and Petty v Niantic Inc confirmed that arbitration agreements in standard form contracts of adhesion in the consumer context will generally be enforceable if they are not unconscionable or contrary to public policy.

The plaintiffs in both cases had each entered into standard form consumer contracts that contained arbitration agreements and commenced proposed class actions. The defendants, Amazon.com Inc (Amazon) and Niantic Inc (Niantic), applied to stay the proceedings in favour of arbitration, with the exception of the relief sought by each of the plaintiffs under the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act (BPCPA). The application in Williams was brought under section 15 of British Columbia’s then-applicable domestic Arbitration Act. The application in Petty was brought under section 8 of British Columbia’s ICAA.

The application judges in both cases dismissed the plaintiffs’ respective arguments that the arbitration agreements were void on grounds of unconscionability or public policy and found that the prerequisites for a stay in favour of arbitration had been established. A partial stay of the proceedings was ordered. As noted above, the consumer claims under the BPCPA were not stayed. Both plaintiffs appealed.

The main issue on both appeals was whether the application judge erred in not finding the arbitration agreements void because of unconscionability or public policy concerns. Parties in both cases relied on the SCC’s decision in Uber Technologies Inc v Heller, in which a majority of the SCC found an international arbitration clause in a contract of adhesion in the employment context where there was significant unfairness and inequality of bargaining power between the parties, invalid on the basis of unconscionability and, in concurring reasons, against public policy.

The Court of Appeal in Williams and Petty distinguished Uber. In particular, the Court highlighted the “profoundly different situation” of the non-dependent consumer plaintiffs in Williams (and Petty) as compared with the plaintiff’s “vulnerable and difficult circumstances” in Uber.

While the Court in both cases recognised that there was an inequality of bargaining power between the parties, it did not consider that to be determinative. As the Court noted in Williams, inequality of bargaining power is just one factor in the unconscionability analysis (which requires a finding of inequality of bargaining power and a resultant improvident bargain) and public policy analysis (a multi-factorial analysis that overlaps with the unconscionability analysis). Among the features of the arbitration agreement that weighed in favour of the Court finding that there was no improvident bargain were the fact that although the filing fee of US$200 was twice as much as the appellant’s claim, it was refundable, and the fact that the arbitration could be conducted by telephone, based on written submissions, or in person in the country where the consumer lives.

The Court in Williams and Petty also declined to find that either agreement was contrary to public policy. Among the relevant factors the Court considered in its analysis was the fact that the arbitration agreement had been tailored, including by giving the consumer the option to elect to pursue a small claims action in British Columbia (for claims up to C$35,000 (US$25,000 in value) instead of an arbitration, and exempting claims involving the misuse of intellectual property from the requirement to arbitrate. In the course of its analysis, the Court also distinguished the case before it from other cases that had applied Uber in a non-arbitration context.

Both appeals were dismissed. The application to the SCC for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in the Williams decision was dismissed with costs.

Around the same time the Williams and Petty decisions were released, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld a stay in favour of arbitration in another proposed consumer class action, Difederico v Amazon Inc. All three of these decisions confirm that, absent legislative intervention, Canadian courts will generally uphold mandatory arbitration even in contracts of adhesion.

Two recent decisions out of Ontario reaffirm the high bar for setting aside arbitral awards in Canada. In The United Mexican States v Gordon G. Burr, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice confirmed that setting aside an arbitral award requires much more than “routine” procedural issues.

The Court confirmed that the onus on an applicant to set aside an international arbitral award under the Model Law for procedural unfairness is high and that intervention will be warranted only when the tribunal’s conduct is so serious it cannot be condoned or where the impugned decision offends “our most basic notions of morality and justice”.

On the first issue regarding “key” documents, the Court found that the question before it was whether the tribunal’s decision not to order production of the documents unfairly precluded Mexico’s ability to present its case fully and fairly. The Court held that there was considerable evidence that the process and proceedings of the tribunal were comprehensive and provided ample opportunity for the parties to fully present their respective cases such that nothing arose “anywhere near the level of offending basic notions of morality and justice.”

On the second issue, the Court found there was no merit to Mexico’s argument that the tribunal had failed to address each argument individually. In reaching this decision, the Court referred to well-established case law that a failure to expressly refer to each argument made by the parties is not a ground under the Model Law to set aside an award.

The Court dismissed Mexico’s application, with costs to the Respondents.

In the second case, Tehama Group Inc v Pythian Services Inc, the Court of Appeal for Ontario confirmed that the absence of certain procedural steps will not justify setting aside an arbitral award so long as the procedure followed was consistent with the parties’ agreement.

The parties engaged PwC pursuant to an engagement letter that circumscribed the scope of the services provided by the arbitrator, including that PwC would only provide determinations from a financial accounting perspective, and set out the timelines for the arbitration, including that there would be no cross-examination of either party’s witnesses and no right of sur-reply for either party.

The arbitration proceeded and the arbitrator concluded that the threshold for the purchase price adjustment had not been met such that Tehama was not entitled to any additional post-closing payment.

Tehama applied to the Court to set aside the award under article 34 of the Model Law on the basis that the process followed by the arbitrator had been contrary to the parties’ agreement or violated the principles of natural justice. In particular, Tehama complained about not being given an opportunity to respond to sworn testimony.

As in The United Mexican States v Gordon G Burr, the chambers judge emphasised the high onus on the applicant seeking to set aside an arbitral award and concluded that the arbitrator had followed the procedure agreed upon by the parties and that there had been no breach of natural justice.

The chambers judge dismissed Tehama’s application. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.